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Generating power with nuclear energy accumulates radioactive spent nuclear fuel, 
anticipated not to be diversified into any unknown purposes. Nuclear safeguards include 
bookkeeping of nuclear fuel inventories, frequent checking, and monitoring to confirm 
nuclear non-proliferation. Permanent isolation of radionuclides from biosphere by 
disposal challenges established practices, as opportunities for monitoring of individual 
fuel assemblies ceases. Different concepts for treatment and geological disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel exist. Spent nuclear fuel disposal facility is under construction in Olkiluoto 
in Southwest Finland. Posiva Oy has carried out multidisciplinary bedrock 
characterization of crystalline bedrock for siting and design of the facility. Site 
description involved compilation of geological models from investigations at surface 
level, from drillholes and from underground rock characterization facility ONKALO. 
Research focused on long term safety case (performance) of engineered and natural 
barriers in purpose to minimize risks of radionuclide release.  
Nuclear safeguards include several concepts. Containment and surveillance (C/S) are 
tracking presence of nuclear fuel through manufacturing, energy generation, cooling, 
transfer, and encapsulation. Continuity of knowledge (CoK) ensures traceability and 
non-diversion. Design information provided by the operator to the state and European 
Commission (Euratom), and further to IAEA describes spent nuclear fuel handling in the 
facility. Design information verification (DIV) using timely or unannounced inspections, 
provide credible assurance on absence of any ongoing undeclared activities within the 
disposal facility. Safeguards by design provide information applicable for the planning of 
safeguards measures, e.g., surveillance during operation of disposal facility. Probability 
of detection of an attempt to any undeclared intrusion into the repository containment 
needs to be high. Detection of such preparations after site closure would require long 
term monitoring or repeated geophysical measurements within or at proximity of the 
repository. Bedrock imaging (remote sensing, geophysical surveys) would serve for 
verifying declarations where applicable, or for characterization of surrounding rock 
mass to detect undeclared activities. ASTOR working group has considered ground 
penetrating radar (GPR) for DIV in underground constructed premises during operation. 
Seismic reflection survey and electrical or electromagnetic imaging may also apply.  
This report summarizes geophysical methods used in Olkiluoto, and some recent 
development, from which findings could be applied also for nuclear safeguards. In this 
report the geophysical source fields, involved physical properties, range of detection, 
resolution, survey geometries, and timing of measurements are reviewed for different 
survey methods. Useful interpretation of geophysical data may rely on comparison of 
results to declared repository layout, since independent understanding of the results 
may not be successful. Monitoring provided by an operator may enable alarm and 
localization of an undeclared activity in a cost-effective manner until closure of the site. 
Direct detection of constructed spaces, though possible, might require repeated effort, 
have difficulties to provide spatial coverage, and involve false positive alarms still 
requiring further inspection. 
Key words: spent nuclear fuel, disposal, nuclear safeguards, non-proliferation, 
containment, surveillance, design information verification, geophysical survey. 
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Detailed site investigations are needed to demonstrate the suitability of the site to be 
selected for a geological repository to dispose of spent nuclear fuel. The hydraulic 
impermeability of the hosting geological formation surrounding the repository is 
essential for the safety case. The impermeability may be jeopardized by inhomogeneities 
in the rock mass and in case of igneous rock by fractured zones with may have long 
extensions. While developing the site-specific geological repository for spent nuclear 
fuel, the performance of rock mass and engineered systems as containment and isolation 
barriers are to be considered during planning, design, construction, operating and 
closing of the repository.  
The designers and rock engineering of a repository need site characterization data from 
different geophysical surveys, pilot drillholes ahead of tunnel front with related 
geophysical, geological, and hydrogeological investigations, and monitoring. Geophysical 
methods have developed and focused on the site-specific scientific and technical needs. 
Their role in safeguards have been under discussion during the development of IAEA 
safeguards approaches for geological disposal to detect undeclared activities. 
Geophysical methods have been proposed as design information verification measures 
as the rock engineering needs the understanding of the host geology and its 
impermeability. The exploratory works can provide sets of safeguards-relevant 
information, but in practice only the engineered underground constructions cannot be 
accessed to be verified. The other application is related to containment and surveillance, 
i.e., detection of human intrusion. For this purpose, the extension of the containment 
should be clearly defined. During the operational time of a repository, this rock volume 
cannot be pre-defined. In addition, monitoring of the site conditions gives assurance 
about the natural responses of the formation and should detect unknown and unwanted 
phenomena in the vicinity of the repository. The Additional Protocol was introduced for 
this purpose to exclude undeclared activities, but it does not include the application of 
geophysical techniques. However, the public research for safety case and rock 
engineering supports the same safeguards mission to have credible understanding about 
the absence of undeclared activities at a geological repository.  
In Finland, Posiva Oy has carried out multidisciplinary bedrock characterization for 
siting and design of the repository at Olkiluoto, focusing long term safety case in purpose 
to minimize risks of radionuclide release into natural environment. During site 
characterization and site selection in Finland, set of information was gathered which is 
having safeguards-relevancy in understanding site properties and providing baseline. 
International regulatory expert group has timely reviewed uncertainty of geological 
data, the interpretations, and expert judgements during the site investigations. These 
findings support also the safeguards needs to have timely conclusion about the absence 
of undeclared activities during the 30 years of investigations beginning from the first 
boreholes drilled at the Olkiluoto site. The excavation of the underground galleries 
began after more than 15 years of site characterisation work. The Continuity-of-
Knowledge must cover the safeguards-relevant information during whole lifetime the 
repository. 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Report #2008207 4 (128) 
   
Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation   




In this report, the current understanding of the applicability of geophysical techniques 
for safeguards purposes is analysed. The report is prepared by the site investigation 
specialist Eero Heikkinen at the AFRY company. The focus is on the resolution and 
detection capabilities of the active electromagnetic, electric, and seismic sounding and 
corresponding passive monitoring at the Olkiluoto site. The report is based on literature 
reviews including safeguards-related research also at other geological sites and 
circumstances. The above-described fluctuation in definitions and safeguards 
terminology is affecting the review work since most of the figures and their captures are 
copied from earlier publications. Many of those are presented at the SAGOR or ASTOR 
group meetings supporting the IAEA to develop methodologies to safeguard geological 
Repositories since 1989. The originality is in the updates in technological details based 
on recent geophysical surveys at repository sites and analysis of cost-effectiveness made 
for STUK. At STUK this work was supervised by Olli Okko. 
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Electricity production using nuclear power involves radioactive materials. Production 
accumulates spent nuclear fuel. Various concepts for spent fuel treatment and storage 
are considered. Disposal of spent nuclear fuel aims to permanent isolation of 
radionuclides from biosphere. Isolation systems should preferably be passive, thus 
rendering extensive monitoring systems for nuclear safety unnecessary (IAEA 2011). 
In the KBS-3 concept, spent fuel assemblies as such are planned to be encapsulated in 
steel reinforced canisters made of copper (KBS-3), or stainless-steel canisters and placed 
into disposal wells or tunnels. Other types of handling and processes can apply for 
processed spent fuel. 
Geological disposal concepts are proposed to be tailored for diverse types of geological 
formations. Considerations exist for sedimentary salt or claystone formation, or 
metamorphic or granitic crystalline bedrock. Construction method can vary from drill 
and blast to full face boring, or a deep borehole. A relative difficulty in implementing 
safeguards in geological disposal has been recognized (Richter 2004, DeMuth 2014).  
Major task in safety case is isolation of spent fuel from groundwater flow, which could 
provide release path for radionuclides. Emplacement of canisters may take place in 
vertical wells in tunnels (KBS-3V) or along horizontal tunnels (KBS-3H or equal). 
Typically, water absorbing bentonite clay backfill is designed to buffer the hydraulic 
interaction between the fuel and surrounding rock mass. Portals to disposal tunnels are 
designed to be plugged, and tunnels and shafts finally backfilled to suppress hydraulic 
transport routes, and simultaneously to prevent intrusion into repository. 
1.1 Nuclear safeguards to geological disposal 
According to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, 1968), IAEA seeks to prevent or 
detect diversion of significant quantity of civil stocks of uranium and plutonium to 
contribute to any unknown purposes. Nuclear safeguards consider non-proliferation of 
nuclear materials. Measures include timely physical inventory verification, frequent 
inspections and containment and surveillance (C/S). These aim to increase probability of 
early detection and this way to deter any diversion. 
In geological disposal, the spent fuel cannot be verified using traditional safeguards 
measures (IAEA 1998, Okko et al. 2018). Uninterrupted monitoring of individual fuel 
assemblies practically terminates at encapsulation. After emplacement of fuel 
identification or item counting of canisters and re-verification of nuclear material 
inventory is no longer possible. Underground engineered spaces will not be directly 
accessible, nor directly observed (Richter 2004). Safeguards of nuclear materials is 
considering means to verify declarations and nuclear material accountancy. In geological 
repositories the new challenge is to verify the accountancy using indirect methods by 
excluding undeclared activities. Applied safeguards measures should ensure credible 
assurance of non-diversion. 
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Methods instead of traditional safeguards belong to category of Containment and 
Surveillance (C/S) and Continuity-of-Knowledge (CoK). Geophysical methodology 
described in this report, does not relate to Containment and Surveillance (C/S), but to 
the confirmation of the host rock suitability for geological disposal and detection of 
tunnelling. 
Once nuclear fuel is included into the material balance of the operator, there will be 
continuous bookkeeping and verification according to international agreements 
between the states and IAEA (INFCIRC/198/Add.8). Inventory change reports (ICR) are 
delivered monthly. Physical inventory taking (PIT) is carried out by operator currently 
once a year generating also physical inventory PIL & MBR reports. Bookkeeping will be 
maintained to unforeseen future. Physical inventory verification (PIV) is proposed to 
continue annually, though it is planned to base on Continuity of Knowledge for the 
inaccessible disposed of canisters/fuel. 
The safeguards as a process should be implemented at applicable stages of the disposal, 
collecting information during site characterization, repository design and construction, 
as well as during operation. The C/S systems may include motion and radiation 
detectors, optical surveillance, and seals. Monitoring would also include detection of an 
attempt to remove any nuclear material away from repository, using portal activity 
sensors at transport routes. Unattended operation and remote monitoring will be 
applied.  
Monitoring and surveillance of closed repository may continue. Confidence needs to be 
built there would not be diversion of nuclear materials before, during or after disposal, 
neither any undeclared activities at the site. At first stage C/S is targeted on 
encapsulation process (Mongiello 2013) and transportation of spent fuel casks but will 
continue during disposal and further on after closure of the repository facility. Later the 
containment and surveillance may be understood including different monitoring and 
remote sensing technologies, requiring definition of containment volume and distance of 
intrusion causing alarm. Containment of spent fuel can be considered effective only in 
case it can be verified (Finch 2009). Definition of “geological containment” is understood 
as the canister though the (engineered) isolation barriers (backfill) and natural barriers 
can contribute to long term safety functionality as well.  
Continuity of knowledge (CoK) will be issued to ensure the status of nuclear material has 
remained unchanged, in cases surveillance is unable to produce concrete information on 
presence via direct observation. This applies after closure of the canister, and 
emplacement of the canister (Mongiello 2013), tunnel backfill and closure of the disposal 
tunnels. In case tracking record is not continuous, the spent fuel can be inspected and 
measured again to confirm the content is unchanged. After encapsulation this is not 
desired and after emplacement of canisters this is not possible. 
Operator produces to competent national authority (STUK) and to IAEA/EC the Design 
Information. These declarations IAEA will verify for correctness and completeness 
(Design Information Verification, DIV), though for natural materials such as rock mass 
this is not unique.  DIV can include for example laser scanning of the tunnels. DIV has not 
been advised to contain the bedrock volume surrounding the repository, apart from 
some related suggestions, for generic safeguards approaches for operating and closed 
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deep geological repositories (IAEA 1998, Okko 2004). It is obvious that a declaration for 
the host rock cannot be expected to be either verifiable, correct, or complete. 
The design information verification (DIV) at various stages (though mainly operational, 
Mongiello 2013) will be used to ensure the repository in its details will conform what 
operator has designed and reported. This would mean there shall not be ongoing any 
undeclared activities in the disposal site (absence of excavation of tunnels, rock 
engineering, and devices), and that the bedrock surrounding the repository is intact. 
Design information verification is carried out at changes of repository frequently during 
design, construction, and operation phases. would be even 3 – 6 times per year.  
According to Additional Protocol (AP) to Safeguards, the operator produces a site 
declaration to national authority (state). State forwards the site declaration to IAEA. 
Verification methods in AP will be additional query, and complementary assess (CA) to 
the site, including for example environmental sampling and radiometric measurements. 
IAEA has thus opportunity to detect undeclared activities in all premises at the 
repository, including those not included in design information. 
Additional protocol (AP) also includes the buildings and volumes of underground rooms, 
but it does not consider the stability of these premises. Posiva runs safeguards 
programme, where information is generated for example using laser-scanning (Pentti & 
Okko 2018). 
Safeguards by design (Okko et al. 2018) is a process for the inspectorates IAEA/EC or 
STUK and the operator to communicate about appropriate safeguards-relevant 
information during design, construction, and operation. Detecting and preventing an 
undeclared intrusion into the disposal facility after disposal, or after closure of the site, 
may require long term monitoring or repeated checking. Design of geological repository 
is changing during construction due to unforeseen conditions. For this reason, the 
safeguards measures need to be flexible to adapt design changes (Okko et al. 2018). 
National authority STUK has direct access to site, and full-time presence at facility during 
operation.  
Pre-nuclear phase of repository construction will consist of generation and verification 
of the as-built design data. The provided baseline information will be based on data 
collected during site investigations and repository construction (Okko and Rautjärvi 
2004). Inspections are proving the data will correspond with the excavated rock spaces 
and geometric volume. Assessment of all safeguards relevant monitoring data would 
assure absence of undeclared safeguards-relevant activities at or near the repository 
(Richter 2004).  
Post closure (Okko & Rautjärvi 2004) safeguards measures would provide a prominent 
level of assurance that the quantity of nuclear material contained in the spent nuclear 
fuel is transferred to the repository and undeclared removal of nuclear material, as well 
as undeclared breaching of integrity of a repository would be detected. The space into 
which repository is constructed and the immediate rock volumes contiguous to the 
repository boundaries cannot be directly observed. After emplacement, the inventory of 
the nuclear material cannot be re-verified due to backfill of disposal tunnels. In case 
continuity of knowledge would be lost, it cannot be restored. 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Report #2008207 8 (128) 
   
Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation   




Closing will last several years. Closing includes backfill of all drifts, tunnels, and shafts in 
repository. Boreholes, surface installations and monitoring equipment will remain until 
these are considered no longer necessary, and surface site will be restored. 
Diversion of nuclear material from closed repository requires excavation of new or 
original shafts or tunnels, excavations from other mines, tunnels, or caves. The surface 
area including original shafts needs to be monitored to cover these activities by on-site 
inspections and remote monitoring. Safeguards approach includes unannounced random 
visual inspections applying also geophysical techniques, satellite, or airborne 
monitoring, active or passive seismic monitoring, environmental sampling, and 
information analysis. Safeguards approach does not require possibility to verify the 
presence of the nuclear material but the integrity of the repository site (Okko 2004). 
Research and development needs have been recognized in some geophysical techniques 
related to safeguards (IAEA 2017). During repository operation, seismic methods may 
be useful. Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) technology was considered useful for 
verifying the declarations in the repository environment. Even presence of a metal 
canister behind the bentonite backfill can be indicated with simple GPR measurement 
(Lee et al. 2020). Topics to be developed would be for example automated data review 
and interpretation of various data sources, including geophysical results. Other 
development issues were for example environmental sampling to detect undeclared 
underground processing activity. Modern safeguards would include qualitative elements 
in non-mechanistic way to gain credible assurance of absence of undeclared nuclear 
operations (Okko 2004). 
A possibility for authorities to make a random inspection on how well declared 
construction activities correspond the actual conditions, may suppress interest in 
carrying out an attempt for diversion. However, any technology to be applied should not 
impact to repository long term disposal safety (Seidel 2007). Methods should be able to 
discriminate declared activities and natural conditions from abnormal (undeclared) 
activities. The methods should also have a low false alarm rate. Further requirements 
have set for using remote monitoring, automated analyses (e.g., Lee et al. 2020) and 
random inspections, possibility to be implemented by well-trained safeguards inspector 
supported by geophysics specialist, and being fast and easy to position and implement, 
carry short measurement time, permit monitoring of large areas, and be reliable and 
rugged (Seidel 2007). Methods should also be cost effective. 
Fully independent IAEA safeguards at geological repository would require continuous 
human and instrument presence at the site during whole lifetime of repository. 
Maintenance of technical equipment would require technical people reached at short 
notice (Okko & Rautjärvi 2006). Given the pace of disposal process, emplacement of one 
canister each working day during several decades, it is apparent that efficiency is 
required. Instead, cost-effective method would be a full usage of existing systems in pre-
nuclear phase including audit of national system elements and their safeguards 
functions. This would incorporate examination of progress reports and the as-build 
design, assessment of national monitoring system to be assured of absence of 
undeclared activities, structures, equipment, and materials of safeguards relevance. It 
would require IAEA access of national system elements in short notice, as well as 
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approaching national system in case of anomalies, inconsistencies, or questions of 
safeguards relevance. 
1.2 Monitoring for long term nuclear safety 
Monitoring of measurable properties at the area hosting the repository would rely on 
baseline information collected during site characterization. Monitoring will use either 
passive source methods (not requiring implementation of active geophysical source, for 
example natural fields or environmental noise), or repeatable surveys, or combination of 
both. Functionality of monitoring would require long time series of comparison data, 
understanding the geological conditions, and the effect of declared construction and 
operation of the repository. 
Monitoring using external capabilities independent of the operator would review time 
series of satellite imagery, to detect changes in environment, like development of roads, 
buildings, excess construction materials, and changes in vegetation or land use in 
general. 
Monitoring at the neighborhood of the site would indicate changes in various 
environmental parameters. These may include observation of excess drainage water, 
changes in water flow and quality, increase in radon release due to underground 
construction, or changes in power consumption or traffic frequency. 
Monitoring using systems and installations provided by operator, applying data 
collected by the operator from the site, is following changes in baseline properties, and 
can be compared to effect of declared activities. Definition of baseline properties require 
accumulation of the recording during long time before starting of operations, to describe 
the properties in adequate accuracy. Most safeguards-relevant methods currently 
carried out by the operator, belong to range of rock mechanic monitoring, and include 
microseismic measurements and detection, rock movement detection on ground surface 
and in excavated tunnels, and temperature measurements and stress field 
measurements in bedrock.  
Microseismic monitoring in detection of unanticipated construction have been studied in 
several reports. Regarding spent nuclear fuel disposal project carried out by Posiva Oy in 
Finland, several previous desktop works were carried out in this respect. Undeclared 
construction work would cause noise and events in case of use of explosives, for both of 
which the source can be localized.  Microseismic network need to be established before 
construction, operate throughout construction in pre-nuclear phase, and continue 
operation in post closure phase. 
Detectability of distinct types and sources of mechanical construction noise have been 
reviewed at Yucca Mountain site in disposal investigations (Finch 2009), and at Gorleben 
test laboratory in salt formation (Altmann 2012, 2013, 2014), and at Olkiluoto (Saari & 
Malm 2015). 
Temperature can be measured in excavated tunnels, but also in drilled boreholes at the 
site and the neighborhood. Temperature can be measured in groundwater contained in 
boreholes, using wireline sensors. Changes in bedrock or groundwater temperature may 
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indicate undeclared underground construction, changing the temperature due to 
ventilation and other processes, as well as due to changes in groundwater flow. 
Other monitoring methods are recognized as changes in hydraulic head. Possibilities 
using hydrogeological pressure field monitoring were discussed in earlier report (Pentti 
and Heikkinen 2017). Construction of the repository will change the hydraulic 
conditions at the site. Drawdown of hydraulic head will occur theoretically both as a 
large-scale cone of depression, detectable in piezometric wells, and in hydrogeologically 
defined domains, like fracture zones. In the zones even greater pressure responses can 
be detected to longer distances. Changes in pressure can be detected using sensors 
installed in an isolated section in a deep borehole. Interception of such zone by 
undeclared construction work would be detected and separately recognized from 
corresponding responses related to declared activities. 
Other potentially recognizable monitoring methods might be available the 
hydrogeochemical conditions, where changes may appear in salinity of the groundwater 
(electrical conductivity of the groundwater can be measured with wireline sensors) due 
to upconing of saline groundwater caused by drainage water management. Changes can 
occur also in various other hydrogeochemical parameters, including ion strength and 
groundwater species, acidity, or alkalinity (due to e.g., cement), redox, oxygen or carbon 
dioxide content, and dissolved gas content, to mention few. 
Monitoring is insensitive to amount of rock volume excavated or shape of excavated 
underground space. Monitoring cannot be used for design information verification in 
sense of reviewing the correspondence between declared excavated rock volume and its 
declared shape, and the one constructed (Okko & Rautjärvi 2004). Actual localization 
and characterization of an observed disturbance would always require more detailed 
checking in the field. 
Monitoring will be applied at all stages of design, construction (pre-nuclear) and 
operation of repository to provide baseline information, ensure operational safety and 
facility operability, and confirm conditions are consistent with long term nuclear safety. 
Monitoring program should not reduce overall level of long-term safety (Okko 2004). 
 
1.3 Active geophysical surveys 
This report will summarize recent development of geophysical site characterization 
methods, which could have safeguards-relevancy. Observed properties of different 
survey methods, and their application, are discussed.  
The geophysical methods are used in characterization of the bedrock volume of the site. 
The results are used in constructing geological description (models) of the site, which in 
turn is contributing to site understanding, design of the underground repository layout, 
and considerations of long-term safety. Knowledge can be used as a baseline for 
safeguards. 
Geophysical techniques may be applied for verification of design information, so that the 
underground constructed premises and spaces are conforming what is declared. 
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Geophysical measurements can be used for exploring the bedrock volume surrounding 
the repository. Several geophysical techniques can be used to detect voids and openings 
in bedrock. 
The results can be used either to indicate presence of undeclared excavations, or 
favorably as a proof of absence of such engineered spaces (Okko and Rautjärvi 2006). 
Direct detection of undeclared activities without prior knowledge, or without using 
baseline information for comparisons, would be demanding, as it should be applied in 
any location and circumstances, without prior knowledge on when and where a 
potential attempt for intrusion would take place. In worst case, detection would be 
necessary even without exact knowledge on geometry of the existing (once declared) 
underground premises. 
Geophysical remote sensing through bedrock relies on contrast in limited set of physical 
properties which govern the potential field or wave field applied in each technique. 
These include specific mass (density), magnetic susceptibility, electrical conductivity and 
dielectric permittivity, and elastic properties. Among of these are physical parameters 
between the void and support structures (air, water, concrete or metal mesh liner, 
bolting) and host rock. 
The detectability of any object in a geophysical survey is governed by number of factors, 
including size and distance of the object from survey, accuracy of the tools and 
measurement parameters of designed measurement system, density of the survey 
stations in the area, alignment of a survey setup, and for wave field, the frequency band 
of used waveform. These factors also affect to the maximum range (depth of survey) 
from where observations can be made, and the resolution at which objects can be 
detected or separated from each another. 
Shortly, longest wave lengths (lowest frequencies) carry information from deepest but 
have the least of smaller object resolution capability. Smaller objects are detected with 
dense measurements, and from shallow depths, at high frequency wavefield. Small 
contrasts require accurate measurement tools and survey practices. 
Each geophysical method has a feasible way of implementation, affected by accessibility 
to the target. Profile measurement or mapping on the ground level may be carried out 
effectively from an aircraft (staffed or unmanned, fixed wing or rotary), producing 
information of variation in physical property within an area. Similar information, 
without physical contact to the medium, can be carried at slower pace from ground level, 
too. This kind of information may include gamma radiation, gravity field, magnetic field, 
or electromagnetic field. The surveys typically carry information from the very surface 
or from a depth of few tens of metres in maximum, and do not imply resolution to detect 
tunnel sized targets from the repository depth. Low frequency or time domain 
electromagnetic survey can be an exception on depth penetration, but not at remarkably 
high resolution. 
Contact onto medium is required for electrical survey (for source and receiver 
electrodes) and seismic reflection survey (for geophones and sources). Electrical survey 
can produce depth penetration to tens of metres or with lower resolution up to 
hundreds of metres. Electrical survey does not carry resolution of small objects to 
greater depths. Seismic survey can provide depth penetration to kilometres with lower 
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resolution, and to hundreds of metres with a good or moderate resolution. Seismic 
reflection sounding is only technique which has at least theoretical potential to observe 
deep seated excavated space from ground surface. Specifically, this holds in case where 
no prior information of exact design of tunnels would survive. 
Survey methods considered as category of “sounding,” can be applied using transmitted 
and back scattered wave field like seismic, ground penetrating radar (GPR) and other 
electromagnetic or electric soundings, which enable imaging of target objects. Other 
than imaging methods can be alternating either application frequency or time delay 
(electromagnetic soundings) or survey array geometry to adjust depth penetration 
(electrical sounding), resulting to a diffuse image, and lesser detection resolution than 
wave field-based methods.  
All the similar survey methods can be implemented also from scan lines formed by a 
borehole in the ground, or in a tunnel or other excavated space in bedrock. These survey 
locations offer a possibility to make observations closer to target. Access to the volume is 
restricted by availability of the drillholes or tunnels. 
Seismic sounding using active sources would have highest safeguards relevancy in 
detection of an attempt for undeclared intrusion. Several variations are possible for 
survey implementation from tunnels or drillholes. The methods however are slow to 
implement and expensive to use. Application is also requiring highly expertized tools, 
design, and processing to create clearly understood results. Methods may also be 
invasive, risking an impact to repository integrity unless carried out with great care. 
There are reported recent development on tunnel or mining environment seismic 
methods, which may be considered in this context. Permanent seismic array for repeated 
measurements might also be a solution, especially if combined with seismic station 
network, and implemented without risking repository safety. Disproving of existence of 
any undeclared voids is difficult without disturbing operational safety of facility (Okko 
and Rautjärvi 2006). 
Geophysical surveys are likely to produce number of anomalies from subsurface. 
Typically, these anomalies are associated with geological objects. Geological variation is 
abundant and anomaly causing contrasts in the same order of magnitude as the would 
be for the tunnel objects. Information is fuzzy in character, potentially containing 
indications mixed of both tunnel and non-tunnel. Verification with drilling might be 
required. Such checking is costly, for which reason it might not be applicable. Also 
drilling may compromise long term safety and thus not anticipated (Okko and Rautjärvi 
2006). 
The observability or detectability of the complete disposal facility at depth of 500 m, 
while not knowing its’ existence, has been studied with forward modeling of geophysical 
responses (Isaksson et al. 2010). Computing used the known contrasts between tunnel 
structures and crystalline bedrock. Results for Swedish Forsmark case, using the 
geophysical signature of bedrock in the area, were indicating that although some of the 
ground surface survey methods can detect weak anomaly caused by magnetic, density or 
conductivity properties of repository in the corresponding field, neither of these could 
localize the repository. Only the seismic reflection method, implemented with using an 
adequate accuracy, could indicate that a repository would exist in the depth. Even in this 
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case, the detail of layout in repository would not be imaged. Reversely, for a known 
layout, it is unlikely that deviations from the design would be observed using ground 
level survey alone, nor presence of an undeclared tunnel in a proximity of existing 
tunnels. Detecting undeclared activities and separating these from existing premises 
would be more difficult, requiring higher resolution, and a comparison between baseline 
and repeat surveys – a knowledge of existing disposal site and tunnel geometry. 
Applicability of ground penetrating radar technique was assessed based on available 
GPR and borehole radar surveys in Olkiluoto (Saksa et al. 2005). Further experiences on 
the GPR method applicability in Olkiluoto conditions have been gathered during 2005 – 
2020. The formed estimate of method applicability is revised in this review. Also, other 
geophysical methods are considered. Scope of this report is to revise GPR applicability, 
and review other geophysical techniques (active seismic sounding, electrical survey, 
electromagnetic surveys), and engineering methods, to update the information collected 
during construction of the ONKALO underground characterization premises in Olkiluoto. 
Also, some of results and knowledge collected in co-operation with Swedish Nuclear Fuel 
(SKB) are referred.  
 
1.4 Olkiluoto spent nuclear fuel repository 
Spent nuclear fuel disposal facility is under construction in Olkiluoto in Southwest 
Finland. Posiva Oy has carried out multidisciplinary bedrock characterization for siting 
and design of the facility, focusing long term safety case in purpose to minimize risks of 
radionuclide release into natural environment. Performance of rock mass and 
engineered systems as release barriers have been considered.  
The rock engineering needs site characterization data which include different 
geophysical surveys, pilot drillholes ahead of tunnel front with related geophysical, 
geological, and hydrogeological investigations and other related information.  
Authority review of site characterization is carried out at three-year interval, reviewing 
suitable volumes to host repository and technical solutions, simultaneously keeping in 
focus the safeguards relevance (Okko and Rautjärvi 2006). International regulatory 
expert group (Cosgrove et al. 2003) has timely reviewed uncertainty of geological data, 
but also the adopted safeguards approach. 
Olkiluoto site is located on an island in Baltic sea coastal area in Southwest Finland. 
Coastal island is surrounded by shallow sea from three sides. Hard bedrock is covered by 
variable thickness of shallow glacial till overburden. Groundwater saturation reaches to 
ground surface. The bedrock is outcropped at few percent of its’ surface. Bedrock 
consists of banded migmatite of sedimentary origin, containing in its current 
composition micaceous veined gneiss melanosome (paleosome) and segregated, 
partially recrystallized leucosome (neosome) granitic pegmatoid inclusions and veins. 
Rock mass contains also varying amount of supracrustal lithologies. The bedrock has 
undergone polyphasic deformation ranging from several ductile deformation phases, 
several brittle deformation phases, and alteration. Brittle fracturing on average is sparse, 
being concentrated to established narrow and continuous deformation zones, defining 
the volumes of avoidance in emplacement of spent nuclear fuel canisters. 
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Hydrogeological properties defining the disposal concept have been assessed using 
these deformation zones as hydrogeological units, e.g., in simulations (Posiva 2011). 
During site characterization and site selection in Finland, set of information was 
gathered which is having safeguards-relevancy in understanding site properties and 
providing baseline. Characterization focused on long term safety of disposal (safety case) 
in natural environment, regarding performance of engineered barriers, to minimize risks 
of radionuclide release. Long term safety considerations have been revised at three-year 
pace. 
Further characterization of the site contains core drilling of 60 deep boreholes from 
ground level, with associated hydrogeological and geophysical wireline logging, ground 
level and drillhole geophysical surveys, and extensive geological analysis. During 
construction of underground rock characterization facility ONKALO since 2004, three 
vertical shafts of 500 m depth extent were lowered. Over 5 km of inclined access tunnel 
were driven during six years, with pilot holes drilled on tunnel face. Geophysical and 
hydrogeological surveys were conducted from pilot holes and on tunnel surfaces, and in 
characterization niches. All these activities have deepened and focused the 
understanding of the rock mass. Acquired data has been used in creating geometric 
models and parameter information for site description. The models and parameters 
have been applied for safety case, intended for reasoning the long-term nuclear safety, 
including engineered and natural barriers of radionuclide release. 
Wide range of geophysical methods were applied and interpreted for geological 
characterization of bedrock. Location and geometry of zones were characterized having 
mechanical or hydrological interest in safety assessment. This information was reviewed 
for relevancy for safeguards. Typical responses received with different geophysical 
methods, the ranges of investigation, and the object resolution are information which 
have also been gained during the site investigations. 
Rock mechanical information is considered to have highest relevancy. Microseismic 
baseline measurements were started in 2002 early during the characterization, well 
before construction of ONKALO started. Currently 18 stations are operational on ground 
level and in tunnels and drillholes in Olkiluoto (e.g., Haapalehto et al. 2020). Annual 
reports of microseismic events include both localization of excavation blasts, as well as 
natural and stress field induced microearthquakes. 
Sensitivity of the network is ML = -2.5 - -2.0 (in local Richter scale). Monitoring has 
provided significant level of information of level of natural seismicity in the area. 
Sensitive station network has provided also localization of each excavation blast. Tests 
were made to detect and localize seismic noise caused by raise-boring of vertical shaft 
(Saari & Malm 2015). Later, small effects of stress field redistribution due to tunnel 
construction have been detected. Results are reported in publicly available annual 
reports. Monitoring has indicated that there has not been detected any significant 
undeclared safeguard-relevant construction activities in ONKALO or its vicinity. Such 
statement was made also by national authority soon after starting of construction of 
ONKALO (Okko and Rautjärvi 2006). 
Bedrock remained undisturbed until construction of underground rock characterization 
facility started. Monitoring programme provides information related to long term safety. 
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Adjustments to the content of monitoring would give signals from rock masses from 
safeguards-relevant neighborhood of the ONKALO. 
The average rock mass has been described in close range to include the local 
deformation zones into geological models, using geological mapping in tunnels and pilot 
holes, but also applying geophysical drillhole and tunnel surface methods like seismic 
and GPR soundings in different scales, and electrical crosshole measurements. Work has 
focused on continuity of local deformation zones, to be avoided in emplacement of spent 
fuel capsules. Joint interpretation of the characterization results is taking place in Rock 
Suitability Classification (RSC) process. 
During construction phase the performance of excavation and rock surface quality of 
constructed underground premises can be investigated with Ground Penetrating Radar 
(GPR). Main purpose of GPR inspection is to ensure the excavation damaged zone (EDZ) 
on the rock surface would not provide a continuous groundwater flow path.  
The excavation has been carried out with drill and blast method. Tunnel face dimension 
is 4 x 5 m. Blasting is carried out in 4 m rounds, where tens of percussion drilled holes 
are prepared at short distances on tunnel contour and on halfway between contour and 
mid-point, and a larger hole for starter charge is prepared on a lower part on the centre 
of tunnel profile. After blasting the rock mass is loaded and hauled to surface to be 
stored. After excavation, the tunnel surface is mapped, scanned with 3D laser (total 
station), and then for working safety, reinforced using bolting, sprayed concrete, 
grouting, steel mesh, or cast concrete. Pre-grouting can be used when rock quality or 
suppression of drainage water flow requires. Support method varies along tunnel wall as 
it depends on conditions. Coordinated inspection is carried out to recognize used 
solutions for safeguards-relevancy (Okko and Rautjärvi 2006). The change of methods 
according to local conditions sets requirements to handle possible unexpected changes 
in repository layout (Okko and Rautjärvi 2004). 
Excavation procedure requires generation of rock spaces for drilling, blasting, loading 
and transport vehicles to pass each other, similar volumes as required for treatment of 
spent fuel transport canisters. For the safeguards it is necessary to map and verify these 
spaces, and the corresponding non-treated rock walls. To carry out the design 
information verification the rock face needs to be documented before reinforcement 
using photos and laser scanning to create 3D image, and volume estimate, etc. This 
documentation will be inspected by national safeguards when support method for each 
tunnel section is accepted and reinforcement taken place. 
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2 Possibilities to detect an undeclared activity 
2.1 General 
Independent detection of undeclared tunnels or spaces is demanding because it needs to 
be possible without prior knowledge when and where a potential intrusion attempt 
would occur. A verification of presence of spent fuel is not required, but continuity of 
knowledge needs to be assumed from credible assurance of absence of undeclared 
activities within repository boundaries. The integrity of repository with its boundaries 
should remain. Perimeter within which other excavation activities may not be allowable, 
have been suggested for example 10 km; and perimeter within large construction, 
capable in hosting shafts or tunnel portals, 5 km (Richter 2004). On the other hand, 
authorities may not be anticipated in installing monitoring devices in a private property 
outside the repository area (Richter 2004). 
Diversion paths may include direct substitution of an empty container at the surface, 
retrieval of a spent fuel package from underground, opening spent fuel packages 
underground followed by removal fuel and transport to surface, and removal of spent 
fuel from packages for reprocessing underground. Pathway can include removal through 
shafts or ramps, or any other openings from repository to surface, or clandestine tunnels 
excavated into repository or out from the repository to the surface or to a nearby 
tunnels (IAEA 2010). During operation, non-diversion may be assured with radioactivity 
portal monitor placed at openings suitable to material transport. 
Enabling the tracking of condition of repository during construction, operation and in 
post closure phase, a staged approach has been proposed (Okko and Rautjärvi 2006). 
Initial information regarding bedrock conditions (baseline) from site understanding 
shall be collected. Design information shall be generated during excavation, 
construction, installation, and operation. Underground repository cannot be planned 
due to unforeseen geological and rock mechanical conditions, so safeguards measures 
need to be flexible to accommodate changes in design (Okko et al. 2018).  
Regarding nuclear material, verification of receipts and flow of materials is required, so 
that there would not be possibility to use other than declared access routes, nor enter or 
remove any undeclared material from the underground facilities undetected. Any 
technology or method used in support of the safeguards should be functional and non-
invasive. A method should also be cost-effective to apply. Maintaining the continuity of 
knowledge shall not impair safety in operation or overall level of long-term safety.  
Safeguards approach will have to be site specific. Least invasive of monitoring methods 
would be satellite imagery or airborne photography in follow-up of changes in 
environment. This kind of activity can be mostly carried out remotely, with some 
reservations for ground truthing and inspections. Surveillance in societal development, 
indications on unexplained activities like energy consumption, traffic, or other, may be 
also carried out with minimal interference. 
Concrete means to follow-up activities in bedrock volume would be based on different 
passive or active measurement techniques. Best established passive methods would be 
the seismic monitoring of the site, which would directly detect and localize undeclared 
attempt to excavation by drill and blast or tunnel boring machine from distances of 
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several hundreds of metres to kilometres. Other monitoring related to rock mechanic 
investigations would be observations of displacements and stress field. Topographic 
interferometry has been used in detection of changes by tunnel construction. 
Extensometers and convergence measurement in tunnels can indicate changes in stress 
field of near environment. Temperature monitoring might indicate closely located 
clandestine tunnel construction. 
Other considered passive techniques would be based on monitoring of hydraulic head in 
bedrock (Pentti and Okko 2018). Tunnel construction causes drawdown in hydraulic 
head. Inflow into the tunnels is reduced by grouting and lining of rock mass. An 
undeclared tunnel construction would be seen as interference in hydraulic pressure 
field. Another groundwater related source of information is associated with salinity. 
Variation in electrical conductivity or changes in dissolved chemical compounds can be 
measured to detect changes caused by groundwater pumping, for example up-coning of 
saline groundwater. 
An existence or absence of a clandestine tunnel at the repository site of Olkiluoto is 
difficult to prove. Geophysical methods (seismic and electromagnetic) would require 
high detection capability and produce substantial number of anomalies to be verified by 
extensive drilling. Contrary, preparation of clandestine tunnels would change 
environmental conditions that may be detected indirectly.  
To reach 430 m depth with truck, sloping tunnel of 1:10 inclination is required, having 
length of at least 5 km. Such tunnelling cannot be easily carried out in undetectable way. 
Excavation blasting would be detected by microseismic station network from 
considerable distance. Saw extraction of rock mass, or full-face tunnel boring (Fuerst and 
Del Nero 2018), would produce noise which also can be detected though from shorter 
distance than blasting. Extracted rock residue mass should be hauled and stored 
somewhere.  
Large construction machinery would be difficult to bring in. Operation consumes energy, 
which might well be detected. Also, the electromagnetic interference caused by large 
power sources are likely to be measured from longer distances even through the rock 
mass. Leading the excess drainage water away, and ventilation of tunnels with exhaust 
air outlet will be detectable as well. The IAEA approaches are very generic. Compatibility 
with national Swedish proposed system were reviewed (af Ekenstam et al. 2018).  
DIV including geophysical methods to detect deviations from declared design could be 
used instead (IAEA 1998). IAEA Board of Governors (2002, referred in af Ekenstam 
2018) have stated that under integrated safeguards, geophysical methods may not be 
needed to detect excavations or excavation activities, but replaced by Complementary 
Access and information analysis (belonging to Additional Protocol). GPR may still be 
needed for required DIV processes like detection of undeclared tunnels, rooms and 
boreholes or permanent underground equipment. The latter would require for GPR to be 
a metallic structure, well reflecting object, when located behind rock mass.  
DIV would be used during construction to verify the declared design of the repository. 
The IAEA may undertake inspection and monitoring activities to assure itself of the 
absence of undeclared chambers or tunnels, and to identify undeclared equipment. 
Geophysical techniques, as far as these would be feasible and effective, could be 
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implemented (IAEA 2010). During operational phase, nuclear material will be 
transferred into repository for emplacement, and controlled to maintain continuity of 
knowledge, using containment and surveillance. DIV will continue, as-built information 
will be subject to inspections. Environmental sampling can be carried out. After 
backfilling the safeguards would be reduced to measurements that assure no intrusion 
occur which could result in retrieval of nuclear material. There would not be an operator 
present at the site after closure.  
Geoscientific characterization techniques can be used either by authority or by nuclear 
energy operator. A continuity of knowledge is anticipated, over wide time span and 
depth scale. Containment of spent fuel is considered effective only in case it can be 
verified (Finch 2009). Different verification activities can be implemented are planning 
and design (baseline information), construction, operation (design information 
verification), and post-closure (monitoring). The construction and operation phases 
offer limited access into close area of the repository, to make comparisons between 
baseline and verifying measurements. After the site would be closed, close access is no 
more possible, and possibilities are focused on monitoring (Finch 2009). Passive seismic 
monitoring seems favorable for long term applications as it can detect a tunnel boring 
machine operation at distances in order of 100’s of meters or kilometers away. Near 
term monitoring is implying more problems because construction itself is producing 
noise, which can mask undeclared activities (Finch 2009). Cost efficient passive seismic 
monitoring may be conducted using commercial sensors (Haddal et al. 2014). 
 
2.2 Previous methodological considerations 
Safeguards relevant geophysical monitoring and exploration techniques are dependent 
on-site properties, like geological environment, physical characteristics of rock mass, 
repository design, and arrangements in operation. Applicable methods have been 
discussed and reviewed in various projects. 
Finch (2009) has reviewed application of range of monitoring and geophysical methods, 
listing their capabilities compared with safeguards relevancy. These included magnetic, 
gravity, electrical, electromagnetic, and seismic methods. Finch (2009) and Haddal et al. 
(2014) conclude on basis of TBM test made at Yucca Mountain site in tuffitic rock, that 
seismic monitoring may be most feasible for long term detection of an attempt for 
diversion. A full-face tunnel boring machine may be seen using sensors from distances of 
several kilometers. Induced noise levels are of similar range as city traffic noise. Other 
techniques like water jet cutting or wire saw rock extraction may cause less intense 
noise, which would be more difficult to detect. 
Tunnel boring machine or drill and blast excavation would need a gentle, maximum 10-
15% slope to enable vehicle transportation. Advance of excavation, 2.5 – 5 m/ day, 
would allow warning time to make detection before suspected undeclared activity 
reaches near the repository. Tunnel excavation activity would be energy intensive, 
which may enable detection of energy consumption, exhaust fumes or ventilation air, 
excess water from dewatering, chemical compounds (nitrogen) from blasting, 
electromagnetic fields caused by machinery, electrically conductive or magnetic mass of 
machines used in excavation, and excess rock mass to be hauled from tunnel and stored. 
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Altmann (2013) has compared wide range of mechanic excavation noise sources 
(mechanic extraction, blasts, drilling, sawing) for their energy, peak particle velocity and 
spectral character in Gorleben salt dome. Detection of excavation caused noise could be 
carried out using an underground “fence” of sensors surrounding the repository at 1 km 
distance from repository, within the salt dome or for example 500 m distance of the salt 
dome margin, placed at depth of few hundreds of metres in drillholes. Various sources 
cause different kind of signals. Spectra from periodic sources like vehicle engines and 
percussion drilling cause harmonic series, transferred to rock via acoustic to seismic 
coupling, seen to distances of hundreds of metres. Rock removal for example by drilling 
because broad spectra signal up to several kilohertz of frequency. Blasting and mechanic 
extraction cause largest signal level, seen to distances of one to several kilometers. TBM 
or road header activity detectability was not estimated. Different other sources cause 
weaker signal than blasting. Rock grader produced signal can be visible from distances 
of 200 – 500 m. Chain saw, roof cutter, picking or percussion drilling can be recorded 
from distances of 20 – 70 m. Detection of such activity from a tunnel face would be 
covered with placing a geophone or accelerometer station at each 50 m of tunnel. 
Detection of acoustic events caused by undeclared activity would be based on simple 
amplitude criterion, which would also need definition of seismic background. During 
operation seismic noise of undeclared activities may be masked by those caused by 
declared activity. After closure, no sensors and cabling can remain in repository. Shorter 
distances are relevant during emplacement phase, higher energy level noise and longer 
distances for long term monitoring after closure. 
Passive seismic monitoring requires less sensors than active seismic survey, does not 
require source, and it can be applied to monitor mining activities in large repository 
scale (Haddal et al. 2014). Passive systems may require 8 – 15 stations of 3 components, 
for borehole and surface sensors, with 10 – 15 years lifetime: saving data and carrying 
automated detection. Cost range would be in order of 100 – 400 k$. Site visits would 
need to be carried out annually. Full time analyst would be required to operate the 
system and carry necessary interpretation of detected responses. Commercial on the 
shelf systems are feasible in case security will be ensured (Haddal et al. 2014). 
Canadian safeguards support reviewed seismic signals theoretically in cases of operating 
underground mines (CSSP 2002). Posiva has followed progress in tunnel excavation 
using microseismic network and managed also in detection and localization of raise-
boring of vertical shaft, which is analogous process for tunnel boring (Saari and Lakio 
2007, 2009, Saari and Malm 2015). TBM detection would require continuous recording, 
which is not typically used in station seismology. The moment when rock cutting head is 
hitting the surface produces best recordable signals, repeating frequently during the 
process. Nevertheless, in case seismic monitoring network is in operation, a skilled 
operator would always detect an attempt of intrusion using TBM due to generated 
continuous seismic noise, making such attempt impossible without detection (Saari and 
Malm 2015). After first detection of a susceptible signal, further field studies at higher 
sensitivity would be required to define location of the origin of signal at accuracy of few 
metres to some tens of metres in lateral direction. Resolution of localization would be 
high to distances of one kilometer, detectable at range of 1 – 1.5 km, and not feasible at 
greater than 2.5 km distances.  
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Altmann (2014) has modelled propagation of various signals and compared these to 
measurement data. Blast shots have S/N ratio 650-3800 when recorded underground at 
distances 31 – 233 m, and 20 – 130 when recorded on surface at 1060 – 1176 m 
distances. In mine detection would require one geophone each 50 m, after closure from 
surface, at 1 … 8 km distances from repository centre. Modelled signal is useful to be 
compared with recorded signal, to detect deviation. Altmann (2013) concludes on basis 
of testing in Gorleben experimental mine, that monitoring around a disposal site in rock 
salt could be carried out with a “fence” of seismic monitoring sensors at 500 m from salt 
margin, at 1 km offset from the site, to recognize any blasting or drilling related to rock 
mass removal. All sources of seismic signal were analyzed from different distances. 
Detection distances are kilometres for blasts, several hundreds of metres for heavy 
vehicles, and c. 100 m for weaker sources (hammer, drilling, scaling). Detection will 
depend on background noise level. Signals can be separated from other sources. Signal 
strength from even same type of source vary greatly.  
The drillholes required for measurements could be prepared to safe distance from 
repository as not to breach the integrity of repository and thus endanger the long-term 
nuclear safety, and preferably placed towards potential directions of intrusion. Problems 
related to of this kind of drillholes include that there needs to be some instance who 
would propose, place, and prepare these. Also, funding would be necessary if excess 
drillholes would be prepared. In worst case the repository hosting volume would need to 
be completely encircled with such an array. Geophysical “alarm fence” around repository 
would consist of for example 30 boreholes at 400 m spacing, 600 m deep each, at 2 km 
radius from the centre of the repository. This would be significantly contradictory to 
requirement of cost efficient, easily implemented safeguards-relevant survey method 
requiring minimal special expertise involvement, but bare existence of such possibility 
would be adequate to suppress attempt to intentionally breach repository integrity from 
outside of repository perimeter. 
Sensors cannot be placed or maintained at the deep disposal premises after their 
closure. There cannot be created hydraulic connections to the ground surface, 
potentially weakening integrity of disposal, so data transfer would be impossible. 
Neither there would be allowed foreign materials. Ground level installations are 
possible. 
Short distances (weak sources) of detection are relevant during operational phases, 
applied automatically at densely placed sensors (50-100 m distances), and stronger 
signals after closure. Signal produced by TBM or road header type of excavation was not 
reviewed by Altmann (2014). Seismic monitoring would be equally feasible method also 
in crystalline rock and sedimentary clay stone. Acoustic emission can be used in mining 
activities and rock stress measurements (Finch 2009). 
Station seismology has been used in monitoring seismic activity at the Olkiluoto site. The 
events measured to levels of ML < -2, include excavation blasts, excavation induced 
microseismic activity, and naturally occurring seismic events. Network capability has 
tested to demonstrate capability to detect and localize a TBM or raise boring type of 
mechanical noise (Saari and Malm 2015).  
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Seismic monitoring has been listed as a potential method in detection of an attempt for 
external intrusion (Finch 2009). Application was tested at Yucca Mountain site. Signal 
decay was analyzed and estimated to be adequate over reasonable distances. Other 
sources of information, like muck and groundwater removal (hydrogeology, satellite 
imagery, ventilation, power consumption) were considered as well for detection of 
undeclared excavation activity (Finch 2009). Tunnel preparation might be detected with 
electricity consumption, electromagnetic interference caused by machinery, or transport 
and storage of residual materials. Interference of local environmental conditions, for 
example in the sea water quality, may also reveal large non-reported underground 
construction work. A legal, purposeful excavation activity would require permitting and 
environmental impact assessment, which would be easily detected and understood 
already in design stage. Clandestine operation is unlikely to remain unnoticed. 
Microseismic survey was carried out in ONK-TKU-3620 POSE project (Reyes-Montes et 
al. 2013), to define intensity of rock spalling during heating experiment and recovery 
(Valli et al. 2013). Microseismic activity related to induced deformation can be recorded 
within sphere of several metres. Survey can detect seismic events caused by excavation, 
and velocity changes due to changing stress field and water saturation, when compared 
between repeated measurements (Haycox and Pettitt 2009). 
Possibilities to apply for safeguards purposes the long-term safety aimed monitoring 
system used in ONKALO was reviewed by STUK in 2017 (Pentti and Heikkinen 2017). 
Functionality of GPR method in Olkiluoto conditions was reported in (Saksa et al. 2005). 
Possibilities to apply ONKALO long term safety aimed monitoring was reviewed in 2017 
(Pentti and Heikkinen 2017, Pentti and Okko 2018). 
Active geophysical survey methods can be used to detect and localize undeclared 
constructed spaces. Most reliable way to detect new tunnels would be comparison of 
repeat measurements with a baseline survey conducted earlier, especially when 
accurate location is unknown, distances from survey location are long, targets small, 
contrasts in physical properties low, or naturally occurring anomaly features abundant. 
Two active geophysical methods, GPR and active seismic reflection sounding, and 
passive seismic methods, were reviewed as examples of geophysical techniques for 
safeguarding final disposals in geological environment (Seidel 2007). Requirements for 
geophysical methods were recognized as not having an impact to repository safety 
envelope, being able to discriminate declared activities and baseline conditions from 
abnormal activities and having low false alarm rate. Further to these requirements the 
applied methods should be efficient, using remote monitoring, automated analyses, and 
random inspections; being possible to be implemented by well-trained safeguards 
inspector with support from specialist in geophysics. Positioning should be fast and easy, 
measurement time short and volume or area coverage large, unless equipment could be 
permanently installed. Tools to be used should carry high reliability, be rugged, and 
possess long meantime between failures (low need for maintenance) (Seidel 2007).  
Two main objectives remained for application of geophysical methods, being verification 
of the design information of the geological repository (detection of undeclared tunnels 
and rooms) and detection of undeclared excavations to get access to the repository from 
outside (Seidel 2007).   
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GPR is considered easy to handle, high resolution, not impacting repository safety, and 
possible to implement by well-trained safeguards inspector (Seidel 2007). Problems 
were recognized to require planning of whole project and interpretation requiring 
expert knowledge, and limited range of detection. Modeling presented in report (Seidel 
2007, Seidel et al. 2004) shows the resolution and detectability would be adequate to be 
able to detect presence of abnormal underground excavation near declared rooms at 
distances of 10 – 20 m, from different geological background (rock salt, clay stone, 
crystalline rock). Modeled case for 50 MHz GPR is for tunnel geometry slightly idealistic. 
A 50 MHz antenna is bulky to operate and requires particularly good shielding to 
suppress tunnel reflections from side walls, back walls, and ceiling, as well as from any 
metallic installations. 
The GPR signal travels in medium at a single velocity waveform (depending on medium). 
The measurement array consists of transmitter and receiver which are located 
symmetrically, and each measurement trace (A-scan) is presented at the mid-point. This 
makes the GPR images (B-scan) easy to understand, though the actual anomaly causes 
necessarily do not locate precisely at line perpendicular to the measurement surface, but 
within a radar transmission cone (“beam”), which has aperture of several tens of 
degrees. More to this the anomaly form for point-like or spherical objects are hyperbolic, 
and for linear objects more linear in form. For inclined linear objects, the angle of 
inclination is not true but apparent. Mathematical process to suppress diffracted events 
emerging from point or spherical objects, and to image all features at correct location, is 
called migration. 
  
Figure 2-1. Synthetic model of GPR measurement data on a tunnel wall in geological environment having resistivity 
and dielectric permittivity contrast. Observability of simple model case with one (on the left) or more complex model 
case with several (on the right) excavated spaces is demonstrated (Seidel 2007, Seidel et al.  2004). Side flanks of 
reflecting events indicate hyperbolic diffracted features caused by point-like objects. 
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Functionality of GPR method in Olkiluoto conditions was reported by STUK in 2005 
(Saksa et al. 2005). Practical results from Olkiluoto (Saksa et al. 2005) show that 
geological variation causes problems in form of possible false alarms, as well as high 
attenuation of GPR signal reduces the effective range of observation. Use of GPR would 
rely on using geological information and design information with GPR data to support 
interpretation. Non-identified objects may be of natural origin or synthetic. GPR has a 
partial coverage at proximity of tunnels, only partial verification of disclosure of non-
reported features is possible. 
An example by Seidel (2007) from unpublished test material in Konrad mine 2004, 
shows that in rock mass resistivity of 2 Ωm at GPR frequencies in iron ore, implies strong 
attenuation and GPR does not carry information from rock mass or constructed spaces. 
Test was carried out using 50 MHz double antenna with an 8 m offset between 
transmitter and receiver. 
Also support structures like metal fibre reinforced concrete will be reducing the 
applicability of GPR method. Modeling was suggesting that spent fuel capsules may 
imply large enough contrast to be detected from distances of up to 10 m from parallel 
tunnel. Lower frequencies have higher detection capability and range but imply 
problems in application and interference from irregular surface and installations.  
Highest resolution is obtained from borehole measurements, which however require 
expensive and rare equipment, expertized personnel, and a borehole for application 
which does not maintain the safety of repository envelope. 
An idea has been promoted on application of directional borehole radar reflection 
sounding in multiple boreholes, for in-mine detection and localization of undeclared 
activities (Althaus 2013, Uchtmann and Althaus 2014). Method would be used in early-
stage identification, applied at a sufficient distance, being complementary to passive 
seismic monitoring. Survey would rely on baseline and repeat measurements, and 
detection of changes. Radar would produce directional volume information within the 
repository boundaries. A static radar system would require permanent installation of 
sensors outside of the repository. Monitoring could be continued in post-closure phase. 
Radar waveform could be used in recognition of types of new observations, caused by 
tunnels or installations. Method would rely on distinction of undeclared activities from 
known activities and baseline conditions. A protective shield should envelope the 
repository. 
A borehole radar method to be developed should require low effort for inspectors, low 
need for maintenance, and automated measurements, processing, and interpretation. 
Method should have no influence on repository integrity, use wireless data transfer and 
self-sufficient power supply. Tools should use standard antennas and be constructed of 
reliable components suitable to rough conditions. Detection of undeclared activities 
should be based on modeling. New development of tool technology would use multiple 
frequency measurements, high transmission power, and high-performance electronics 
and data storage.  
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In favourable conditions borehole radar could be used to distances of hundreds of 
metres from a measurement borehole. In Olkiluoto conditions, the attenuation in 
metamorphic rock suppresses the range to tens of metres, which would require high 
density and number of boreholes to be prepared, requiring excessive costs, and 
potentially risking the integrity and safety of repository. Also, the naturally occurring 
reflections would cause multitude of false alarms which would need to be checked or 
rejected to create a meaningful set of information. 
An alternative technique for borehole radar, to be used to complement the passive 
seismic monitoring, would be seismic borehole reflection measurement. Having longer 
range, requirement of drillhole density would be lower. Method would still be expensive 
to implement and maintain, but could use combination of passive, environmental noise 
recording, and active surveys. 
Regarding the active seismic methods, also these have sufficient resolution, do not 
impact repository safety, and range of detection is good. Seismic investigations, 
however, require expert knowledge to design the work and interpret the results, high 
technical effort for measurements, and cannot be done by an inspector alone (Seidel 
2007).  
 
Figure 2-2. Directional drillhole radar reflection example (Althaus 2013). Vertical axis is drillhole length. Horizontal axis 
shows radian distance from drillhole. Image displays backscattered radar waveform reflection amplitude. Colour coding 
indicates direction (azimuth angle from the measurement drillhole). Reflections can be lithological contacts, excavated 
tunnels or deformation zones in rock mass. In favourable conditions (inside a salt formation, granite containing fresh 
groundwater) low 10 – 20 MHz frequency drillhole radar can indicate reflections to two-way distances of several hundreds 
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of metres from measurement drillhole. Repeat measurements would indicate undeclared activities, and their distance and 
direction from a borehole. Coverage of several boreholes would enable more precise localization, and enable creating a 
detection shield around the repository. 
 
 
Figure 2-3. Comparison of GPR synthetic model generated single traces containing baseline measurement (geological 
information), and responses from excavated tunnels, tunnels with installations, tunnels containing disposal cask, and 
backfilled tunnels with casks. Waveform is slightly different in each case (Uchtmann and Althaus 2014). 
 
The seismic signal travels in medium at several group velocities (compressional, 
shear and surface waves). The measurement array typically consists of multiple 
receivers for each source position, and a trace is produced by geometric stacking of 
several recordings to achieve adequate signal level. Recognition of the source of an 
anomaly is less straightforward as for GPR. The actual location of anomaly source 
may differ from what is seen in image. Directional effects of different waveforms 
may leave objects at specific locations unobserved for certain measurement 
geometries. Enhancement or suppression of different waveforms, and enhancing 
visibility of specific anomaly sources, would be necessary in processing. 
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Figure 2-4. Seismograms from synthetic models of seismic measurement data on a tunnel wall in geological 
environment (Seidel 2007, Seidel et al. 1999) having elastic contrasts. Observability of simple model case with one (on 
the left) or more complex model case (on the right) with several excavated spaces is demonstrated. Several waveforms 
and velocities, converted waveforms, complex geology combined with measurement geometry, etc., are making the raw 
stacked image complicated to understand.  
Field testing in a mine was presented, using high 1 m density of geophones and 
seismic sources on tunnel wall in a salt mine, along a 144 m line. Seismically visible 
targets are visualized in surface wave and shear wave reflection image up to a 100 m 
distance from measurement line, with a 1 m accuracy. The interpretation was based 
on knowledge of location of the targets (Seidel 2007, Zöllner and Schicht 2007, 
Schuetze et al. 2008).  
In case unexpected observations would be made, these could further be checked. 
Measurement of the line has required two working days in tunnel conditions. 
Seismic methods would require technical development to be applied for safeguards 
purposes (with comparable ease as GPR systems), including principal tests, 
development of prototype and appropriate software for processing and 
interpretation (Seidel 2007). False alarm rate needs to be kept low. There is also a 
risk that not all relevant features would be detected. Results should be compared to 
known layout of existing tunnels or using a baseline and repeat measurement to 
compare changes between measurement campaigns. 
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2.3 Capability of geophysical methods in safeguards 
Detectability of engineered underground spaces using active geophysical methods would 
be based on contrast of physical properties of the constructed volumes to the 
surrounding rock mass. The contrast may be causing an anomaly in potential field 
(electrical, magnetic or gravity). Cause could be a density contrast, or electrical 
resistivity contrast between rock and air or water. Magnetic contrast to rock mass would 
be caused by iron containing support structures, installations, or machinery. Active 
survey can describe location, size, and partially form of an excavated space. 
Actual construction activity instead could be observed, and localized, by monitoring a 
related physical wavefield, which may be electromagnetic interference from electric or 
 
Figure 2-5. Practical seismic example from a salt mine (Seidel 2007, Zöllner 2007). Seismic image produced with high 
spatial coverage of geophones and seismic sources at a target with known tunnel locations (orange and black lines, 
orange lines are considered as seismically visible structures). Creation of image has involved multiphase processing. 
Horizontal axis is survey line length in a tunnel, vertical axis is distance from the measurement tunnel. Reflection 
amplitude is show on grey scale image, black and white continuous lines indicate reflections from tunnel wall. Known, 
seismically visible tunnels are shown with orange color and other known tunnels with black color. Also, other objects 
(lithological contacts, faults) are seen in image. Not all visible tunnels, due to orientation generate reflections using this 
survey geometry. 
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diesel engines or power source, or mechanic noise from extraction of rock mass, or 
operating machinery.  
Contrast may also be generating a reflecting boundary, seen in back scattered 
electromagnetic or elastic waveform. Contrasts can be generated by seismic or radar 
velocity between rock and air or rock and water, or by metallic installations and support 
structures.  
Detection capability is defined, further to the contrast, by distance of the target from 
measurement array, and attenuation of the physical signal carrying the response from 
the target. Also, size of the target, comparable to the detection distance, and to 
properties of physical signal, are governing the observability.  
In a waveform-based method like seismic or radar survey, the wavelength of transmitted 
and reflected wave needs to be minor compared to size of the object, to enable detection 
of a target. Decreased wavelength decreases the achievable range. From longer distances 
and longer wavelengths, the size of object needs to be larger to be detected. 
Reinforcement of engineered spaces may increase detectability, like metal containing 
shotcrete lining or bolting may make tunnel wall more visible in electromagnetic 
measurements. In some cases, the electrically conductive installations may suppress 
observability due to wavefield attenuation. 
Active seismic methods in verification of design information are likely to require highly 
designed survey technique and processing, high source and receiver density, high 
frequencies to enable detection of small objects, directional, capable of processing shear 
waves for better detection and resolution, but for these reasons compromising range of 
detection from tunnel. Methods may require preparations on tunnel wall, like drilling 
boreholes to install sources or receivers. 
Also, other geophysical techniques have been tested in tunnel conditions, of which 
electrical resistivity sounding or electromagnetic sounding may have capabilities in 
safeguards. More limited application possibilities may be involved in magnetic surveying 
and gravimetric surveying, either in tunnels or in boreholes. Best application 
possibilities would be with repeat measurements, where baseline not containing 
undeclared activities, would be compared to later survey. 
In Olkiluoto conditions, performance of several active geophysical methods for 
safeguards were reviewed (Okko 2004). Ground penetrating radar (GPR) was estimated 
capable to detect an undeclared void from distances of few metres behind rock face. 
Reference is the declared repository design, so a GPR baseline survey of full site 
coverage (on tunnel rock faces) is not likely needed.  
Active seismic survey from ground surface was initially assessed not capable to detect 
undeclared tunnels or excavations at repository level (Okko 2004). 
Active electromagnetic or electrical ground level surveys were initially assessed not 
practical for safeguards purposes (Okko 2004). Passive electromagnetic monitoring may 
be considered in detection and localization of power consuming installations and wiring. 
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Electromagnetic (or electrical) methods can be used for locating the metal canisters or 
waste containers (Finch 2009). Also, metallic support structures can be observed with 
EM or DC methods. Passive electromagnetic methods can be used in monitoring power 
consumption (Finch 2009). Detection of electrical or electromagnetic fields may lead to 
detection of undeclared activities (machinery, power feed). 
Applicability of geophysical methods from the ground surface to detect existing 
repository were reviewed in case its presence would be unknown during the time of 
survey (Isaksson et al. 2010). Review was using the known contrasts of constructed 
tunnels and repository to the host rock in simulation of geophysical responses in 
measurement, and comparison the variation in the synthetic data (“anomaly”) to the 
naturally occurring variation. Seismic reflection measurement was the only relevant 
technique for the purpose. Yet confirming a known design information from ground level 
measurements to the depth of 400 – 500 m, and even detection of deviation from the 
declared information, would require much higher resolution for active survey methods. 
 
2.4 Places and timing of geophysical measurements for safeguards 
Development of repository can be divided to pre-nuclear, operation and post closure 
time ranges. The pre-nuclear phase includes selection between candidate sites, 
preliminary characterization aiming for siting process, safety assessment and repository 
design, and construction. All these phases are producing site description information, 
which can be used as baseline for safety case and safeguards related investigations alike.  
Geological site characterization includes drilling of several dozens of deep drillholes, 
which provide also access closer to the repository volume. Construction of tunnels and 
shafts will also provide closer access and view to the site volume, and possibility to 
install sensors at closer range, and different vertical levels with respect to the repository 
volume.  
Also monitoring is necessary to be started in suitable time before construction, to 
understand site properties and risks, as well as to follow changes caused by 
construction. Seismic monitoring from ground surface is adequate to detect events of 
large energy, like excavation blasts, with their magnitude and location to distances of 
several kilometers. Possible natural and excavation induced microseismic activity can be 
localized and detected in cases where several stations are able to detect the same event. 
Smaller events to be detected will require more sensitive sensors to be installed near the 
repository volume, either in boreholes drilled from surface, or from tunnel. Range of 
detection is several hundreds of metres. 
Ground surface-based measurements can be conducted in any time during lifetime of the 
repository, also post closure. However, the depth range of ground-based surveys, and 
first, their detection capability, is inadequate to observe an undeclared tunnel from 
depth of 400 – 500 m. Reflection seismic survey is in practice only existing active 
geophysical method which has the required detection power. A 2D line survey has 
highest resolution but needs to be placed and aligned correctly to observe tunnel. A 3D 
area survey has highest coverage. 
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Locations and timing from where and when undeclared tunnels might be observed, are 
from ground surface any time during and after construction of the disposal facility. Deep 
drillholes can be used in survey to enhance the resolution. Extending closer to target, 
drillholes can be used to observe smaller objects than would be possible from ground 
surface. Any surveys carried out from the drillholes would have shorter range, but 
higher resolution than from ground level. Surveys would also be directional. The 
location and distance of drillholes from the expected target is more critical than those of 
ground level-based survey.  
The drillholes would be available during site description and partly during construction 
of the underground facility. Due to avoidance of hydraulic connections between 
hydraulically conductive zones and the repository volume, the drillholes located close to 
the facility will be permanently sealed, without possibility to leave installations behind. 
Neither any new drillholes would be allowed. This means the drillhole based survey 
opportunity near the repository would not be available after closure of the disposal 
facility.  
In case an intrusion from outside of the repository volume would be expected, an early 
warning capability would be useful. Tunnel construction is expected to progress at 
maximum pace of 5 m /day. Observation of tunnel construction at a perimeter of 1 – 2 
km from the repository would allow time to react to an attempt. In case a tunnel would 
be prepared from closest distance, it would be also located closer to the surface, making 
observation more feasible. Inclination of 10-15% would mean vertical distance of 200 – 
300 m below ground level at this perimeter. This depth is still so large, that other than 
seismic reflection method is not capable in observing tunnel sized objects from ground 
surface. A drillhole measurement can be used to distances from 150-250 m from the 
drillhole using seismic survey, and 30 – 50 m using drillhole radar. Distances between 
the drillholes would need to be 300-500 m for seismic reflection survey and 50-100 m 
for radar survey to cover and overlap the rock volume with survey. 
Distance large enough from the repository would also make it possible to prepare 
drillholes for installation of a network of sensors. Such perimeter installation would 
however be costly and require continuous operation and maintenance. Attempt to 
approach from deep below the repository, trying to avoid detection, would be greater, 
more time-consuming effort.  
Tunnels and vertical shafts constructed during site description and during repository 
construction, are available locations which can be used also for safeguards related 
geophysical measurements. The tunnel or shaft surfaces can be used to place surveys to 
observe undeclared tunnels from closer, up to distances of few metres to few tens of 
metres from measurement system. Accessibility to the target during construction and 
during operation may have practical limitations, though. The tunnels and shafts would 
not be available for investigations after the backfill and closure of the site. Just like 
ground level based deep drillholes, the tunnels and shafts will be finally backfilled and 
sealed and at later stages of disposal not any more available for detection 
measurements. Neither any permanent data acquisition systems, or their required data 
transfer systems, would be very unlikely to be allowed to become constructed before 
backfilling and sealing.  
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Characterization drillholes from the tunnels can be used in detection measurements 
until these are not sealed. Normally during construction, the pilot holes drilled onto 
middle of planned tunnel before excavation, serve as data source, but are excavated 
away during tunnel construction. 
Different survey methods have different capabilities in detection and possibilities for 
implementation. Waveform reflection-based methods GPR and seismic reflection can 
provide exact information of location and shape of an object behind tunnel wall.  
Electromagnetic radio wave reflection method, Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) is 
providing imaging of bedrock volume. The GPR method can be applied from tunnel 
surfaces or drillholes. The method can produce high resolution imaging at close 0 – 40 m 
range from measurement line in deep Olkiluoto bedrock conditions. In salt dome or 
granite, the range may reach 50 – 100 m. Results can be used to detect undeclared 
constructed spaces behind tunnel surfaces. GPR reflection measurement is quick to 
implement, cost effective, and does not require specialist driven planning or 
implementation, taken that serious range limitations would be respected. The GPR 
method does not apply in conditions where the bedrock has high electrical conductivity, 
or lining material used for tunnel support is electrically conductive. 
The GPR in its current industry standard method, is capable to detect tunnel behind rock 
wall to distances of 10 m using conventional manually operated tools. Detection range 
depends on applied frequency and measurement system. Detection with low frequency 
(20 MHz) drillhole radar is possible to distances of 40 m in favorable conditions in 
Olkiluoto. Presence of conductive minerals or saline groundwater in rock mass 
suppresses this range significantly. In salt dome environment even 500 m is possible to 
reach. Limitations of the GPR belong it cannot be applied through metal fibre containing 
concrete reinforcement or concrete walls. Survey may encounter limitations due to 
reinforcement of tunnel walls, for example bolting, wire mesh support or metal fabric 
containing shotcrete lining. On the other hand, GPR does not require mechanical contact 
onto the measurement surface, is quick to implement, has high production rate, is easily 
operable, and does not require prominent level expertise in planning, operation, or 
interpretation. Method is also easily repeatable.  
Seismic reflection imaging methods from tunnel have significantly larger distance range 
than GPR up to 100 m, but the design and implementation of method is slower, more 
expensive and requires high expertise.  
The seismic reflection method is also standardized investigation technique in 
geotechnical, mineral exploration and oil exploration industries. Method is capable in 
detecting a tunnel behind rock wall to distances of more than 100 m. The method 
requires mechanical contact onto the measurement surface. Implementation is 
significantly slower and more expensive than GPR. Planning, implementation, and 
interpretation requires prominent level of expertise. Results are not possible to view 
immediately but require extensive processing. 
Alternatives for GPR at similar, or slightly deeper range are other electromagnetic 
methods and electrical resistivity sounding (tomographic imaging), which however have 
less resolution than GPR and would be slower and slightly more expensive to and 
require expertise to implement.  
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Other geophysical methods than reflection surveys can be used in detection of presence 
of an undeclared tunnel behind rock wall. These can rely on density contrast in case of 
gravimetric method, magnetization contrast in case of magnetic method, and electric 
conductivity in case of electromagnetic profiling or electrical resistivity tomography. 
Each of these methods are quicker to implement than seismic reflection, slower than 
GPR, and can indicate presence of suspected deviation to distances of 10 – 50 m from a 
tunnel. Understanding the results would require comparison to synthetic model results, 
and preferably comparison between baseline and repeat surveys. 
The existing site description data includes survey results which could be used in 
designing new investigations, and for comparison of repeat studies. Coverage is limited, 
though. Approximately 20 of the deep drillholes were measured with 3D VSP reflection 
seismic survey. Data can be used to compare possible new features in the rock mass 
within 200-300 m of drillholes if survey would be repeated. The same holds for 9 
drillholes measured using drillhole radar, up to distances of 40 m from the drillholes. 
From ground level, two campaign of reflection seismic surveys conducted in 2005 and 
2006 can be used as partial baseline in Olkiluoto. One seismic 2D reflection lines cover 
the length of the island and one line in crossing direction. Outside of their coverage area, 
no baseline survey is available for comparison. 
Along access tunnel, three different campaigns of seismic reflection survey were carried 
out in 2007, 2009 and 2013. These surveys can be used as a baseline data in case the 
visibility of now constructed or future planned declared tunnels would be checked, or 
measurement for screening undeclared activities would be anticipated. GPR studies on 
tunnel wall were conducted in few locations for methodological development, 
assessment of applicability can be drawn on that basis. Electrical resistivity tomography 
was carried out at one location in a demonstration tunnel, indicating the possibility to 
apply that kind of survey. Some of relevant surveys have been conducted during 
construction of the tunnels or shafts, and their results can be utilized as a baseline for 
comparison, to detect any changes in responses.  
Regarding other than geophysical techniques which could be applied for safeguards, the 
construction produces data which can be applied for safeguards. The tunnel surfaces are 
laser scanned immediately after construction for documentation and quality control 
purposes. Deeper seated areas are reinforced after excavation, using systematic bolting, 
wire mesh installations on ceiling, and shotcrete lining reinforcement at most of tunnel 
sections, though mainly not in the disposal tunnels to avoid chemical influence of the 
cement material. In the tunnels are frequently carried out maintenance work. Bolts and 
mesh installations are checked and replaced. Shotcrete is drained for water leakages and 
it can be repaired where necessary. Tunnel sections which do not contain lining, are 
checked for loose rock material which is frequently removed for personnel safety 
requirements. Form of the tunnel surfaces can be re-surveyed either by laser scanning or 
photogrammetry to compare any reported or non-reported changes on the local tunnel 
wall. This may help in observing potential changes, when comparing to the original 
scanning results. 
This report is describing experiences from geophysical surveys used in rock mass 
characterization during excavation of the ONKALO disposal facility. Similar techniques 
can be applied later safeguards purposes, if required. 
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3 Experiences from hard rock geophysical surveys 
3.1 Ground penetrating radar and drillhole radar 
Ground Penetrating Radar method (GPR) is based on high frequency electromagnetic 
(radio) wave reflection occurring at boundaries and objects having contrast between 
electrical rock properties. These properties include dielectric permittivity which is 
defining the wave velocity within the rock mass, and electrical conductivity which is 
governing the attenuation of the wave field in the rock mass. 
GPR signal is generated by creating a short timed (rapidly raising and lowering) impulse 
of high electric current into an antenna. Size and shape of the antenna define the central 
frequency and frequency band at which the antenna operates. Dipole antenna length is 
defining the frequency. Similar antenna is receiving the direct and back scattered wave 
field according to recording time. Transmitter and receiver antennas can be placed close 
to each other within same housing (monostatic, zero offset) or operated separately at 
specifiable mutual distance (bi-static, adjustable offset), or even in an array of several 
antennas. Antennas can be shielded against transmission towards other than target 
itself, and receipt of scattered reflections from side and above (behind) the antenna, or 
non-shielded, radiating to all directions on antenna transmission pattern (e.g., dipole 
axis). Non-shielded antennas are sensitive for interference in tunnel conditions, being 
more suitable for application in open outdoors terrain or using drillhole. 
Alternatives for impulse radar, there are systems based on continuous waves (single 
frequency), and modulated stepped-frequency systems, covering wide frequency band 
within one tool. 
Waveform is sampled at dense time intervals to form a radar trace (A-scan), to specific 
time after transmission. One trace at each line position is stored. Several frequently 
repeated traces measured at anticipated intervals on measurement line form a B-scan 
(GPR image). Images produced parallel on a rock surface, or from different sides of an 
object, can be used to form a volume description or C-scan (tomography). 
At each measurement location, the boundaries having contrast of electrical properties in 
rock mass, create returning amplitude occurring at specific time on the trace. The time is 
proportional to distance to the object. Changes in GPR wave velocity modify the distance 
axis accordingly. 
The contrasts in rock mass are related to water content in fractures. Water has high 
relative dielectric permittivity (εr = 81) compared to typical rock mass (εr = 5 – 8), which 
enables high reflected amplitudes. Other contrasts can be found at lithology contacts, 
contacts at electrically conductive layers (like sulphide minerals), and on boundaries of 
engineered structures. For safeguards relevancy, the contrasts between rock mass (εr = 
5…8) and air (εr = 1), or installations in tunnel (steel, wiring, etc. which are highly 
conductive) are of importance. 
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Polarity of amplitude depends on properties of the contrast. Amplitude of the reflected 
event depends on strength of the contrast, distance, and extent of the target. Different 
shapes of reflecting boundaries cause different form of anomaly on GPR image. A 
continuous planar surface can be seen as a line on the image. The apparent inclination of 
the line depends on the true angle of the planar surface with the line of observation.  
A point like or spherical object is seen as a hyperbolic trace on the GPR image (a 
diffracting event). Also, termination points of planar or linear objects are causing a 
diffractor event in the GPR image. 
The GPR image is projected as a vertical depth (from floor) or perpendicular distance 
(from a wall). In practice the GPR signal is transmitted in a conical volume, which angle 
is delimited by dielectric contrast between air and rock mass. For this reason, the 
reflections can arrive also slightly offset from the normal to the observation surface. 
Distance onto which the GPR can detect an object in rock mass, is depending on the 
dielectric permittivity governing the velocity (time vs. distance), the electrical 
conductivity of the medium (attenuation of the GPR wave field), and on the transmission 
power of the antenna, sensitivity of the receiver antenna, dynamic range of the 
measured amplitude, noise level, and frequency of the signal. Lower frequencies 
attenuate more slowly and penetrate to greater distances. Dynamic range of the receiver 
amplitude is affecting to the range through signal to noise ratio. Transmission power is 
connected to the rock mass through coupling onto the surface, depending on both the 
quality and material of the rock surface, and the antenna design. 
GPR receiver is a control tool which contains computer, storage, software, display, and 
connections to antenna. Antenna designs are several different, depending on frequency 
and application purpose. High frequency conical antennas can be used in an air-coupled 
mode, at a distance from observation surface. This implementation allows vehicle 
installation and quick operation. Tools are sensitive to reflections arriving from 
surrounding environment. Other types of antennas are used as ground-coupled, which 
require short distance from the observation surface during measurement. Antenna 
systems can be mono-static (zero offset), containing both transmitter and receiver 
elements within same housing at short distances, or bi-static, having transmitter and 
receiver in separate units, with either fixed or adjustable offset distance. In these cases 
offset can be placed either in-line or broadside. Selecting different offset distances may 
enhance some reflection observability compared to zero-offset measurement. 
Especially the monostatic antennas are often shielded against transmission and receipt 
of signal from other directions than the actual measurement target. This is required in 
tunnel environment, as the reflections of airwave from side walls, ceiling, and irregular 
surfaces, as well as installations, are easily making the data useless for application. Bi-
static antennas, either in separate units, or assembled in a pulled array cable or in 
drillhole antenna system, are usually not shielded making their application in tunnel 
almost impossible. Drillhole antennas are radiating to all directions perpendicular to 
antenna length (that is, on dipole axis), and have good coupling on the surrounding rock 
mass, which enhances data quality and observability. Directional drillhole radar can be 
used to define the arrival direction of reflections based on polarity. Also, directional 
transmission drillhole antennas have been developed recently. 
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Low frequencies, which could be used to detect objects further away from tunnel wall, 
are using large antennas, which are difficult to manufacture properly shielded, are heavy 
and bulky to operate, and sensitive to irregular shape of surface between antenna and 
rock mass. The latter is causing severe ringing, which makes data less usable as for high 
frequencies. Especially surfaces aligned with observation line are difficult to detect when 
airwave ringing is present in data. 
Measurements can be carried out with moving the antenna with vehicle or manually at 
walking pace, especially when measurement is directed downwards on the floor of 
tunnel. On the walls or ceiling, it is necessary to hold antenna firmly with a mechanical 
arrangement or manually. 
Measurement is carried out in fractions of seconds at a single station. Measurement can 
be stacked to improve signal to noise ratio, with multiple recording at one location, 
either stopping or during slow movement. Also, multiple offset Measurement can be 
repeated at dense interval on measurement line, launched either with time, by operator, 
or using for example pulse encoder which can be attached to length measurement line 
tape, or rotated on the surface as antenna is moving. 
Measurements need to be carried out as campaign on specific location. Application 
technique would consist of lines, having some degree of continuity, placed on tunnel 
surfaces. Lines may be placed also parallel, at separation of some metres. Measurements 
can be made using a vehicle moving at slow pace, or with slow walking pace, up to 1 – 2 
km / h. Tunnel conditions in a construction work area causes severe limitations for 
accessibility, survey timing, and arrangements. For these reasons achievement with 
interpreted results would in an order of 2000 €/ km on tunnel surface. 
Measurements are possible through paving on floor in case the material does not contain 
significant amount of metal residue from reinforcement. Measurements cannot be taken 
on wall or ceiling which is lined with metal fibre reinforced (sprayed) concrete. Nor it 
cannot be carried out to volumes behind a reinforced concrete wall. The banded texture 
of foliated rock mass causes abundance of irrelevant reflections, and in part attenuate 
the signal sooner than in many other lithology would.  
Drillhole radar measurements could be conducted in rock mass, the range covering 5-10 
m radial distance around the drillholes with 250 MHz antenna, 10-15 m with 100 MHz 
antenna, 20-25 m with 60 MHz antenna or 20 – 40 m with 22 MHz antenna. Using 
drillholes in survey is unlikely possibility, as for nuclear long-term safety there shall be 
avoidance of potential hydraulic connections within the repository. Maintaining 
drillholes around the tunnels, or drilling new holes, would not be anticipated. 
Observability of a target is depending on distance, size, contrast to surrounding rock, as 
well as GPR wave frequency, dynamic range of the system, and transmission power. 
Signal to noise ratio can be enhanced to some level by improving numerical accuracy 
(previous 16 bit to 32 bits recently), using more powerful transmitter, and stacking 
(summarizing) the signal at specific location or over several offset distances (at common 
mid-point). Smallest targets which can be detected are linear and continuous water filled 
drillholes, when located in GPR transmission cone, and aligned so that reflection can 
arrive back to receiver antenna. Otherwise, smallest realistically detected objects have 
radius in order of magnitude of product of distance and wavelength. Two closely located 
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objects cannot be separated as individual targets when located closer than a wavelength. 
For the lowest GPR frequencies, the resolution is in order of 1 – 3 m (Olsson et al. 1992, 
Sandberg et al. 1991) which is adequate for tunnel detection. 
Lowest contrast remains earliest below signal to noise ratio threshold; highest 
amplitudes are detected from longer distances. Reflections and diffractions are obtained 
from surfaces facing towards the receiver antenna, located within the transmission cone. 
Objects aligned close perpendicular to observation surface are not observed directly, 
though scattering and attenuation may occur. 
Accuracy of detection in distance is related to correct knowledge of GPR wave velocity. 
In Olkiluoto, typical average dielectric permittivity εr = 6, converts to 125 m/μs GPR 
velocity. Changes in lithology and variation in groundwater content may cause changes 
of 5 – 10 % of this range. On observability, tunnels, shafts, and galleries are large objects 
to be detected with GPR in case these would be in favorable location, and the properties 
would be appropriate. Measurement needs to be directed towards the target so that it 
would be located within GPR transmission cone. Tunnel would need to contain surfaces 
facing towards the measurement system. Contrast of rock mass and water is remarkably 
high enabling good observability. Contrast between rock mass and air is much smaller 
and may not be detected from greater distances. Low contrasts like rock mass and 
concrete, combined with higher attenuation due to elevated electrical conductivity, may 
suppress observability. Best observed would-be perpendicular intersection of tunnel at 
close distance, which is creating a distinct hyperbolic reflection of a spherical object. A 
dead-end tunnel face behind the wall may be observed equally well. 
Long, parallel to observation line and discontinuous surface with weak contrast and 
further away, may lead to false negative observation. Regarding the effective range of 
GPR observation, there is no reliable way to confirm at which distance an object would 
not be seen even when it is there.  
False positive observations may become a risk in case a survey is carried out as a single 
pass study. Plenty of natural lithological and fracture anomalies exist, some of which are 
also causing hyperbolic anomalies, and other objects linear continuous features. These 
are unlikely to be possible to become checked by drilling. Most reliable confirming 
method would be useful, using repeated survey on same positions, focusing on new 
features which have appeared after previous measurement round. Measurements would 
need to be also checked against reported tunnel layout to check visibility of existing 
tunnels. 
The GPR is suitable with manually handled, well shielded antennas to frequencies of 250 
– 400 MHz, providing fairly accurate detection and location possibility to 5 – 10 m 
distance from rock wall. Effectivity is based on high data production rate and continuous 
measurement, without need to stop and attach tools physically to tunnel surface. 
Measurement needs to be applied on non-reinforced, clean rock surface, with adequate 
continuity of survey line to image the target properly. Measurement is hampered by 
elevated electrical conductivity in rock mass e.g., by saline groundwater. Measurement 
needs to be directed towards the anticipated target. A slightly deeper penetration, 10-15 
m, would be obtained with a shielded 100 MHz antenna, which is however already bulky 
to be operated on the wall, and the results are disturbed by ringing caused by uneven 
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rock surface below antenna. Lower frequencies at 20 or 50 MHz would be clearly useful 
for greater depth range (20 – 30 m), especially when combined with recent 32 bit 
recording dynamic range providing better signal to noise ratio. However, these tools are 
large, up to 4…8 m of antenna length, and in tunnel conditions would need to develop 
proper directionality and shielding for both transmitter and receiver antennas, to avoid 
direct wave and multi-path airwave ringing in the results. Consequently, this kind of 
tools would be slow to operate in production.  
GPR method can be used in assisting of containment and surveillance in cases where 
would be expected presence of undeclared tunnel near existing tunnels. Method can be 
used only until backfill of the disposal or central tunnels. Design information verification 
is also an application method, using to prove there would not be indications of 
undeclared excavated spaces after construction, or that the form of the tunnel face is 
conforming what is reported. Regarding continuity of knowledge, though it is possible to 
observe a capsule in backfilled disposal hole from close distance using the GPR method 
(neighboring disposal tunnel may be at distance limit or too distant), there would not be 
confirmation that the high amplitude reflection would emerge from a capsule, and that it 
would not have been moved and replaced meanwhile. In extremely limited cases GPR 
could be used in non-designed purpose for security, e.g., to detect a vehicle transport 
even through a wall, in a form of altered reflection amplitude. 
Range of tunnel or ground surface operated GPR is not high to observe any undeclared 
spaces from rock mass after closure of tunnels or the whole repository. Range and 
accuracy are high enough to detect locations where interference of natural properties 
would have taken place (clandestine portals below soil layer or rock wall, covered 
excavations). Drillhole radar method can be used as repeat survey in case existing 
drillholes of minimum 56 mm diameter would be available. Data is of high quality and 
undisturbed by local variation in tunnel properties installation interferences. Data is 
usually not directional, so only distance to potential target can be derived. Directional 60 
MHz RAMAC antenna has in Olkiluoto 10 – 20 m radius from drillhole, and it has 
capability to indicate direction from where reflection is arriving. Physically larger 22 
MHz tool can provide reflections from 20 – 40 m distance from the drillhole. New 
development of more powerful multi-frequency tools (Althaus 2013) may bring in 
slightly larger range and quicker measurement, at a cost of more expensive tool and 
requirement for larger 85 mm or 130 mm drillhole diameter.  
Deep drillholes prepared at the disposal site perimeter, at distances avoiding 
interference to long term safety, can be used as a campaign to observe tunnels. 
Measurement of each drillhole (down to 500 m depth) would require 1 day, at an 
approximate cost of 5000 €/day. False alarms could be suppressed by repeated survey, 
and comparison of results between subsequent measurements. Drillhole radar tools are 
not likely to be used as permanent installations due to their relative rarity and excessive 
cost. More likely method of application would be repeated survey rounds at pace of 
months or years, or on demand. 
Lower frequency and higher measurement range may become feasible with shielded 
antennas, array of one or several transmitters and multiple simultaneous receivers at 
different offsets, used for stacking and mathematical suppression of air and direct waves 
and ground interference reflections. Measurement would be based on stopping at 
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frequent intervals and would become much slower and more expensive than 
conventional GPR survey. 
One possibility to apply two separate low frequency antennas would be placing a fixed 
transmitter in one tunnel and completing a measurement line up to 40-50 m direct 
distance in another tunnel. This Vertical Radar Profiling (VRP) geometry might help in 
suppressing tunnel interference. Each profile would indicate undeclared tunnels 
between two disposal tunnels, within few metres distance from measurement tunnel. 
3.1.1 GPR and drillhole radar surveys for Posiva and SKB 
The GPR method in its variations has been used in separate phases of site 
characterization and site description or construction. Preliminary stages applied GPR at 
40 MHz and 100 MHz antennas for measurement of till layer thickness and partly 
bedrock fracturing. Later investigation trenches were surveyed with GPR to estimate 
fracture extensions. 
Drillhole radar was applied at 22 MHz omnidirectional reflection survey to 30 – 40 m 
from drillhole down to 1000 m length (Figure 3-1). The tool does not indicate direction 
where the cause of anomaly is located. From ground surface, drillholes were measured 
with VRP surveys to 50 m depth using fixed surface transmitter positions. A directional 
60 MHz survey was carried out to 15-25 m distances to delineate and orient fractures 
and other reflecting layers in rock mass.  
The other investigation sites in Finland, Kivetty and Romuvaara, made it possible due to 
higher resistivity of bedrock, to reach range of 100 m around drillholes using 22 MHz 
frequency, and up to 50-60 m using 60 MHz directional drillhole radar.  
SKB was using drillhole radar in Stripa mine characterization, and was able to make 
imaging of existing tunnels with drillhole radar measurements to distances of tens of 
meters (Figure 3-2, Olsson et al. 1992). There it was possible to indicate that drillhole 
radar is capable to detect nearby tunnels with their characteristic hyperbolic reflection 
or diffraction pattern. Similar survey was carried also in Grimsel test site for Nagra, 
showing comparable results. 
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Figure 3-1. Drillhole radar single hole reflection image from Olkiluoto drillhole OL-KR5 in 1991 (Carlsten 1991, Saksa 
et al. 2005), 22 MHz Range of reflections, 1 microsecond, indicates roughly 60 m radial distance. Strong inclined 
reflection is nearby dolerite dyke. Smaller, drillhole intersecting reflections are local fractures, faults, and lithological 
contacts. Stronger attenuation is seen deeper (below 400 m) in drillhole. Local water bearing faults or conductive 
mineral bearing veins attenuate signal at some intervals (50 – 100 m, 300 m). Prominent ringing at late times is caused 
by wave traveling along drillhole and back between transmitter and receiver. 
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Figure 3-2. Drillhole radar single hole reflection image from Stripa mine investigations, 60 MHz drillhole radar (Olsson et 
al. 1992; Saksa et al. 2005). Excavated drift is clearly seen as a hyperbolic reflection at 40 m radial distance from the 
measurement drillhole. Other drillholes drilled from the same niche  are visible as linear objects. 
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During construction of ONKALO access tunnel, more than 30 tunnel and niche pilot holes 
were used to measure omnidirectional 250 MHz drillhole radar profiles to radial 
distance of 5-10 m. Survey used bi-static drillhole antenna (Malå Geoscience). Purpose 
was to locate, delineate and measure intersection angle and continuity of fractures and 
other radar reflecting layers in rock mass within and near the tunnel perimeter. Results 
were combined with core logging data. Functionality of the method in this purpose was 
evaluated by Döse and Gustafsson (2011), related to Rock Suitability Classification work 
(Figure 3-3). In case a tunnel would be located within range of measurement, it would be 
observed. Range of investigation would be greater with 100 MHz or 60 MHz tools, or 
even with 22 MHz drillhole radar, which on the other hand are heavier to operate due to 
their large size. In one case (Mustonen et al. 2011) a repeat survey in remaining drillhole 
was indicating the parallel tunnel wall is clearly visible in drillhole radar data (Figure 
3-4), though distance was 1 – 2 m in that case. 
 
Figure 3-3. Extract of drillhole radar reflection image from pilot hole ONK-PH08 at chainage PL3115 m in ONKALO access 
tunnel, 250 MHz dual antenna (right). Full time scale 200 ns, reflections are obtained until 100-120 ns two-way time (7-8 
m radially from drillhole). Reflectivity is associated with lithology and fractures, which contribute to GPR velocity and 
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Figure 3-4. Drillhole radar images in horizontal pilot hole ONK-PP200 with 250 MHz drillhole antenna, full radial scale c. 
10 m. Left image before excavation (baseline), right image after excavation of investigation niche ONK-TKU-3620. 
Lithology and fractures are contributing to inclined reflections, water saturation to velocity and amplitude differences 
near top of the hole. A parallel, discontinuous new reflector, partly masked by ringing, indicates a tunnel face approaching 
closer to drillhole towards the end of the hole, 1 – 2 m distance (Mustonen et al. 2011). 
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The surfaces of access tunnel were measured with GPR for testing the performance, then 
for description of the Excavation Damaged Zone, using 1.6 GHz high frequency GPR 
down to depth of 1 m from the surfaces (Heikkinen et al. 2020b, Figure 3-8). Results are 
detailed, and in case any structure would be hidden immediately behind a tunnel wall, it 
would be also detected. Based on testing, a GPR EDZ method (Silvast & Wiljanen 2008) 
was developed, where GPR measurement amplitude data would be processed in 
frequency domain to index values, representing EDZ layer thickness on the rock surface. 
Measurement can be carried out with air coupled antenna, using vehicle mounting 
(Figure 3-5). Later a ground coupled system has been developed (Figure 3-6). High 
frequency GPR has been applied also on experimental disposal hole walls and shaft walls 
to detect extent of fracturing. The GPR EDZ method is independent on reflection data, 
which could have relevancy for safeguards purposes, like baseline and repeat surveys 
(Figure 3-7). 
 
Figure 3-5. GPR images measured at ONKALO access tunnel chainage 1950 – 2050 m. Distance from the wall 0.5 – 1 m, mounted 
on a vehicle. Air coupled horn antennas with frequencies 1.0 GHz and 2.2 GHz, produce range of 25-30 ns corresponding 1 – 
1.5 m distance in rock mass, performed without contact to the surface (Silvast & Wiljanen 2008). Steel reinforced mesh on the 
surface would prevent any measurement. 
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Figure 3-6. GPR EDZ measurement, GPR image of 1.6 GHZ antenna showing effect of small-scale fracturing on surface, and 
frequency processed GPR EDZ index data, blue colours represent increased excavation damage (Heikkinen et al. 2010b, Kantia 
et al. 2013). Depth range 0.9 m from surface. 
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Figure 3-7. GPR EDZ repeat measurement at investigation niche PL2240 in ONKALO access tunnel, with and without 
water saturation. Repeat measurement can be compared to baseline (Heikkinen et al. 2010b). Depth range 0.9 m from 
surface. 
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Figure 3-8. GPR measurement profile on tunnel floor at investigation niche ONK-TKU-3620, measured for EDZ 
characterization, draped on to form of the floor. Frequency 1.6 GHz, depth range 1.0 m (Heikkinen et al. 2020b). 
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Laboratory analysis and numerical simulations indicated the electrical conductivity 
0.005 – 0.01 S/m at high GPR frequencies (analysis at 2 GHz) start to be at limit on wave 
transmission, and attenuation of 0.5 – 1 dB/m approach the level where GPR starts to be 
no more applicable (Heikkinen et al. 2020a).  
Table 3-1. Estimated GPR range at different frequencies in Olkiluoto and other spent nuclear fuel disposal candidate sites. GPR 
wavefield Q (number of cycles within range of investigation) is depending on attenuation (conductivity) of the rock mass, but 
















22 MHz 5.7 5 125 50 (Q=10) 100  (Q = 20)  
60 MHz 5.7 2 125 25 (Q=12) 50  (Q = 25)  
100 MHz 5.7 1.2 125 15 (Q=12) 25 (Q = 20)  
100 MHz 
DH 
5.7 1.2 125 15 (Q=12) 25 (Q = 20)  
       
250 MHz 5.7 0.5 125 10 (Q = 20) 15  
250 MHz 
DH 
5.7 0.5 125 10 (Q = 20) 15  
350 MHz 5.7 0.35 125 10 (Q = 30) #N/A 32-bit, hyper 
stacking system 
400 MHz 5.7 0.30 125 4 (Q = 12) #N/A  
1.0 GHz air 5.7 0.12 125 1.5 (Q = 10)   
1.6MHz 5.7 0.08 125 1 (Q = 12) #N/A  
2.6 GHz 5.7 0.04 125 0.6 (Q = 10)   
 
Earlier the conductivity and attenuation were estimated indirectly based on 
measurement data at different frequencies, and from various targets in Olkiluoto (Saksa 
et al. 2005). Recently more direct information on the range has been produced from the 
actual disposal level and actual rock mass properties, also with the applicable type of 
tool and antennas. In any case, the conductivity in high frequency end is high enough to 
cause strong attenuation, which is severely delimiting the GPR range to the class of 10 m 
from tunnel wall at its best. For example, saline groundwater in bedrock would further 
suppress the GPR range. GPR was thought to provide information on possible empty 
spaces behind tunnel lining. However, metal reinforced shotcrete, widely used to 
support tunnels for personnel safety, suppresses completely the GPR wavefield, being 
highly electrically conductive. 
As the electrical conductivity and attenuation of GPR wave field is strongly frequency 
dependent (dispersive), the lower frequencies have slightly lower conductivity and that 
way greater penetration as cycles, and accordingly also distance. The resistivity in 
Olkiluoto saline water containing gneiss is low, and attenuation high. In salt formation or 
either dry, or fresh water containing crystalline rock, method would be more functional. 
The 270 MHz antenna was used in mapping of fracture extensions in tunnel floor at 
investigation niche ONK-TKU-3620 (Koittola 2014, Figure 3-10), as well as the access 
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tunnel at chainage PL3300 – PL3600 (Heikkinen andKantia 2011, Figure 3-9), to depth 
of 8-10 m from tunnel floor and wall. This tool was used also in demonstration area for 
rock suitability classification in mapping of fracture continuity in analogous way (Figure 
3-11, Heikkinen and Kantia 2011). Tests were made also with 100 MHz tool (Figure 
3-12, Heikkinen and Kantia 2011), with a hope of deeper penetration. However, the large 
size and consequent inferior quality of the signal led to almost comparable (max 15-20 
m) depth range with lower frequency (theoretically with greater range). Heavy 10 kg 
tool is slow to be operated manually on the tunnel wall.  
 
Figure 3-9. GPR image measured on tunnel floor downwards at ONK-TKU-3620, using 270 MHz GSSI tool (Heikkinen & 
Kantia 2011). GPR range is at order of 7-8 m. Reflections from ceiling, side walls and back wall as well as interference 
caused by irregular form of floor affect to results. Best range and performance are obtained with 200 – 400 MHz 
shielded antennas. Interference increases with larger 100 MHz antenna, gaining little to actual range. 
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Figure 3-10. GPR images measured with 270 MHz antenna stacked in 3D on  a tunnel floor. Depth range 7-8 m. Tunnel 
(red solid) height 5.5 m (Koittola 2014). Fractures are seen on images. A tunnel below floor could be detected. 
 
 
Figure 3-11. GPR image draped on tunnel wall in 3D, measured between chainage 3300 – 3600 m on right hand wall of 
ONKALO access tunnel, 270 MHz antenna. Range on the wall is less than 10 m (Heikkinen & Kantia 2011). 
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Figure 3-12. GPR image draped on tunnel wall in 3D, measured between chainage 3300 – 3600 m on right hand wall of 
ONKALO access tunnel, 100 MHz antenna. Range on the wall is slightly more than 15 m (Heikkinen & Kantia 2011). 
Interference from tunnel surfaces and installations make application of results difficult without extensive processing. 
 
Test with 400 MHz antenna at same ONK-TKU-3620 niche (Koittola 2014) indicated 
depth range of 3 – 4 m. All these measurements require that the rock surface be clean 
and dry, and there must not be any reinforcement or shotcrete lining on the wall. Also 
the macadam lining on floor should be absent, because moisture, salinity and metallic 
fragments from shotcrete cause noisy reflections and amplitude decay near surface. 
SKB tested for development of detailed investigation methods GPR survey on tunnel wall 
on same places as seismic survey methods and electrical resistivity tomography. GPR 
survey was designed to measure extensions of fractures encountered on tunnel surface 
(FPI’s, full perimeter intersection). GPR reflection image produced with measurement 
using 100 MHz antenna has a range of 15-20 m (Figure 3-13) in Äspö site, which is fairly 
resistive. Some reflecting objects are detected, though few directly associated with 
tunnel mapped fractures. Non confirmed reflections may arise both from fractures or 
fracture zones and lithological contacts. Reflectors are seen generated also from short 
grouting drillholes left outside of tunnel perimeter. If a non-declared tunnel would be 
present behind the wall on the same elevation, within measurement range, it would 
likely to be observed. 
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Figure 3-13. GPR survey results on tunnel TASA wall at 450 m in Äspö hard rock laboratory, Oskarshamn 
(modified from Cosma & Enescu 2015). Frequency 100 MHz enabled a 20 m depth range. Black lines inside 
the tunnel perimeter are mapped fractures. Disks indicate a fracture trace covering the full perimeter of 
tunnel, described as a geometric object with orientation. Some weak reflectors are seen, though not 
explained by tunnel observation. Few near tunnel reflections are due to grouting drillholes remaining on 
tunnel wall (filled with cement). Black to red bar is indicating a drillhole synthetic seismogram based on 
sonic and density logging (not relevant to GPR results). 
Applicability of the different antennas (and frequencies) require good contact on the 
tunnel surface. An irregular rock surface leaves an air gap between wall and antenna 
surface, which causes ringing in the data, which is difficult to remove and makes 
observations more difficult. The larger the size of the antenna (increasing with lowering 
frequency), the weaker is the shielding of the antenna. Also, the air gap variation and 
irregularities of wall are causing scattered reflections. Poor shielding also causes side 
reflections from irregular tunnel surfaces, electrical and lighting installations, or any 
other metallic objects in tunnels, opposing wall, and from the floor and ceiling. It appears 
that optimal resolution and range can be achieved with higher frequency antennas, 
which are better shielded and fit more closely to tunnel surface. 
3.1.2 Other types of environment and new GPR development 
DMT has constructed a more powerful 85 mm or 130 mm diameter directional borehole 
radar for salt dome internal characterization (Althaus 2013). Salt has exceptionally low 
attenuation of radar wave. Presented idea was to create a protective screen of boreholes 
around a repository, which could be used to detect undeclared intrusion from outside, 
even after closure of the site (Figure 3-14).  
Development in radar technology would include high transmitter energy, massive 
stacking, bi-static transmitter-receiver array, stepped frequency tool, use of multiple 
frequencies. Also, the transmitter would be directional and shielded. 
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Figure 3-14. (Althaus 2013). Drillhole radar amplitude map from a single drillhole at length interval 800 – 1300 m 
(vertical axis). Location of a drillhole in the image is on the right. Horizontal axis on top shows time to 6000 ns. 
Horizontal axis on bottom indicates the distance from drillhole converted to time (370 m), assuming constant radar 
wave velocity. Reflected radar wave amplitude is shown as intensity in the map. Different colours are indicating the 
radial azimuth around the drillhole. Linear features of different elevated amplitude regions show direction and distance 
of boundaries in differing electrical properties, like boundary of salt formation. Reflection signature in salt is low 
amplitude except few inclusion caused features. Reflectivity in surrounding rock mass is higher in amplitude. A tunnel 
would be seen in image as a local hyperbolic diffracting event. 
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Application of borehole radar has been developed further than before, into comparison 
of baseline data and repeat measurements (Uchtmann and Althaus 2014). Application 
would be based on early-stage implementation, recognition of all excavated spaced in 
the repository volume, identification of reflections, and monitoring for changes in 
backfilled areas and post-closure stage. Monitoring will require static radar system 
installed permanently outside of the repository. Similar static arrangement might be 
applied also for active seismic methods, or in limited cases for other electromagnetic 
method than radar, or even resistivity. 
Recent GPR development has increased the range of the survey method. The change of 
data bit depth from 16 bit (+/- 32 000 integer) to 32 bits (millions in floating point) has 
made the relative noise smaller and increased the depth range 30%. Another 
development to GPR technology is related to recording of traces (the A-scan). 
Historically the GPR scan has been constructed from time lapse sampling oscilloscope 
type of readings, which have been repeated with small time increments to finally 
construct a complete scan, consisting for example from 1000 samples at 0.2 ns time 
interval. Currently a hyper stacking GPR system can record each trace at single pass, and 
then use dozens of traces to stack data further into a single trace with much higher 
signal to noise ratio than before, and with enhanced depth range from tunnel wall. Still, 
the GSSI 350 MHz HS tool appears to have a maximum depth penetration in ONKALO 
rock mass of 10 – 12 m. 
3.2 Seismic investigations 
Seismic measurements are a group of active geophysical methods, which uses seismic 
waveform interaction in rock mass for characterization of geological geometry and 
physical properties. Active seismic surveys can be used to detect structural features with 
sharp contrasts, to verifying repository design, and monitoring rock stress fields (Haddal 
et al. 2014). Active surveys require many sensors and active source.  
Active seismic survey uses an artificial source of elastic waves, and measures 
backscattered wave field. Method is based on transmission, reflection, refraction and 
diffraction of elastic waveforms within geological medium. Measurable properties are 
travel times and amplitudes of backscattered seismic waveforms. Travel time and 
amplitude of waveforms are depending on both geometry (distances) and elastic 
properties in the medium. Boundaries of different elastic physical properties cause 
reflections, refraction, diffractions, and waveform conversions. These properties are 
bulk density of geological medium, related to mineral composition, as well as seismic 
velocities (initially governed by Lamé parameters and density) which in turn are related 
to mineral composition, texture, porosity, and stress field. Boundaries can be caused by 
geological structures like lithological contacts, fractures, and fracture zones, and 
engineered (constructed) structures like tunnels. Sharp elastic contrasts may be created 
in potential clandestine tunnels, like bedrock face on tunnel surface (Finch 2009). 
Source of seismic signal can be active or passive. Sources can range from explosive 
charges to mechanical impact or vibrating frequency sweep sources. Active sources are 
ranging from mechanic impact from a hammer or drop weight, sweep with a variable 
frequency vibrating source, or small explosion using detonator fuse or small explosive 
charge. Passive signals can include application and correlation of natural signal sources 
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like wind, waves and microearthquakes, as well as synthetic noise as traffic and industry 
as the seismic source. Mechanical environmental noise and its autocorrelation can be 
applied as a source, especially in longer term recording. 
Source of seismic energy needs to be coupled into the medium to be investigated. Impact 
generates different seismic waveforms, which travel in the medium with their 
characteristic phase velocities. Velocity of each waveform is governed by elastic 
properties of the rock mass (Lame properties and bulk density) and stress field. 
Compressional P wave front has highest phase velocity. P wave is transmitting through 
all materials. Shear S velocity is traveling at slower velocity, proportional to P velocity, 
and does not penetrate fluids. Different forms of surface waves generate and travel on 
surfaces on the medium on ground level, tunnels, drillholes and fracture surfaces. 
Back scattered seismic amplitude according to time are recorded with accelerometer or 
geophone sensors, which need to be attached onto investigated material. Recently 
possibilities for applying fibre optic (DAS) sensors as receivers have emerged. Recording 
is carried out with accelerometers or geophones, or using optical fibre sensors, 
depending on frequency range. 
Detection of a target within rock mass is based on seismic reflection or refraction 
sounding or imaging. A survey line would consist of multiple, overlapping recording 
stations and source locations. Measurements are most often carried out by geometric 
stacking of several records, for example centered at a common midpoint (CMP stack), at 
several different source-receiver distances (offsets). 
Each implemented source signal is recorded with several (even tens of) sensors on a 
survey line or on an array. Sensors are located at varying offset distances from the 
source location. Seismic wave reflections within rock mass are weak due to geometric 
spreading and attenuation, for which reason it is necessary to geometrically stack 
(summarize) the recorded traces. Typical way of stacking consists of common mid-point 
calculation of signals received from variable offsets. Range of other processing steps, 
including frequency filtering and arrival time geometric adjustments (normal moveout, 
static corrections) are also required for proper alignment of reflected events in the 
processed image. For weak reflections, multiple stack fold is often necessary. Before 
actual stacking, several filtering and direct and surface wave suppression steps are 
always necessary. 
Measurements can be carried out on a 2D survey line on ground surface, along drillhole, 
or in tunnel. The surveys from drillholes or tunnels are directional and can be arranged 
as a side-view geometry. An array of in-line receivers at several lines, and sources on 
several crossing lines, can be used to form a (downwards viewing) 3D reflection survey 
on ground surface.  
From tunnel or drillhole geometry, possibility to run 3D survey is geometrically more 
limited. Using offset sources from receiver lines or drillholes, it is possible to run a 
limited 2D or 3D reflection view for resolving location and orientation of a planar or 
linear reflecting target, usually interpreted as a combination of several survey lines. In 
tunnel environment, also emerging tunnel waves need to be suppressed preferably 
already with measurement array or using advanced processing (Enescu et al. 2014). 
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Observability of targets, and depth range of the seismic method, depends on applied 
frequency range. Surface based investigations may apply frequency range of 20 – 200 Hz, 
being able to carry imaging to depth of several kilometers and resolving targets at size of 
some tens of metres. High frequency surveys from tunnels and drillholes, at 100 – 1000 
Hz, can be used to image rock mass to distances of 100 – 200 m, and detect objects in 
size of metres. Thickness of a layer to be observed can be tens of centimeters. The radius 
of a planar object, or distance between two objects, needs to be in order of product of 
wavelength (velocity divided by frequency) and distance. Lower frequency range has 
depth or distance penetration of several kilometres, mid-frequencies tens to hundreds of 
metres, and highest frequency range some metres to tens of metres. Detection of a target 
depends on frequency and thus wavelength, largest range, and lower frequency band, 
with 5500 - 6000 m/s P wave velocity, show wavelengths of 20 – 100 m; mid-range 5-10 
m, and highest frequencies tens of centimeters.  
Observability of a boundary is fractions of wavelength, detection of an object and 
separation of two closely located objects in order of wavelength. Bedrock often shows an 
optimal frequency band which penetrates the rock mass best and carries most 
information. The frequency band, and relevant waveforms, would need to be considered 
for example with numerical modeling tests with related processing methods. The sensor 
density for sources and receivers needs to be dense to recover the reflected or scattered 
signal well. For a 500 Hz frequency (10 m wavelength), sensors should be placed in 
order of 2 m distance. 
Normally in spent nuclear fuel site characterization, and in rock engineering where 
fractures and fracture zones are the main target, the used seismic processing techniques 
are designed for detection and enhancing of continuous reflections from extensive 
fractures and lithological boundaries. 
A tunnel would be different kind of targets compared to continuous fracture surfaces. 
Depending on the orientation of a target tunnel or gallery, compared to the 
measurement array, a perpendicular tunnel may be seen only as a diffractor. These are 
easily removed in standard seismic processing or migration. Thus, a specific diffracting 
or scattering source processing would be necessary. A tunnel parallel to measurement 
array would be seen as limited linear reflector, which may again be easily removed as a 
multiple reflection and would be sensitive to directionality of wave field. Tunnel 
scattering event might be best observed from single shot gather before processing, or 
while composing a processed image, requiring special processing techniques. 
Tunnel target itself may also generate multiple types of scattered wave fields, starting 
from ringing tunnel waves along the tunnel surface, then reflected P and S waves, 
depending on contrast of air or water with the rock mass, and a range of converted wave 
forms. Observability issues, and processing design would be best resolved using pre-
survey modeling and test measurements for tunnel detectability. 
Tunnel seismic investigations can use different migration schemes and spectroscopy 
(Tzavaras et al. 2008) to focus the imaging to actual reflection or diffraction point. 
Detection on a tunnel using seismic methods may be enabled by full waveform imaging 
(Smith et al. 2017). Common problems in conventional analysis, based on first arrivals, 
or reflection interpretation, are poor signal-to-noise ratio, lack of separation of body 
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waves and surface waves, and rapid attenuation of higher frequency seismic energy in 
shallow surface. Elastic full waveform inversion of densely placed sources in a 3D field 
array, show location of a tunnel as an elongated low S-wave velocity anomaly. 
Survey is partially directional. Different waveforms emerge best at different offsets, like 
P wave at normal incidence to the reflecting boundary, and S waves at wider angles best. 
Compressional waves reflect towards the measurement line best from surfaces at 
reflection angles of 0° … 25° from surface (near offset). Shear wave reflectivity maximum 
is at 45° offset and can be observed starting from 25° reflection angles. Especially 
underground and drillhole surveys may be useful to be applied with 2-component or 3-
component receivers. Reflections however can arrive from offline and locating of actual 
position may require external knowledge to constrain. 
Typical survey timing on surface has consisted of 0.5 – 1 km of 2-D line in day, requiring 
minimum 100 – 200 geophones attached on a line, with a cost range of 10 000 – 30 000 
€/ km processed and interpreted. A drop-weigh source and land streamer receiver array 
are more efficient to deploy. Practical production rate of sources is at order of 100 
stations in a day. A 3D survey is more demanding in preparations, will require 300 – 
1000 geophones installed in a field, and being able to produce a square kilometer in few 
weeks’ time, at minimum 1 000 000 €/ km2 cost range. Drillhole reflection 
measurements, using several source locations on ground surface or in tunnel, and 
repeatedly moving a receiver array along the drillhole after deploying all source stations, 
has required working time of one week for each 500 m long drillhole and 10 sources, 
50 000 € each drillhole. Using more receivers to cover longer drillhole lengths at each 
shot or recording a whole drillhole length at once using a fibre optic DAS, would make 
the field time shorter at a cost of more expensive measurement tools. 
Tunnel seismic work has required attaching geophones into tunnel surface, deploying 
sources in prepared short drillholes, or both. Placing either sources or receivers 1 – 2 m 
away from tunnel surface would help reducing ringing and tunnel-based surface waves 
in the results. Using 100 geophone stations, preparation of a 100 - 200 m long dense 
geophone line on tunnel surface may require one day. Deploying corresponding source 
locations would require another day, then moving on similar length day more each 100 
m.  
Typical cost profile for a single, full coverage 2D seismic imaging on a tunnel wall has 
been at an order of 100 000 € /line. Lower density of sources at high receiver density, or 
reversely low density of receivers using a high amount of densely located sources, may 
produce adequate data to locate undeclared tunnels to 50 - 100 m distances from survey 
line, achievable at slightly lower costs. According to Seidel (2007), Zöllner (2007) has 
demonstrated dense receiver and source array capability to image nearby tunnels. Time 
required to produce measurements for 144 m line in two sections required two days. 
Adding more efficiency would require development work (Seidel 2007) in 
measurements and processing. 
Repeating such survey, at higher resolution, might help by comparison of results to 
detect the existing (intentional) tunnels, and separating new tunnels that would not be 
allowed. Because the coverage of existing measurement line data is limited, possibilities 
to directly detect a tunnel with local high resolution seismic line or several lines would 
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be useful. Typical CMP stack binning size on 2D line can be in order of 5 m, which is 
corresponding the size of tunnel profile. Higher resolution would mean higher density of 
sensors, and slower, more costly survey. Processing technique would need to be 
designed to enhance specific tunnel related observations. Direction of survey line would 
be optimally near perpendicular to potential tunnel traverse. Seismic line survey on 
ground level can be run on any time, also after closure of the disposal facility. 
Applying a land streamer receiving array and using sources in short drillholes would 
enable quicker downward viewing survey. Fast drop weight type of survey on tunnel 
floor, would require more sparsely placed receivers attached in a drillhole, or advanced 
processing to suppress ringing, cyclic tunnel waves from the results. Running a side 
viewing survey on wall of tunnel would require an oriented (side hitting) hammer 
source, small explosive sources, or a vibrating source on a same wall as where the 
receivers are attached. Possibilities are also to use tunnel construction and operation 
generated noise in and accumulating signal in passive mode recording. leaving sensors 
for measurements over specific period. 
In each case, processing and interpretation would require design and modeling to be 
able to visualize the results in proper way, after which systematic processing could be 
run in brief time. A single campaign would require research and trial processing of 
several weeks before results are available.  
Seismic survey can be recorded using industry standard seismograph tools and 
geophones and processed with existing processing software. However, design of tunnel 
survey will require planning prior the survey. Amount and size of tools require that 
there will be arranged a quiet period in tunnel sections during the work, at least for 
installation of receivers. 
In seismic survey results, geological variation like lithological contacts, veins, and 
inclusions, as well as different kind of deformation zones like fractures, are causing 
abundance of anomalies in reflection images. Separating these natural reflecting or 
diffracting objects from synthetic, undeclared tunnels, would require at first place 
dedicated processing of results to indicate cause of the observation. Comparable way as 
in GPR results, a parallel tunnel to the measurement line may be observed as a linear, 
continuous feature, as an intersecting tunnel would be seen as hyperbolic event in raw, 
stacked data, and point like event in a migrated data. In case an anomaly would be 
observed, decision should be made can its origin be resolved with more accurate and 
focused further measurement or would a confirming drilling be required. A baseline and 
repeat survey using similar measurement and source array, or semi-continuous 
measurement using a permanent measurement array and repeated sources at specific 
time periods, would enable comparison between results to follow up changes, avoiding 
need to check unexplained observations. Especially the underground survey geometry 
requires thorough planning to avoid false positive alarms, but also possibilities to leave 
out possibility for false negative result (not observing an existing undeclared tunnel, 
located too far, or a dead zone with respect to measurement geometry). 
Seismic survey in a tunnel can be conducted any time the tunnel is still open, before 
backfilling and closure. Near the tunnels, surveys can be used for verification of 
repository design. With professionally designed acquisition (angular coverage, 
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components), it may be possible to detect changes in rock stress fields. Passive recording 
systems can be used in measuring noise and events from activities related in excavation. 
Actual geometric properties need support from active measurements with more dense 
receiver arrays. Seismic response from bedrock and tunnels are complicated compared 
to single wave form, zero offset GRP responses (Chapter 3.1). Figure 2-4 in previous 
section displays a synthetic example of seismic 2D line measurement over a model 
containing tunnel and a lithological contact (Seidel et al. 1999). Direct wave, hyperbolic 
reflection and multiples from a tunnel, and reflections from a layer interface overlap, and 
make visibility of each object difficult even without presence of noise and multiple 
natural objects. Adding more boundaries and tunnels also add the difficulties in 
understanding the results. 
Existing and backfilled tunnels and their environment can be surveyed from neighboring 
still open tunnels. Feasible distances from tunnel range at 100 – 200 m in case long 
survey lines can be deployed. Resolution is not high enough to view the disposal facility 
construction details from ground surface after closure of the facility, even against design 
data. Resolution would be better using existing drillholes for such surveys, until sealing 
of the drillholes. Active seismic survey can display reflections from tunnel openings 
(Seidel et al. 1999), though the more complicated a geological setting will be, more 
difficult the recognition of tunnel related features would become (Figure 2-4). More 
advanced processing techniques combined with knowledge of existing tunnels will help 
in understanding the seismic images. A repeat survey may be required to recognize 
features that have not existed during previous measurement. 
After closure of the site, only possibilities to apply seismic reflection survey for 
safeguards would be to carry combined surface and drillhole based reflection 
measurements at the perimeter of disposal facility environment, to detect a new tunnel 
in case such would be in preparation. Active surveys at frequent intervals would become 
expensive. Automated acquisition of environmental noise with permanent receiver 
installation, assisted with possible active source campaigns at least in beginning, and 
processing to display only changes occurring in subsurface, may appear a possible 
though tedious method. On a circle, on repository perimeter, would need to be equipped 
with DAS or equal seismic receiver on ground level and in drillholes at c. 500 m interval, 
down to depth of minimum 500 m. Active source locations would need to be dense, with 
spacing of few metres. Also, drillhole based sources would be useful. System would rely 
on continuous data acquisition and automated processing. 
 
3.2.1 Seismic surveys for Posiva and SKB 
The active seismic surveys in Olkiluoto crystalline rock have applied frequency ranges 
from 30 Hz to 200-300 Hz from ground surface and deep drillholes, up to 1000-2000 Hz 
from tunnel surfaces, and as high as 100 kHz in short drillholes.  
Historical seismic measurement methods from Olkiluoto which could be used as future 
technique for safeguards purposes, include drillhole 3D VSP reflection in c. 20 deep 
drillholes, moving source seismic profiling, 2D surface seismic profiling (HIRE), 3D 
reflection seismic imaging, tunnel seismic survey, and cross drillhole or cross tunnel 
seismic reflection or tomographic imaging. Other applicable methods might be tunnel 
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seismic profiling carried out during construction, or repeat measurement using similar 
survey array. 
 
Figure 3-15. Seismic 3D VSP reflection image, drillhole OL-KR29 (Enescu et al. 2007). Seismic waveforms from ground 
surface source station were recorded using 3C receiver in drillhole at 5 m interval. Image contains reflected energy 
from distances of several hundreds of meters from drillhole, which may be used to detect tunnels at close range (best 
using baseline and repeat survey). Source position needs to be selected optimally for detection from different directions 
from drillhole. Two way arrival time 400 millisecond corresponds radial distance 1200 m from source via reflector to 
receiver. 
Two-dimensional seismic line measurement (Kukkonen et al. 2010, Figure 3-16), can be 
used to detect reflecting objects. A deep seismic sounding of 31 km was carried out in 
2008 using Olkiluoto road connections. Vibroseis source point interval was 25 – 50 m, 
and receiver station interval 12.5 m. Comparison between baseline and repeat survey 
would be essential to detect undeclared tunnels, as well as enhancing resolution. 
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Figure 3-16. Projection of the drillhole OL-KR1 on seismic profile V1, view from NE (Kukkonen et al. 2010). Processing enhances 
gently dipping, continuous linear events.  
In Olkiluoto, short geotechnical refraction lines with 2.5 m CDP distance can be used for 
reflection processing (Öhman et al. 2006, 2008, Figure 3-17), but their resolution is 
limited. Application requires minimum stack fold of 20 - 30. Strong diffracting events 
may be an indication of undeclared activity in an area, detectable in favourable 
conditions down to depth of 500 m. 
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Figure 3-17. Reflection processing of densely acquired geotechnical refraction seismic line (Öhman et al. 2008). Reflections at 0.2 
ms time (500 m depth) are distinct. Stack fold is 30, CDP bin 2.5 m. A 3D survey is not so sensitive to direction of tunnel as 2D line, 
so any direction might be observed. However the area coverage is smaller, and the whole of Olkiluoto island is not covered with 
3D seismic surveys. This makes comparison to previous data impossible in part of the area. Detectability considerations of 
different object sizes at various depths were discussed before survey implementation, using synthetic calculations (Saksa et al. 
2007). 
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Size of a survey area in 2006 was 600 x 650 m. The bin size of 3D stacking in 2006 was 
12 m (Juhlin and Cosma 2007) for receiver line interval 60 m and receiver interval 24 m, 
and source crossline interval 100 m, source interval 10 m. In 2007 another area was 
measured at slightly modified, larger measurement array (Cosma et al. 2008b). 
Compared to 2D seismic line, coverage is small but resolution clearly higher (Figure 
3-18). A rule of thumb for proper imaging would require three times as long lines as 




Figure 3-18. Comparison of HIRE 2D seismic data (above, Kukkonen et al. 2010) with 3D seismic results from 2006 (Juhlin and 
Cosma 2007) and 2007 (Cosma et al. 2008, below). Resolution with denser measurements and different source is significantly 
higher. 
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Fold was highly variable. This means that observing a tunnel reflection and separating 
from the results tunnels which are close to each another, like 20-25 m, may become 
difficult. In direct observations, features deviating from known tunnel layout may still be 
checked. Useful would be to make a survey denser, so that bin size would be in order of 2 
- 5 m, allowing closer separation. Design of processing so that diffracting events would 
be imaged best, would be useful. There may be more area limitations for a full 3D survey 
than for 2D, but this kind of technique would be available even after closure of 
repository. 
A detailed 3D seismic survey was carried out in Forsmark 2016 on a small 320 x 406 m 
area, with aim to image reflecting events to depth of 500 m from surface (Lundberg et al. 
2018, Figure 3-19). Receiver spacing was 4 m on 24 lines, receiver line spacing 14 m. 
Shots were placed at 16 m interval online, and crossline interval was 14 m. In processing 
the CDP bin size was 2 m in inline and 7 m in crossline direction. Static correction was 
based on velocity tomography at 4 x 4 x 2 m cell size. Shallow boreholes were used as 
control for bedrock depth. Earlier two parallel 2D lines of 300 m in length were surveyed 
at 2 m geophone and 6 m shot spacing (Brojerdi et al. 2014). Reflection interpretations 
are focused on the upper 250 m of rock volume. Most interpreted events are found at 60 
– 80 m depth level. It may not be likely to detect a tunnel from deeper levels even using 
these detailed active seismic surveys. A longer line length and designed processing 
scheme would be required to reach to greater depth.  
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Figure 3-19. Comparison of 3D reflection image (above, Lundberg et al. 2018) using 7 m CDP distance and a 2D line (below, 
Brojerdi et al. 2014) with 1 m CDP distance, from same location. 
Surface to drillhole reflection seismic survey (also called as 3D VSP) can make imaging 
around drillhole at 100 – 300 m radial distance range (Cosma et al. 2003, Enescu et al. 
2007,  Figure 3-20). Number of fixed sources is limited. Location of a source will affect to 
observability. Resolution is higher than with surface array, which need to operate from 
greater distance, and are affected by near surface effects of attenuation and scattering. 
Because recording is carried out using 3C geophones, the results are directionally 
sensitive which would enable localization. Processing using common model from several 
drillholes, and focusing processing into a limited volume at a time, would further 
enhance the interpretation (Figure 3-21). 
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Figure 3-20. Comparison of 2006 seismic 3D results (left, Juhlin and Cosma 2007) with 2007 3D results (Cosma et al. 2008b, 
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Figure 3-21. Interpretation and verification of tunnel intersecting reflectors from 2005 seismic drillhole 3D VSP survey near 
ONKALO volume (Enescu et al. 2007). 
A variation of the 3D VSP is a moving source seismic profiling (MSP) where a survey can 
be carried out with fixed receiver station in a drillhole, and densely repeated sources on 
a ground level line (Enescu et al. 2004). Another variation, horizontal seismic profiling 
(HSP, Cosma et al. 2003) uses geophone line recording on ground or hydrophone 
recording on lake or sea bottom, and fixed source points around the survey line at 
different directions. These surveys are available at limited coverage for comparison and 
possible repeat surveys. The VSP and MSP would require non-sealed drillholes available 
for measurements, or permanently installed receivers in sealed drillholes. HSP can be 
run as a variation of 2D seismic line, with limited number of source stations, which also 
brings in directional sensitivity. 
Two cases of drillhole seismic surveys exist. A single hole reflection survey is a radially 
sensitive measurement where elastic source is moving along the drillhole with the 
recording stations. Survey range is, depending on frequency range and power of the 
source, in order of 50 – 100 m around a drillhole (Figure 3-22). Crosshole seismic 
tomography can be run between two closely (30 – 200 m apart) located drillholes 
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(Enescu et al. 2003, 2004). Finding a geological or other explanation for reflecting or 
diffracting events is a demanding task containing uncertainties (Heikkinen et al. 2004). 
Comparison of baseline and repeat surveys would be most certain means to obtain 
positive alarm of potential intrusion attempt. 
 
Figure 3-22. Drillhole reflection and crosshole tomographic sections overlain, from drillholes OL-KR14 and OL-KR15 in Olkiluoto 
(Enescu et al. 2003). Survey can be directional, and is able to provide reflection data to over 100 m from drillhole. Recognition of 
a tunnel may be most feasible from a shot gather, or require a modified processing scheme, also likely to require comparison 
between baseline and repeat surveys. 
A velocity or attenuation tomogram may be used to image velocity anomalies caused by 
a tunnel located between the drillholes. Reflection data can be used in indicating the 
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location of a tunnel as a support for tomography. Single hole reflection array can be used 
also from drillholes drilled from a tunnel, or as a measurement conducted using the 
tunnel instead. Also, the crosshole tomographic survey can be run between two holes 
drilled from tunnel, between tunnel and drillhole, or between two tunnel sections. Again, 
timing of single hole measurements or crosshole measurements is not possible after the 
drillholes need to be sealed. Also, along tunnel or cross-tunnel surveys must be 
abandoned after the tunnels would be backfilled and sealed. 
Tunnel seismic surveys have ranged from a 100 m long 2D line to a single 3C line of 300 
m along tunnel, and two different tunnel and drillhole arrays consisting of several 80 – 
200 m long 3C line segments and drillhole intervals. 
A single 2-component line, surveyed in 2007, was viewing on the side of the tunnel and 
downwards to 100 – 150 m from the tunnel (Figure 3-23). Purpose was to resolve 
location of continuous fractures and local fracture zones. A 2C receiver configuration left 
possibility to resolve the location of reflectors either towards horizontal, inclined, or 
vertical plane. Both P and S wave migrates sections were produced. Percussion drilling 
was demonstrated a feasible seismic source. Survey with preparations took five working 
days. Receiver stations were attached into shallow drillholes on the tunnel wall (Cosma 
et al. 2008a). 
 
 
Figure 3-23. Tunnel seismic sections measured in Olkiluoto 2007 (Cosma et al. 2008a). 
A single 3-component receiver line of 300 m, surveyed in 2009 produced several 
inclined sections of migrated P and S wave reflection images, reaching to 250 m from 
tunnel, and placed at 15 degrees angle intervals from vertical up to vertical down 
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(Cosma et al. 2011, Sireni 2011, Sireni et al. 2011). Survey took 8 – 10 days in the field. 
Receivers were attached in percussion drilled shallow holes in the tunnel wall. Results 
indicate a remarkably high resolution. Similar reflection measurements have been used 
also earlier to produce information from fractures and nearby tunnels (Figure 3-24, 
Blümling et al. 1990). 
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Figure 3-24. Stacked tunnel seismic data showing a clear reflection from other tunnel (shown with “L”), from Blümling et al. 
(1990). 
 
Higher frequency (100 kHz) crosshole and single hole seismic surveys were conducted 
at excavation damage zone (EDZ) study niche (Enescu and Cosma 2010). A drillhole 
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profile along length of planned niche (short tunnel section) was surveyed from drillholes 
at 2 m separation, 50 m long, before excavation with crosshole tomographic and 
reflection survey, and repeated at tunnel contour between tunnel wall and remaining 
drillhole. Clear indication of lowered velocity near tunnel, and fracture caused 
reflections near the tunnel surface, as well as the surface itself, were detected from the 
results (Figure 3-25). Another, tomographic survey was carried out on tunnel floor in 
pairs of 1.3 m deep vertical drillholes. Velocity tomograms indicated lowered velocity 
zone on the tunnel surfaces, related to stress field release and generation of some new 
fractures on the tunnel surface (EDZ). The 100 kHz surveys are capable in detecting 
small scale variation and changes due to excavation, but the range is limited to few 
meters.  
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Figure 3-25. Baseline (left) and repeat (right) directional single hole S wave reflection survey from drillhole ONK-
PP200 on the side of investigation niche ONK-TKU-3620, showing a tunnel wall near the observation hole (Enescu and 
Cosma, 2010, Mustonen et al. 2010). Full distance scale 3 m. Before excavation, the local reflections are caused by 
lithological contacts, fractures, and fracture zones. Tunnel perimeter is shown on green line. Fractures are focused 
onto the tunnel surface, which itself is also reflecting. 
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Figure 3-26. Migrated seismic image attached on ONKALO tunnel, survey 2009 (Cosma et al. 2011, Sireni 2011). Resolution is 
high. Migrated sections can be projected towards different azimuth around the tunnel. 
Two different seismic reflection works included 2-component receivers on tunnel wall, 
seismic source on tunnel wall and in drillholes, and several P and S wave migrated 
reflection profiles, imaging the bedrock around the study area in horizontal plane 
towards different directions (Figure 3-26, Figure 3-28) and distances of 150 m (Cosma 
and Enescu 2014, 2015, Enescu et al. 2014). Processing included some cross tunnel, 
drillhole to tunnel, and crosshole tomographic sections (Figure 3-29).  
One survey was carried out for SKB in Oskarshamn Äspö underground research 
laboratory (Figure 3-27). The other was taken in ONKALO at demonstration area tunnels 
and pilot holes. Purpose of the surveys was to develop techniques to detect fracture 
zones and extensive fractures from tunnels and drillholes prior to excavation, and to 
define extension length of observed fractures. Comparing the different geophysical 
measurements from same tunnel section indicate that seismic reflection survey has 
greatest range and detection power from available methods (Figure 3-13, Figure 3-30 
and Figure 3-40). Investigations designed for fracture zone characterization would need 
to modify to detect a tunnel. 
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Figure 3-27. Cross tunnel reflection measurement in Äspö 2014 (Cosma and Enescu 2014). White arrow indicates reflection from 
other tunnel. 
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Figure 3-28. Side scan 3D seismic survey from a tunnel (Cosma and Enescu 2015). Directional imaging can be obtained with 
multicomponent receivers and using several source station lines within the investigation volume. 
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Figure 3-29. A directional seismic 3D reflection survey from tunnel may be applied in detection of undeclared excavation at 100-
150 m distances (Cosma and Enescu 2015). Repeat survey to compare baseline, and specialized processing method to enhance 






Figure 3-30. Comparison of tunnel seismic investigations from same location in Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory. left seismic 
crosshole/cross tunnel tomography and lower right seismic reflection survey.  
 
 
Surveys were preceded by numerical synthetic modeling of tunnel wave suppression 
and processing, and optimal observability of fractures in reflection images, as well as for 
design of processing techniques. Modeling indicated that strong surface waves are 
generated on tunnel surface, intersecting fractures, and lithological contacts on tunnel 
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surface, and ends of tunnels. To suppress the tunnel wave in survey, the receivers were 
placed and cemented in 0.5 m deep drillholes. Further measures were taken to process 
data to avoid tunnel wave caused ringing in migrated sections. Optimal receiver and 
source distances, and processing steps, were defined on basis of modeling, which were 
intended for detection of continuous linear features (fractures), their orientation, and 
termination. Processing included oriented migration to enhance one orientation set of 
reflectors at a time. Similar designed processing for detection and localization of tunnel 
generated diffraction events might be useful in designing safeguards monitoring, as a 
normal seismic processing method would suppress the diffractors from being seen in the 
results. 
3.2.2 Development in seismic survey techniques 
Forward to tunnel seismic techniques with sparse seismic source and receiver 
arrangement have been advised by Nagra 1990 (Blümling et al. 1990), and applied for 
tunnel construction surveys either with conventional seismic recording (Krüger et al. 





Figure 3-31. Tunnel Seismic Profiling (TSP) procedure by Amberg (Krüger et al. 2010). Limited seismic recording near tunnel 
face is carried out during excavation break. 
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Figure 3-32. TBM signal recording using 3C geophone stations in shallow (5-10 m) drillholes maximum 100-150 m in front of a 
tunnel face. TBM pilot signal recorded from boring machine is correlated to geophone recording to produce seismic reflection data, 
processed further to imaging (Chwatal et al. 2011). Survey is repeated at 200-250 m interval. Baseline survey could be produced 
using tunnel excavation as a source, then a repeat survey carried out using similar array to ensure absence of deviatory activities. 
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Ideas range from placing receivers onto tunnel wall, tunnel floor, or in short drillholes on 
the tunnel surface; and using either small explosives, mechanical source, tunnel boring 
machine (TBM) noise (Chwatal et al. 2011), or other, as a source either on tunnel wall, 
on drillholes drilled to the side of the tunnel, or the TBM face as the tool penetrates 
through the rock. Recording of seismic sections is carried out at frequent intervals 
(daily/weekly), and processed in a standardized manner at fast pace to determine 
location and orientation of fracture zones in the front of the tunnel, to distances of 100 – 
150 m. This kind of survey approach may well be used also for safeguards checking from 
tunnel surfaces until the tunnels are open (not backfilled). 
Some practical conditions may be required for tunnel seismic survey. Simply mounting 
receivers on tunnel surface or macadam bed on floor, and using explosive, impact, or 
vibrating source on same surface, is likely to cause severe ringing in recorded data, 
called tunnel wave. Suppression of tunnel wave will require either the sources or 
receivers placed away from the tunnel surface. Distance could range from 1 – 3 m. 
Survey can be organized in a reciprocal manner. Either it is possible to use standard 24 
or 48 channel seismograph or equaling tool system, mounting geophones or 
accelerometers on the tunnel surface, and applying several sources at different 
directions and lengths along the receiver line. Or, mounting several multicomponent 
receivers in different directions and length along a source line, which would be 
implemented either as TBM locations, drill and blast excavation blasting or probing hole 
percussion signal, or purpose made source stations along the tunnel surfaces. Critical is 
to have several, separated tunnel seismic profiles either as a single receiver-multiple 
sources, or single source-multiple receiver gathers. Result would be a combination of 
different migrated sections, where energy is stacked onto locations where reflectors 
reside.  
Optimal seismic survey to detect 3-10 m size of tunnel like objects from distance, may 
consist of 100-1000 Hz frequency, and either dense receiver or dense source lines, with 
selected number or sources or receivers to produce seismic profiles for spatial 3D 
migration. Seismic survey has also potential to detect possible empty spaces behind a 
tunnel wall or tunnel lining. 
Recent development in seismic acquisition techniques (Koivisto et al. 2018) have 
included using sparse active source arrays (Singh et al. 2019), combination of surface 
and borehole or tunnel measurement arrays to enhance directionality and resolution, 
and application of passive recording systems of ambient noise from different types of 
source signal (Afonin et al. 2018, Chamarczuk et al. 2018), or using fibre optic sensors 
(DAS, Distributed Acoustic Sensing) for simultaneous dense recording of a complete 
drillhole at a time (Riedel et al. 2018), or wireless sensors to provide dense and cost 
effective recording in poorly accessible conditions (Heinonen et al. 2018). Enhancement 
of processing may also include interferometry to correlate signal in receivers to create 
dense virtual sources (Figure 3-33, Väkevä et al. 2018a, b, Väkevä 2019, Chamarczuk et 
al. 2018), for better and higher resolution imaging. Combination of the new active and 
passive or monitoring methods could provide possibility for both design information 
verification and post closure detection of undeclared tunnels (Figure 3-35). Permanently 
installed borehole DAS receiver (Figure 3-34), repeated recording of ambient noise with 
interferometric processing, and frequently repeated active sources on ground surface 
may enable high resolution for safeguards monitoring. 
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Figure 3-33. Passive seismic recordings with virtual sources processed by interferometry (Väkevä et al. 2018), left active synthetic 





Figure 3-34. Comparison of 3C VSP recording with conventional borehole receivers (left) and DAS optical fibre receiver in same 
drillhole, different source position (Riedel et al. 2018). DAS provides opportunity to make recording at once for all receiver 
locations, whereas traditional survey requires moving sensors and repeating shots. DAS includes only one component, traditional 
survey can provide three-component recording, enabling better visibility of reflectors in different direction. DAS can be installed 
as a permanent recording system. 
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Figure 3-35. A composite of seismic imaging at different scales and geometries, combining dense passive seismic recording, 
sparsely applied Vibroseis sources, tunnel seismic recording, and borehole DAS recording into subsurface imaging in mining 
environment (Koivisto et al. 2018). 
 
Surrounded by sea areas, the Olkiluoto area would be favourable for higher production 
rate and better coupling of seismic signal using underwater array for acquisition. An 
acoustic seismic survey (Alvi and Virtasalo 2016) can be used in definition of soil 
thickness and soil types, bedrock topography and fracture zone ground interception 
data. A hydrophone streamer and towed seismic source would enable efficient high-
resolution survey on seabed. 
 
3.3 Electrical measurements 
Electrical resistivity methods are based on measurement of variation of specific 
resistivity (inverse of electrical conductivity) in subsurface. Direct current or low 
frequency alternating current is generating an electric field in the ground, where the 
measurable voltage is proportional to source current intensity, inverse distance from the 
source, and resistivity of material.  
It has been considered for nuclear safeguards that resistivity survey can be used for 
locating the metal canisters or waste containers (Finch 2009). Also, metallic tunnel 
support structures could be observed. Passive detection of electrical fields may enable 
detection of undeclared activities (machinery, power feed).  
The resistivity in natural materials has broad range of variation. Silicate and quartz 
containing minerals are highly resistive (insulators). Pure groundwater as itself is 
weakly conductive (low resistivity). Increase in electrolyte content is further lowering 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Report #2008207 82 (128) 
   
Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation   




the resistivity of water. Groundwater content due to porous space and fractures is 
lowering the resistivity of the bulk rock mass.  
Presence of electrically conductive minerals within rock mass or on fracture surfaces are 
lowering the resistivity to further extent. Weakly conductive minerals include different 
clay materials due to their texture and water content. Higher conductivity is found in 
metal sulphides and graphite. Apart of occurrence of water and conductive minerals, 
also texture in rock mass is affecting to the resistivity. 
Regarding the constructed tunnel environment, application of resistivity methods would 
be based on resistivity contrast of the tunnel and the surrounding rock mass. In purpose 
of detect air or water filled cavities from ground surface using resistivity measurement, 
elevated or lowered resistivity has been applied as an indicator of a cavity. A high 
resistivity air filled cavity is more difficult to observe from background, than any 
conductive material containing object from resistive background mass. Tunnel may be 
detected with resistivity measurement due to metal containing support structures or 
installations, which will be lowering the resistivity.  
Electrical resistivity measurement requires a galvanic connection to the investigated 
medium. Two electrodes at a time are used to inject a short pulse of electric current into 
the medium. Polarity of the current pulse is alternated to suppress polarization effects in 
the medium and electrodes. 
Amplitude of the pulse, and distance of the electrodes, will define the form and intensity 
of generated electric field. In case the second (return current) electrode is effectively at 
great distance from the target, symmetric field of an electric pole source is generated. 
Shorter distances between the two electrodes are handled as dipole source.  
The voltage difference (potential) generated by the current pulse (compared to the off-
injection time) is measured synchronized with the current pulses, using two other 
electrodes at a time than the current circuit electrodes. The primary measurement data 
is a resistance value, voltage difference divided by the current difference. This is 
converted to apparent resistivity of surrounding material by using a geometric 
coefficient, which is depending on mutual distances of each of the four involved current 
and potential electrodes. Also, the voltage transient decay after closing the current 
injection can be measured to describe the so-called induced polarization effect, where 
electrolyte content, grain size of medium, texture, and presence of electrically 
conductive minerals is causing a transient electrical field. 
One measurement station contains influence of the complete spherical volume 
surrounding the measurement system, from a distance proportional to the size of the 
current injection dipole.  
To carry electrical resistivity imaging in the subsurface, a set of repeated measurements 
need to be carried out. Multiple opportunities for geometries exist. A resistivity profiling 
is using a fixed length of current injection dipole, joined with a fixed length of a voltage 
measurement dipole, placed at a constant location and distance from each other. The 
complete measurement system would move on a line, to provide profile display of 
variation in resistivity. Length of the electrode system would define the range of 
investigation (typically, 15-20 % of maximum length of the array). Profiling can be 
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carried out also keeping the current sources at permanent position (further away from 
the target area) and measuring profile of the voltage with moving measurement dipole. 
Electrical resistivity sounding at an individual location would consist of a series of 
expanded current injection arrays, centered on the measurement station, and measuring 
the voltage at the same location. Increasing the size of the array will be increasing the 
range of investigation, though at the cost of lowering resolution with increasing 
distances. Multiply repeated measurement stations on a profile, or on a surface area, are 
producing a resistivity imaging (“tomography”) profile, which can be used for detecting a 
resistivity low or resistivity high targets from surrounding volume. The effective range 
where an object can be detected, is defined by the size of the measurement array, and 
the size of the objects which can be detected, is defined by distances between 
measurement stations, the closest distances between pair of current electrodes and 
distances between the pair of measurement electrodes. Size of an object comparable to a 
tunnel of 5 m in cross section, would require distances between electrodes to be in 
order, or less than, the distance of 5 m. A measurement system may be able to detect a 
tunnel containing conductive materials to distances of 20-30 m from the measurement 
line in favourable conditions in resistive environment. 
Measurements can be carried out also along a drillhole or a tunnel with radial symmetry. 
In a tunnel, measurement systems with size less than 2 - 3 times of the tunnel diameter 
can be used as directional. Longer arrays start to become viewing radially to all 
directions. Survey can be carried out also between two closely located drillholes or 
tunnel sections as a crosshole (tomographic) survey, imaging objects located between 
the survey drillholes or tunnels. Measurement can be carried out also with grounding a 
current electrode to a conductive body and measuring the electrical field generated by 
this body as an object (mise-á-la-masse survey), locating the presence and continuity of 
the grounded object by the shape of modified electric potential field. 
Measurement is carried out by a computerized resistivity meter, containing either 
separate or integrated current transmitter and a voltage receiver tool. Most efficient 
manner to carry out a resistivity survey is to apply a multiple electrode cable array, 
where the receiver is changing the current injection positions one by one, and measuring 
meanwhile all relevant voltage recording stations, either one at a time, or up to 10 at 
single recording. Electrode positions in a cable can vary from 32…40 connectors to 80-
100, or even more. A composite of such recordings would be presented as apparent 
resistivity pseudo-section, according to length and depth (or distance) from 
measurement line. An inversion processing would be used to carry imaging into a 
resistivity length and depth (or distance) section, where the correct resistivity 
parameter values are imaged at their actual location. Further interpretation may be 
possible by carrying out forward modeling with synthetic model computing, and 
comparing the measured data and inversion computed images with corresponding 
results obtained with the model, then changing the models until reasonable match would 
be obtained. 
Measurement and inversion can be carried out on a profile in 2D, where objects are 
assumed to be located on below the measurement system, and side effects may interfere 
with the result. Optimal observation of a target would require location of a measurement 
line right at the location for limited size of an object, and near perpendicular to an 
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elongated object. A target parallel to the measurement line would be harder to detect 
and understood as a planar (layer like) object. 
There is usually found plenty of natural causes of anomalous resistivity objects which 
can be masking the anticipated observation of a tunnel. To avoid or suppress possibility 
of false positive alarm, and to enhance possibility to detect weak indications, a repeat 
survey using same measurement array several times at same location, might become 
useful application technique. Survey could be used in indicating the presence (or 
absence) of significantly changed electrical conductivity near the existing (and 
accessible) tunnels. Survey may be able to detect some indications of spent fuel canisters 
located on a neighbouring tunnel at 20 m distance but is not capable to indicate absence 
of a capsule at its expected location. 
Typical measurement time on a ground or tunnel surface, for a 80-100 electrode cable 
array would consist of 2 hours of recording. One of a cable spread like this could cover a 
400-500 m of tunnel length in a general, geotechnical application of 5 m electrode 
spacing, imaging to distance of 30-50 m from the survey line. Extension of a survey 
moving ½ or ¼ of a cable system ahead on the line would take 1 hours each. 
Constructing and dismantling, as well as moving a line or line segment would require 1 
hours. Typically, production with this kind of array would be 600-800 m in a day. More 
detailed survey at 1 m electrode spacing on tunnel floor or wall would cover a 80 – 100 
m line, to depth of 15 – 20 m, and achieve a 150 – 200 m of line per day. Daily cost of 3–
4-person crew and tools may require 2000 €/day. Processing of each daily line segment 
requires 1 – 2 hours of expert work. Drillhole and crosshole surveys are much slower to 
implement and processing and interpretation will be more demanding than for the 
surface or tunnel-based survey. 
Electrical survey can be applied along the existing tunnels before closure of the tunnel. 
Resolution is adequate to observe undeclared conductive objects located in resistive 
environment to maximum distances of few tens of metres, with some geometric 
limitations of direction and relative tunnel orientation. Tunnels or shafts with related 
installations might be possible to become detected with similar restrictions from 
drillholes, until sealing of the deep drillholes. From ground surface the resistivity survey 
methods can be expected to observe targets of size of a tunnel down to depth of no more 
than some tens of metres. Due to near surface variation of resistivity and natural causes 
of elevated conductivity in rock mass, it is unlikely to avoid false positive alarms without 
baseline and repeat survey. 
3.3.1 Electrical surveys carried out in Olkiluoto and in Äspö 
Electrical surveys for different purposes were carried out in several phases, both in 
ONKALO, and in Äspö HRL. Early stage in characterization, several tens of sounding 
stations were placed to detect effect of increasing salinity in bedrock groundwater, 
reaching to depth of 100-150 m from ground surface (Lehtimäki 1990; Heikkinen et al. 
1992). The results were showing also lateral variation of resistivity by fracture zones 
and conductive mineral occurrences. More detailed and continuous imaging of bedrock 
resistivity was carried out on three lines, one along the length of the island (length 3 km) 
and two in crossing direction, using a pole pole measurement array. Spacing of 
measurement stations (current electrode location) was 50 m along the line, and the 
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resistivity was measured at 50 m interval on spread distances to 500 m from current 
electrode (Figure 3-36, Heikkinen et al. 2004). The results were combined to pseudo-
sections and inverted to true resistivity vertical cross sections. Theoretically the survey 
depth range was c. 200 m. Reviewing the results together with electromagnetic 
frequency sounding results, and with drillhole core logging and resistivity wireline 
logging results, it was observed that the firstly met electrically conductive, laterally 
continuous layer up to 100-150 m depth was correctly imaged in its position. The 
thickness of the layer, or presence of similar deeper seated separate layers was not 
possible to determine. Inversion interpretation was attempted with constrained 
inversion using drillhole logging profiles. However, the different array geometries are 
difficult to combine in inversion process. The local resolution might be enhanced with 
combining ground level and surface to drillhole pole-pole array results in inversion. 
Observation of a tunnel sized object from deeper in the rock mass, independent from 
other supporting information, may not be feasible even with this kind of survey. 
 
Figure 3-36. Electrical resistivity tomography ground level survey in Olkiluoto, 1.5 km long N-S line. Interval  of 
measurement stations 50 m, spacing of current source locations 50 m to distances of 500  m. Measured resistivity pseudo-
section on top, results of computer inversion of resistivity in the middle, and obtained vertical cross-section model on the 
bottom. Inversion was constrained with borehole data (Heikkinen et al. 2004). Though section extends to depth of 400 m, 
resolution is limited to upper surface of first significant conductive body at depth of 100-200 m. Detection of a steel 
reinforced tunnel deeper than that would be unlikely. 
Crosshole and drillhole to surface mise-á-la-masse surveys were carried out in several 
campaigns in deep holes drilled from ground surface (Ahokas et al. 2014). Current 
source was grounded in a drillhole into an electrically conductive interval, which was 
detected by wireline resistivity logging. Measurement of electrical potential was 
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performed in the same drillhole and in several neighbouring drillholes, and on ground 
surface lines, at 5 m measurement interval. Results were used for interpretation of 
electrical connections between the drillholes through deformation zones, or through 
electrically conductive minerals containing layers. This kind of survey would not be 
directly applicable in safeguards. An alternative, fully covering crosshole electrical 
tomography, may serve as method for tunnel detection, but as a baseline and repeat 
survey implementation. After sealing of deep drillholes this kind of approach would not 
be possible. In drillholes located further away from the disposal volume, a permanent 
electrode installation would be possible, to carry repeated tomography. 
A detailed electrical resistivity tomography survey was carried out for characterization 
of Excavation Damaged Zone (EDZ) at ONK-TKU-3620 (Heikkinen et al. 2020a, Figure 
3-37). Electrode spacing was 0.1 m or 0.2 m in a survey array of 80 electrodes, producing 
a 8 m long section reaching to depth of 1 m. In total 11 parallel profiles were measured. 
The more intensely fractured layer on the tunnel floor, and some natural fractures in the 
rock mass were possible to be detected from the results. It seems that this detail of 
survey, or slightly coarser resolution, 0.5 – 1 m electrode spacing to reach high 
resolution until 5 – 20 m of depth, along 40 – 80 m of line length, may be applicable to 
detect electrically conductive objects behind the tunnel surfaces. Method can be applied 
also to view behind the conductive metal fibre reinforced concrete on the wall, or 
macadam cover on the floor. both of which would suppress GPR performance. 
Mise-a-la-masse survey was conducted in Hydco niche on the right-hand side of ONKALO 
access tunnel (ONK-TKU-3760), grounding with a source electrode at fractures in one 
drillhole at a time and measuring potential field densely (0.1 m spacing) in another 
drillhole located 2 m apart (Ahokas et al. 2011). Survey was carried out also between the 
drillhole and the nearby tunnel at 1 m measurement interval. Grounded electrically 
conductive installation or support structure could be detected on basis of changes in 
electrical potential field. 
Similar survey was conducted between demonstration tunnel pilot holes at 20 m 
drillhole distance, grounding source electrodes onto fractures in one drillhole, and 
measuring electrical potential field on tunnel surface at 1 m spacing and in the other 
drillhole at 0.1 m spacing (Ahokas et al. 2015). Using a sparse location of source 
electrodes, does not allow detailed observation of other objects from underground. 
However, it allows following continuation of electrically conductive objects when 
grounded with current source. One measurement campaign in ONKALO for mise-à-la-
masse, included also a drillhole pair at 20 m drillhole distance measured with electrical 
crosshole tomography (Figure 3-38), and one tunnel floor which was surveyed with 
electrical resistivity tomography downwards to 20 m depth (Heikkinen et al. 2017). 
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Figure 3-37. Electrical resistivity tomography on tunnel floor at 8 m line, results of inversion modeling considering the 
form of tunnel surface. Lower electrical resistivity indicates presence of fractures. Method could be applied to detect 
cavities and conductive installations behind rock surfaces (Heikkinen et al. 2020a). 
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Crosshole mise-à-la-masse survey was conducted in three vertical shaft characterization 
holes at a 100 m vertical length. Drillholes were located c. 3 m distances of each other. 
Fractures and veins containing conductive minerals were imaged in the rock mass 
(Heikkinen et al. 2010a).  
Highly detailed mise-á-la-masse surveys were carried out between pairs of eight 
drillholes surrounding an experimental disposal well ONK-EH3 in investigation niche 
ONK-TKU-3620 (Heikkinen et al. 2013). Survey included mise-à-la-masse measurements 
and electrical tomography to line up fracture connections around the experimental hole, 
partly caused, or explaining, damages caused by thermal spalling experiment. 
 
 
Figure 3-38. Crosshole electrical resistivity tomography between drillholes ONK-PH22 and ONK-PH23 (Heikkinen et al. 
2017). Drillholes are parallel, horizontal, and located 20 m apart each another. Pole-pole electrical survey was carried 
out at 1 m current electrode spacing in one drillhole and 0.1 m potential electrode spacing in the other drillhole, and 
inverted to tomographic image (above). Mise-à-la-masse survey was used in following electrical connections (lines) 
along fractures between drillholes (below), partly coinciding with tomographic image. An object of deviating resistivity 
(low or high) located between the drillholes could be detected. 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Report #2008207 89 (128) 
   
Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation   









Figure 3-39. Electrical resistivity tomography carried out on tunnel floor at demonstration tunnel ONK-DT2 /Heikkinen 
et al. 2017), line length 92 m. Current electrodes were located at 2 m interval on the floor, and electrical potential was 
measured at 2 m interval to distance of 40 m. The results were compiled and inverted for three geometries: acquisition 
pole-pole geometry (top) with deepest 20 m depth range, and superposition of results to pole-dipole (middle) to ten 
meters and multigradient (bottom) to depth of 6-7 m and highest resolution. Disposal well pilot holes (8 m) are indicated 
with vertical lines. Conductive locations are shown on red colours. A tunnel near rock surface could be detected, though 
also natural resistivity variation would contribute to the results. 
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Higher coverage of electrical survey was used in Äspö for cross-tunnel and along tunnel 
electrical tomography for designing detailed underground characterization methods, 
and during a revised campaign using single-hole electrical survey, crosshole electrical 
tomography, and drillhole to tunnel electrical tomography. All these measurements also 
included mise-a-la-masse interpretation of grounded electrical conductors (Cosma and 
Enescu 2015). 
 
Figure 3-40. Electrical resistivity tomography carried out on tunnel wall on three sides of a 100 x 100 m rock block in 
Äspö HRL (Thunehed et al., Geovista, presented in Cosma & Enescu 2015). Electrically conductive locations are coinciding 
with modeled minor faults and tunnel crosscutting fractures.  
A series of crosshole tomographic sections was carried out in vertical holes, placed at 1 
m distance from each another, to characterize electrically conductive features around an 
experimental disposal hole. Main purpose was to carry out mise-a-la-masse survey on 
fractures grounded with active electrode, measuring potential field in neighbouring 
drillholes on profile. Fairly dense pole-pole data was used to compute downhole pole-
dipole crosshole data and used in tomographic inversion. Conductive bodies were 
aligned with survey. 
The electrical potential (mise-a-la-masse) and electrical resistivity tomography were 
used for measurement of continuity of electrically conductive structures, like fractures 
and sulphide veins.  
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The surveys could be applied, with some limitations, to detect also tunnels at close 
distance from measurement line in tunnel or drillhole. Survey would need a 
multielectrode measurement system, to place measurement electrodes densely and on 
adequate long spread, to also obtain depth range.  
In case a tunnel would be lined with electrically conductive, metal reinforced shotcrete, 
or bolted or wire mesh lined for supporting, this would enhance observability with 
electrical tomography. A tunnel without lining, and being air filled, would be resistive 
and not so easily observed. The electrical tomography in observing a tunnel would be 
efficient to distances of 10-20 m away from observation line. Survey could be applied to 
detect an undeclared tunnel near a disposal tunnel, or a disposal well, before 
emplacement of the capsule, or soon after emplacement. Possibilities to install a low-cost 
permanent electrode positions on tunnel surfaces would enable frequent repeat 
measurements to detect possible new, undeclared tunnels. Only cables, transmitter and 
receiver would need to be brought with crew during survey. 
After backfilling of tunnel, the possibility to apply the method at close range and high 
resolution will cease. 
 
3.4 Electromagnetic survey 
Electromagnetic measurements can apply either natural magnetotelluric fields or 
artificial sources. Similarly, as for the resistivity method, the electrical conductivity in 
subsurface, or its inverse resistivity, are affecting to the measurable results. 
Electromagnetic wave field generates secondary field components proportional to 
conductivity of the medium, which can be observed with receiver tool.  
Conductivity of rock materials has broad range of variation. Most rock forming silicate 
minerals are insulating, and conductivity mostly associates to metal ion containing 
sulphides and graphite. Weak conductivity can be observed in fractured rock mass due 
to increased water content, and due to clay minerals. 
Electromagnetic methods can be used for locating the metal canisters or waste 
containers (Finch 2009). Also, metallic support structures can be observed with EM 
methods. Electromagnetic (wave field) survey can be applied to detect metallic 
reinforcement related to tunnels, based on their large contrast to surrounding mostly 
resistive rock mass. An exception in Olkiluoto is local graphite and pyrrhotite bearing 
fracture zones, shear zones and layers (veins), which also are conductive. 
Electromagnetic measurement does not require physical contact onto surveyed medium. 
Methods using artificial source, may apply the energy into the surrounding ground 
either by magnetic dipole source, created with a strong alternating current injected into 
wire loop, or a long-grounded wire. Size of a loop can be small, or large. Intensity of the 
primary field is proportional to surface area of the wire loop, circles of wire in the loop, 
and amplitude of electrical current.  
In frequency domain measurements the current is injected at one or several known 
frequencies. Measurement coil is tuned to the measured frequency. Measurement is 
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carried out during on-time of the transmission. Receiver is located at a known distance 
and it is aligned with the transmitter, either on co-planar or co-axial orientation. 
Transmitter and receiver are synchronized. In absence of any conductors, receiver 
response will be zero, and in presence of conductive bodies, the receiver amplitude of in-
phase field (at same phase as source field) and quadrature field (90 degrees phase shift 
to source field) are increasing. Distance range of observation depends on the distance of 
transmitter and receiver, on the power of transmitted primary field, and mostly on the 
frequency of measurement. High frequencies have shortest measurement range and 
highest location resolution. Low frequencies have greatest range. Measurement is 
carried out as densely measured stations on a profile, repeating measurement on each 
station. On profile form, closely located conductive objects can be seen as specific 
anomaly forms, usually cross-over or double maximum. Conductivity and distance of a 
conductor can be defined from the results. Using multicomponent receiver, it would be 
possible to also estimate direction to a conductive object. 
In time domain measurements the current is injected as a short impulse of known pulse 
form. Measurement is carried out during off time of the transmitter. Transmitter and 
receiver are synchronized very accurately. Receiver coil or magnetometer is measuring a 
transient decay of secondary field intensity, normalized with primary field and with 
distance. Receiver is aligned with transmitter. Different geometric arrays can be used. 
Transmission can be carried out using a large, fixed loop, where measurements are 
taken along lines or along a drillhole within and near the loop. Or a local smaller loop can 
be used as a source and measurement carried out as coaxial array, receiver in the middle 
of transmitter loop, or as a dipole-dipole (Slingram) array where receiver is located at 
fixed distance from transmitter. In both cases the entire system moves along a 
measurement line. Each measurement station forms a sounding, where slope of the time 
decay curve shows conductivity of the target, but also physical extent, and distance to 
the target. Measurement profile formed by several soundings on a line can be used to 
further characterize orientation and location of the target. Using multicomponent 
receiver, also direction to the target can be estimated. 
Electromagnetic measurements can be carried out with portable frequency domain tools 
as a line measurement on quick pace, up to 2 – 3 km line coverage during a day. Time 
domain survey may operate at slightly slower pace, depending on transmitter technique. 
In tunnel measurement, size of measurement array would be limited. As the 
measurement system would detect all possible conductive objects near the survey line, 
the probability of false positive alarm is high. Also, natural conductive bodies probable 
cause multiple anomalies. For this reason, also the electromagnetic survey methods 
would apply best as baseline and repeat survey, where results from each measurement 
time would be compared to detect any undeclared activity. 
Whole of the area in Olkiluoto was covered in early site investigations with airborne EM 
measurement, and later ground level survey, using dense line and station spacing. 
Results were used to create a ground level electrical conductivity map, used in 
interpretation of lithological and deformation properties and geometry on surface. The 
survey methods which were applied have a depth penetration of few tens of metres. If 
repeated, this kind of surveys could reveal near surface synthetic (clandestine) 
installations, as these are causing interference in the results. Airborne or ground level 
EM line surveys with portable tools have little contribution to deep repository 
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safeguards but may be applied effectively on wide surface areas to detect exceptional, 
previously unknown installations. Largest depth penetration is associated with time 
domain electromagnetic survey, which can be operated airborne or ground level. This 
method has not been used in Olkiluoto. 
During early site investigations, a frequency domain electromagnetic sounding tool 
Gefinex 400 Sampo was used to measure several hundreds of sounding stations at 
different transmitter receiver spacing distances (Heikkinen et al. 2014). The tool 
operates at 1 – 20 000 Hz frequency range. Survey was covering the rock mass to depth 
of 1 km, indicating variation of electrical conductivity caused by fracture zones, presence 
of saline groundwater, and electrically conductive layers. Later the method has been 
applied in repeat measurements on fixed measurement stations for monitoring, to detect 
conductivity changes (increases) due to expected up-coning of saline water interface in 
the rock mass, caused by pumping of excess water from tunnels (Korhonen 2018).  
The detection resolution is estimated to be inadequate from ground level to produce 
reliable information of tunnel sized objects even with repeated and controlled surveys. 
Drillhole receiver for this specific system, which might have higher resolution in 
detection at closer distance, is not widely available. Method has been severely interfered 
by power lines in the area. 
Transient electromagnetic survey methods from ground surface have not been widely 
implemented in Olkiluoto area. Though these methods might have benefit on highly 
conductive object detection and depth penetration, the time domain survey technique is 
even more disturbed by power line interference, and to greater distances than the 
frequency domain survey. Transient electromagnetic survey could be carried out in 
drillholes and even in a tunnel using a large ground surface loop as transmitter. 
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Figure 3-41. Interpreted compilation of 1-D soundings in Olkiluoto using frequency domain electromagnetic tool Gefinex 
400S SAMPO (Heikkinen et al. 2004). Two different measurement arrays on a same line are presented (slightly different 
length coverage). The 200 m transmitter-receiver spacing has better resolution, depth range to 200-300 m. The 500 m 
transmitter receiver spacing improves depth penetration to 600-700 m with a tradeoff of weaker resolution. Upper surface 
of deeper conductive body is detected. Separation of natural and artificial conductive bodies would require repeat surveys. 
Crosshole electromagnetic frequency domain method, FARA, or EMRE, a radiowave 
shadowing method, has been carried out at three pairs of drillholes in Olkiluoto down to 
depth of 500 m. Distances between drillholes was 100 – 150 m at measurement interval. 
Method produces at high frequencies a crosshole tomographic image (Korpisalo et al. 
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2008). Frequency range of 300 – 1250 kHz is not capable to function as radar reflection 
survey, though both dielectric permittivity and conductivity will contribute to results. 
The results display a conductivity image between drillholes. Image may include features 
located off-plane. Whether a survey could geometrically identify a tunnel sized object 
between drillholes but not intersected by either of holes, is uncertain. A new conductive 
object might cause some differences between baseline and repeat survey. 
 
Figure 3-42. Electromagnetic radiowave imaging at 1250 kHz frequency. Amplitude is converted to resistivity 
(Korpisalo et al. 2008). Changes in image could be associated with undeclared activities. 
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In Olkiluoto, no tunnel electromagnetic survey has been carried out. Possibilities are, 
that such method might be applied to detect possible undeclared tunnels near existing 
ones. Because all nearby metallic objects, installations and natural conductive bodies 
cause anomalies in the measurement data, the application manner would be repeated 
survey to be compared to baseline data. 
Frequency domain EM survey, for example Slingram (horizontal loop EM), can be carried 
out in tunnels. Typical slingram tool like MaxMin II, may use comparably short 
transmitter to receiver spacing, and high frequencies. Measurement would detect 
presence of metallic objects to distances of 10 – 30 m from the tunnel. A multicomponent 
Slingram (like Iris Promis 10) can also display direction to the conductive body. Drillhole 
slingram tools have been developed (e.g., GTK SlimBoris), but are not commercially 
available. 
Time domain EM survey, using for example Geonics Protem, would be based on 
transmitted EM pulses, and recorded transient decays of the EM field induced into the 
conductive bodies. Currents induced into tunnel lining would cause a secondary field, 
detectable to distances of tens of meters from tunnel or drillhole. Implementation can 
use a large and powerful ground surface based current loop (vertical magnetic dipole), 
and measurement of the secondary responses either in drillholes (before their sealing) 
or in tunnels (before backfill). Ground level-based measurement is not sensitive enough 
to detect deeply seated small objects from other variation.  
Another alternative for TDEM survey is to carry a local loop source together with 
receiver, at constant distance (Slingram-type of array) or using central loop array and 
measure the responses locally. Combination of resistivity and induced polarization on 
near surface, and magnetotelluric survey on deeper part (Titan-24 or Spartan, Quantec 
2021), especially when supplemented with a drillhole measurement, may enable high 
enough resolution. 
All electromagnetic soundings would benefit on comparison between a pre-survey and 
repeat measurement. Responses can be modeled prior to considerations, using forward 
modeling. Recent development of techniques (Duncan 2017) is likely to bring in new 
applications. 
3.5 Magnetic survey 
Magnetic measurements are based on observation of natural magnetic field. The Earth 
has a magnetic field associated with the internal geological processes of the globe. 
Orientation and intensity of the field is varying according to location. Typical values in 
latitudes of Finland (in Olkiluoto) are 51 000 nano-Tesla (nT) intensity, declination c. 5 
degrees to east from geographic North, and inclination towards 75 degrees from 
horizontal. 
Small scale variation of the field intensity and field orientation can be caused by local 
conditions. This variation may range from few tens of nanoTeslas to several thousands. 
Local field orientation may also be altered due to local anomaly sources. The magnetic 
field induces secondary field in paramagnetic minerals. Ferrimagnetic minerals possess 
their own magnetization, contributing to the local field. A tunnel with steel 
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reinforcement on the wall and ceiling, or large construction vehicles placed into a tunnel, 
may appear as magnetic sources in external Earth magnetic field. 
Magnetic field is a potential field, where the intensity of a specific source of magnetic 
interference is decaying according to distance from the source. The magnetic field 
intensity related to the source is proportional to the amount and distribution of 
magnetized material in the medium, the shape, and volume of the object. Effect of 
homogeneously distributed magnetized substance in rock mass can be understood as a 
geometric object, which would cause a specific anomaly form on a line or surface area 
measurement. Shape of an anomaly on a line can be used in localizing an object and 
defining its orientation and form. Historically, magnetic methods have been applied also 
to detection of submarine vessels and mines, unexploded ordnance, and other 
manufactured objects, even in archaeology. 
Magnetic field intensity can be measured with widely available tools, ranging from 
ferrite-coil construction (fluxgate) to proton-precession and more precise cesium-vapor 
operated or squid magnetometers. Method of application of magnetic measurement, is a 
line survey with densely located measurement stations. Depending on application, either 
specific field component, total field, or orientation of total field and different 
components, can be measured. Numerical accuracy requirement is depending on the 
application purpose. Geotechnical and ore exploration purposes record the field at 
accuracies of 0.1 nT. 
Magnetic survey is quick to implement. With continuous recording of 10 values per 
second, survey can be carried out installed in a vehicle, or walking pace, several 
kilometers in day. Magnetic measurements can be carried out also in drillholes, until 
these would be sealed. Some sensor types are cheap, so that these could be installed into 
a permanent monitoring network, enabling recognition of undeclared activities at some 
areas within repository volume. Alternatively, drillhole based survey or monitoring may 
be carried out from ground surface or drillholes placed further away from the repository 
boundary. 
Method of application of safeguards, would rely on detection of magnetized metallic 
objects, which could range from support installations to construction machinery. A large 
drill rig or tunnel boring machine may cause interference in natural magnetic field, 
detectable to distances of tens of meters through the rock mass. Human constructed 
objects would also cause deviation into the orientation of magnetic field, because of high 
content of magnetizable iron in the materials. Due to abundance of natural anomaly 
causes, and anomalies already existing due to declared tunnels, method would be based 
on baseline and repeat surveys, where only the changes in the result would be inspected 
in more detail. 
Olkiluoto has been covered by both airborne magnetic survey and with dense ground 
level measurement. Results have been used for mapping of lithological and deformation 
zone locations and geometry. Magnetic properties in rock mass have been measured by 
wireline logging. Observations on 3-component magnetic field variation have associated 
with drillhole imaging surveys. Even small metallic objects have found to cause 
interference in magnetic field orientation to distances of few metres. Tunnel based 
magnetic surveys have not been carried out. Magnetic surveys may be applied on ground 
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surface for effective detection of unexpected features. Surveys can be run also with 
UAV’s. 
In case of bolting or steel fibre reinforcement in tunnels, magnetic survey has some 
capabilities on detecting undeclared tunnels from close distance. Magnetic total field 
measurement would indicate magnetic field high and low anomalies due to metallic 
object to distances of some metres to tens of metres. Distance to the object can be 
resolved using forward modeling. Three component magnetic measurement would help 
in also resolving location, or direction towards, the object. Again, a comparison 
measurement and a repeat survey, with mutual comparison, would be most useful 
technique to detect any changes occurred between the surveys. 
Downhole magnetometry, or three component magnetometry, can be used in ground 
level based deep drillholes, and tunnel based drillholes until these are sealed. Tunnel 
based magnetometry can be carried out until backfill, but not after that. 
3.6 Gravimetry 
Gravimetric measurements are based on observation of natural earth’s gravitational 
acceleration. Gravimetric field ranges on earth surface at 9.81 m/s2, which is referred as 
one Gal (Galilei). Instantaneous gravimetric potential field varies at latitude, and due to 
tidal effects. Density of rock mass causes local variation in the gravimetric potential field, 
which can be measured using sensitive accelerometer-based tools. Relevant variation is 
at range of microGal to milliGal. 
Typical rock forming silicate minerals have densities ranging at 2500 – 3000 kg/m3. For 
crystalline lithologies this also produces the density of rock mass. Significant fracturing 
or porosity and associated water content may decrease the density. Sedimentary rocks 
have slightly lower densities due to their lower consolidation. Sulphidic and oxidic ore 
minerals (magnetite) as well as mafic silicate lithologies have higher densities than 
granitic rock types. Gravimetry has been applied for cavity and void detection from 
ground surface measurements in karstic areas, and in past mining areas for detection of 
risk of collapse and other hazards. 
Gravity field intensity due to an anomalous object is depending on the contrast (amount 
and volume of the object), size, shape, and distance from the object. Gravimetric field can 
be measured as a total field, gradient, or using a tensor measurement tool, a tensor field 
which is capable on also indicating the direction to the anomaly source. Gravimetric 
survey can be carried out also in drillholes, using downhole sensor with wireline logging 
(Nind et al. 2013). Possibilities would be using the measurement technique from 
drillholes located further away from the repository boundary. 
Any excavated spaces within rock mass have significant density contrast to the 
surrounding rock mass. Air filled (density close to zero) or water filled (density 1000 
kg/m3) would be clearly detectable by gravimetric measurement from a short distance 
of some tens of metres.  
Gravimetric measurement requires stationary recording of results over some tens of 
seconds to minutes at each station. Measurement technique would be recording gravity 
value at stations along line in tunnel. Pace of measurements would be 1 – 2 km in a day.  
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Because of already existing tunnels and natural anomaly sources will cause variation in 
gravimetric field, most applicable method would be baseline and repeat measurement 
and comparison of the results. Observation of changes in results can be made directly 
but understanding the results would require comparisons to synthetic modeling. 
Microgravity surveys are frequently used in past mining areas and in karst areas to 
detect voids and underground tunnels which may become hazardous for surface 
structures. Detection distance of a 3 – 5 m diameter tunnel is delimited to few tens of 
meters in maximum. Gravimetric survey would be based on density contrast between 
rock mass (2720 kg/m3) compared to density of air (0 kg/m3) or water (1000 kg/m3). 
Gravimetric method has not been used in Olkiluoto as systematic survey technique. 
Candidate areas containing mafic lithology occurrences (Syyry and Romuvaara) included 
gravity survey lines in preliminary investigation phase. 
From ground surface to depth of 420 m the gravimetric method is not feasible in 
detection of tunnels. From existing deep drillholes, using drillhole gravimeter logging 
technique, detection could be carried out from closer distance. This again would not be 
possible after drillholes become sealed. Drillholes made from the tunnel, closer to the 
target area, may be used in comparable way, until their closure. More standard 
gravimetric measurement can be carried out in tunnels, with similar detection 
capability. This is possible until backfill of the tunnels.  
Any gravimetric measurement would benefit of a baseline measurement, onto which the 
repeat survey would be compared. This is because the possible responses would be 
small. 
3.7 Radiometric survey 
Radiometric measurements include detection of gamma radiation, beta particles, alpha 
particles, and neutrons. Gamma radiation is measured with scintillometer sensors. 
Method is applied in geotechnical, geological and mine exploration tasks. Measurements 
can be used also as radioactivity safety monitoring in industrial and transportation 
activities, for example to prevent illegal trafficking of radioactivity containing materials. 
Scintillometers can be based on NaI(Tl) or CsI(Tl) crystal sensors and can be used in 
producing a full gamma radiation energy spectrum, to recognize radionuclides. Crystals 
are sensitive to mechanic failure and would require comparably large volumes and 
surface areas to be effectively used as portal sensor in transport monitoring.  
Alternative sensors, which provide large volume and surface area, are based on plastic 
Polyvinyl Toluene (PVT) material, are more cost effective in manufacturing, robust in 
demanding conditions, and can be used in larger volume, surface area and mass in 
effective count rate screening. Though measurement is based on windowed calculation 
of spectrum, it can be adjusted to provide alarm on specific radionuclide. Tools are 
widely used in industrial and cargo applications, at metal foundries using recycled raw 
materials, at airports, terminals, and border crossing.  
Corresponding sensors, with different functional principle are available also for 
detection of beta particles, alpha particles, and neutrons.  
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In safeguards application, radioactivity portal sensors may be effectively used for 
monitoring that radioactive materials, or indications of contamination due to diversion 
attempt, would not depart from repository. Testing of spent fuel itself for gamma 
spectrum may enable identification of the type of fuel (Hellesen and Grape 2018). 
It is unlikely that a geophysical mapping type of application of radiometric sensors 
would be useful, unless expected a case of fallout or contamination spreading during 
declared (or undeclared) transportation. 
3.8 Temperature 
Temperature in rock mass can be measured with sensors placed in tunnels and 
drillholes. An effective method to measure large amount of temperature scan line, is to 
use an optical fibre thermal sensor, based on Raman spectroscopy. Fibre optics sensors 
can be hundreds of metres long and return temperature value for example at one metre 
interval. In case drillholes would be available for installation of such sensor, even minor 
changes in temperature due to construction and excavation would be detected to 
distances of metres to tens of metres. Effect is slow to emerge, requiring months or years 
to become visible, though. 
Observations have shown that the ventilation air is changing temperature in and around 
tunnel compared to the temperature occurring in the ambient rock mass in Olkiluoto 
(Pentti 2017). Accurate temperature logging in deep drillholes were observing these 
temperature changes to distances of several metres from the tunnel. However, repeat 
surveys for temperature are unlikely to be possible after sealing of the drillholes. 
Temperature has been discussed in more detail in report (Pentti 2017). 
Temperature field created by disposal of the spent fuel canisters, can be also measured 
and any deviations from the expected behavior might be observed in long term 
monitoring. 
Thermal monitoring can be used to detect decay heat. It needs to be calibrated against 
initial conditions (Finch 2009). The baseline conditions of temperature distribution in 
Olkiluoto are well characterized (Haapalehto et al. 2020). 
 
3.9 Groundwater pressure 
Pressure in groundwater can be measured with either a pressure sensor installed within 
a packer isolated interval in drillhole, or using a vibrating wire piezometer, which needs 
to be cemented into the packer section. Inflatable packers can be used in non-sealead 
drillholes, and there is a possibility to carry maintenance or replacement of the sensor 
and packer system. Piezometer can be applied also in sealed drillhole, though it needs a 
communication and power source link from surface, which may not be allowed in any 
drillholes near the repository. Once failing for any reason, the piezometer only can be 
abandoned, as there is no possibility for replacement or maintenance. Service life can be 
long, but still limited.  
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Pressure field is easily reacting to change in hydrogeological conditions. Intrusion to a 
hydraulically conductive fracture zone with some degree of continuity, is lowering the 
pressure, which will be visible either immediately or after some time delay, over long 
distances in bedrock. Even small transient changes in pressure field would be indicative. 
Localization of an event is not straightforward, though. A deterministic fracture zone 
model and hydrogeological simulations based on the observation would be method in 
understanding the observations. 
Excavated tunnel space will be draining the groundwater from surrounding rock mass, 
causing groundwater pressure level to approach atmospheric level close to the tunnel, 
and being significantly lowered in fractures and fracture zones directly or indirectly 
connected to the tunnel. Permanent hydrogeological pressure stations in deep drillholes 
(multi-packer installations) or in ONKALO (PVA stations) can be used to detect intrusion 
about tunnels. Groundwater pressure is discussed more detail in report (Pentti 2017). 
 
3.10 Laser scanning or photogrammetry 
Laser scanning is producing a millimeter scale accurate point cloud, including also RGB 
compiled photo assemblage, from a tunnel surface. Method is widely used in 
engineering, tunnel excavation, and mining. Survey of one measurement station covers 
few meters of tunnel length at a time. Advantage of stationary scanning is the 
opportunity to carry reliable staking for the survey. Also mobile, vehicle based multiple 
sensor laser and photo scanners are under frequent application in urban environment, 
traffic corridor, and infrastructure documentation. Survey can progress at quicker, slow 
driving pace, and carries the required localization while measuring, using necessary 
fixed-point indicators installed beforehand. Under development are also UAV or drone-
based laser scanning methods, which would collect the point cloud during movement of 
the drone, localization would be run by using Simultaneous Location and Measurement 
(SLAM) processing technique.  
Alternative for laser scanning using active source, slower to operate, is application of 
photogrammetric survey. Partially overlapping series of high-resolution photographs 
are taken from slightly different viewing angles, and processing after recognition and 
indication of fixed stations, seeks for substantial number of common points from the 
images, and computes then a 3D point cloud and triangulation from the results. Results 
need to be tied onto staking belonging to the design information. Also, photogrammetry 
can be run by drones or vehicle. In tunnel, photogrammetry survey requires organized 
and even illumination of the tunnel surface. Development of photogrammetry or video 
imaging assisted with active laser survey has been also underway recently, combining 
the accuracy and high pace of production. 
During ONKALO construction in Olkiluoto, each excavated tunnel section, after few 
blasting rounds, are measured with laser scanning using total station. Obtained point 
cloud is used for quality control of the excavation, to detect under- or over excavation. 
After scanning, the rock surface is bolted for support, and on access tunnels lined with 
shotcrete and in disposal tunnels the ceiling is supported with wire mesh attached on 
the bolts. Photogrammetric surveys have been used for mapping of specific investigation 
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niches, for example for the POSE investigations in ONK-TKU-3620 (Koittola 2014, Figure 
3-43). Results have been used in geological mapping and documentation of changes, as 
well as in numerical stress field simulation as a 3D surface model. 
 
 
Figure 3-43. Photogrammetric imaging of ONK-TKU-3620 investigation niche. Technique uses partially overlapping 
high resolution images and tie points to compute a 3D point cloud which can be rendered to a 3D image (top) and 3D 
surface or solid model. 
Known laser scanning or photogrammetric techniques can be used to resurvey the 
tunnels, to make comparisons on the reported initial surface, and changes in the surface, 
due to potential undeclared tunnels or spaces. Resurvey can be run using drone, vehicle, 
reconstruction of photos into point cloud, or using laser scanning. Photogrammetry can 
be used also to measure hyperspectral data to recognize differences in moisture (near 
infrared absorption) and temperature on the tunnel wall, or differences and changes in 
the materials on tunnel surfaces. 
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3.11 Nuclear magnetic resonance 
Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) is technology which has developed in hydrocarbon 
exploration for measuring water or hydrocarbon content in porous space. Also, medical 
application in form of magnetic imaging is in active usage. From ground level, NMR have 
been used for groundwater resources exploration. NMR operates either with excitation 
of strong local magnetic field, turning the field on and off in rapid sequence, or with high 
intensity transient electromagnetic field. A transient magnetic field of specific high 
frequencies (associated with emissions from proton displacement), can be measured. 
The intensity and time decay of secondary field is used as measurement of water (or 
proton) content in the medium. 
Nuclear magnetic resonance measurements (NMR) in drillholes have been recently 
developed available to slim (76 mm) drillhole diameter. A drillhole measurement can be 
used to measure water saturation immediately around the drillhole (Freedman and 
Heaton 2004). In case groundwater would be drained from unexpected locations in 
bedrock otherwise, being saturated with groundwater, the NMR method would be used 
to produce an indication of potential intrusion nearby. Again, survey cannot be 
conducted after closure of drillholes. Deep drillholes prepared to a further distance from 
repository volume, may be used for detecting volumes drained from groundwater due to 
a clandestine tunnel. A pre-measurement and comparison to repeat surveys would be 
best way to also apply this technique. 
 
3.12 Muography 
Muons induced by cosmic radiation in upper atmosphere can penetrate bedrock to 
depth of several hundreds of meters (Holma and Kuusiniemi 2018). Muon flux is 
inversely proportional to density of the medium above the recording station. Placing 
sensors below a target of interest, muon flux can be used in tomographic imaging of 
density variation in the medium located above. Imaging applies information collected 
from muons arriving from slightly varying directions, and multiple observation stations. 
Measurement requires long times to collect adequate number of muons into the sensors. 
Method is especially efficient in detecting presence of high-density material, even in a 
closed container, as the muons penetrate through any medium. Technique has been used 
to render imaging of interior of pyramids and other synthetic structures, and for 
example volcanoes. Applications have also been created for transillumination of cargo 
consignment to reveal trafficking of materials. 
At a level of interest of repository volumes in the bedrock, a muon flow tomography can 
be used to map volumes of different densities. Lower density in an excavated, 
undeclared tunnel space would be detected with muography, using appropriate survey 
geometry. Limitations to application of the technique would be required density of 
sensors and need to install sensors below the level of disposal tunnels, where there is no 
accessibility other than existing deep drillholes.  
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Deep drillholes will be sealed and there is no possibility to leave there any permanent 
installations. In case sensors could be left in the bedrock, muography monitoring would 
be carried out as time lapse comparison tomographic surveys with specific time steps. 
Resolution is adequate to detect the presence of spent nuclear fuel canisters, and 
possible undeclared tunnels, required the sensor density is high. 
Another applicable muographic method in nuclear safeguards would be using imaging at 
a gate to inspect that any specific material (of declared size and having relevant specific 
density) is entering the repository, and that no corresponding material would leave the 
specified repository area. 
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Olkiluoto site monitoring has collected data which can be used for safeguards purposes. 
Current monitoring practices may be modified, or readily include data to provide also 
safeguards applicable information (Pentti and Okko 2018). Monitoring is likely to take 
place during construction of the repository, operational phase, during closure and at 
post closure phase. The reasons for monitoring will be ensuring safe operation and 
effective isolation of spent fuel from biosphere and ensuring contained nuclear materials 
would not be diverted to unknown purposes or nuclear explosives (Okko and Rautjärvi 
2006). Practices can be further modified to conform information needs. 
Currently microseismic monitoring (18 stations) is one of passive geophysical methods 
considered suitable for nuclear safeguards application in deep geological storage of 
spent nuclear fuel. Seismic monitoring in Olkiluoto is already running by the operator. It 
has adequate operational history proving detection and localization capability of 
excavation blasts to distances of several kilometers and within the repository 
construction area using traditional seismic event localization. Technique is based on 
recording and storage of events triggered on amplitudes exceeding criteria coherently 
on at least three stations. Method has been tested also in detection and localization of 
raise-boring, a vertical equivalent for application of tunnel boring machine. Correlation 
of coherent noise envelope emerging on continuous, low energy level, would require 
recording and storage of complete time series, at least until processing would have been 
completed. Micro-seismic monitoring has also been used in detection of seismic events, 
either natural tectonic and stress-field originated, or events induced by ongoing 
excavation and stress-field redistribution. 
Seismic monitoring is safeguard-relevant, and it can be continued over long time 
periods. On the other hand, this method, or any other locally applied sensor-based 
monitoring method, is excessive cost, demanding to implement, and requires expertise 
involvement. Method might be remotely controlled. There would remain questions to be 
resolved, regarding how long the monitoring and maintenance of measurement array 
would be carried out (not indefinitely long), and who would be the responsible party to 
carry the activity (operator, state, or international agencies).  
The construction and operation phases offer limited access into close area of the 
repository, to make comparisons between baseline and verifying measurements. During 
construction and operation of the repository, maintenance work is necessary for 
operational safety. Maintenance may include annual scaling off loose rock slabs from 
walls and ceiling, inspection and renewal corroded or loosened reinforcement bolts and 
mesh at 10 - 20-year interval, and maintenance of shotcrete lining or drainage between 
liner and bedrock surface. Also access route draining of groundwater seepage is likely to 
require maintenance activity for pumping, settling pools, and leading the excess water. 
These activities are likely to cause changes in shape of the wall, require reporting 
(declaration), and confirming measurements with laser scanning using either total 
station, or vehicle or drone-based scanning or photogrammetry, can be applied to 
monitor immediate changes on tunnel surface. These can include hyperspectral 
measurements of temperature, moisture, or other indicators of undeclared activities. 
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Measurements may join also near infrared or temperature observations. Some of the 
activities will also cause mechanic noise, which will produce events in seismic network, 
and would require explanation. Spontaneous post-excavation microearthquakes, in case 
occurring immediately near the tunnels, would need to be controlled and explained in 
design information verification as well. 
Similar development of monitoring, based on continuous gathering of data, may be 
applied to detect changes in groundwater pressure level (hydraulic head). Hydraulic 
pressure field can be used to detect an intrusion to repository volume, especially when 
compared to land use monitoring information.  
Instrumentation of drillholes with sensors require special expertise in selection of the 
monitored drillhole intervals of fault interception. The hydraulic sensors need to be 
installed in packed off sections in drillholes, typically intercepting defined 
hydrogeological zones in bedrock. These drillhole installed sensors can be used during 
disposal operation. In case the holes would be permanently sealed during closure of the 
repository, alternatives may remain to install sensors into purpose-made drillholes, 
preferably outside of the repository volume, to detect undeclared intrusion after closure. 
Installation of piezometer or pressure sensors require also skilled personnel, as well as 
maintenance or replacement of such systems. Though monitoring, data storage and 
management, and analysis can be carried out also remotely, there remains question also 
on hydrogeological monitoring, that who shall have responsibility on the operation, and 
over how prolonged period. It might be feasible to suggest that operator would monitor 
recovery of groundwater saturation within the repository over some specified time after 
closure. Understanding the pressure field responses may also need special expertise, 
both in form of classifying the different form and amplitude of events, but also explaining 
their origin, requiring reference to numerical simulations. Hydraulic monitoring does 
not enable localization of events. After sealing of deep drillholes, monitoring cannot be 
continued, and sensors maintained within the perimeter of repository volume (to be 
defined).  
Measuring or monitoring temperature changes, or changes in groundwater pressure 
field, may be one applicable technique. A proven technology to detect post excavation 
microseismic activity, or direct excavation attempt, is the passive seismic monitoring 
network. Efficient application of any of these monitoring techniques would require 
maintaining a sensor network at least in part of the repository if possible. For use of 
temperature monitoring in safeguards surveillance, a drillhole needs to be close (20 – 25 
m) to an undeclared engineered space, be available for measurements, and adequate 
time must be passed after excavation to make the thermal effect detectable. A 
continuous monitoring of temperature would require permanent installation of thermal 
sensors, like optical fibre, into a drillhole.  
Actively operated geophysical characterization methods are capable in localizing 
activities in the bedrock, considering their limitations with respect to range, resolution, 
and involved contrast in the physical parameters on where application of each method is 
based on. Several techniques exist. Most of these have limitations related to survey range 
and resolution. Applicability would be best at close range from existing tunnel surfaces. 
Standard processing techniques are not adequate to be successful in tunnel detection. 
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Comparison of baseline and repeat measurements might be best practice to detect 
undeclared tunnels. Selection of methods, measurement parameters, design of field 
survey, and processing practices as well as using the results are likely to demand highly 
experienced specialist personnel. Potentially a set of instructions, including how-to 
description on applicability, would be useful. 
These methods may be implemented for design information verification during 
construction of the repository, in ensuring that there would not be deviatory activities 
from and within the repository, potentially carried out by the operator. Depending on 
method, application may be either continuous, applied systematically and frequently, or 
applied on demand at specific locations. Possibilities would be also to use geophysical 
methods in proofing of absence of attempt for external intrusion, again by operator or by 
a non-specified party. This kind of monitoring can be based on GPR or its drillhole 
application at close range, seismic reflection methods to gain further range and 
resolution, or various passive potential field (thermal, magnetic or gravity) or diffuse 
active source field methods (electrical or electromagnetic). Other possible tunnel or 
drillhole based close range methods, which are not applied in ONKALO characterization, 
but might be used in 10 m range to detect tunnels, are gravimetric survey (density 
contrast, does not require metal reinforcement), magnetic survey (requires steel 
structures), electromagnetic frequency or time domain survey (requires electrically 
conductive reinforcement), or surface wave seismic methods (passive or active; Fedin et 
al. (2020) demonstrated that surface waveforms may be used to detect cavities within 
rock mass to distances of tens of metres). Each of these methods would benefit of prior 
forward modeling, pre-survey for baseline to be compared with repeat survey, and then 
modeling or inversion to deduce location of potential changes in tunnel surface. 
However, resolution and depth extent of either refraction seismics or ERT are not 
adequate to detect an unanticipated tunnel excavation deeper than few tens of metres 
from surface. Method combination might be applied from tunnel, during operation stage 
(before closure of the site). 
Application of any of these methods from tunnels will cease on closure of the repository. 
Electrical tomography can be used either as cross-tunnel or crosshole measurement, or 
as resistivity tomography sounding from tunnel surface to different directions 
(downwards or sideways) and might be used to detect a steel reinforced tunnels to 
distances of 10 to 20 m from the tunnel. 
Best resolution to detect undeclared underground spaces from underground would be 
from the tunnels during operation and before the backfill of tunnels. Range of detailed 
observation is short (with GPR 0 - 10 m, using seismics 100 m). Other possibility is to 
use existing ground level based deep drillholes or tunnel based drillholes which are 
closer to target. The drillholes will be sealed for long term nuclear safety reasons soon, 
even before startup of operation, or latest before backfilling and closure. Location of 
existing drillholes is limited regarding survey coverage and can be used only at some 
selected locations. 
GPR measurement can be used from exposed rock surfaces to distances of 10 m using 
250 – 400 MHz tools. The currently available 32-bit data dynamic, and modern 
hyperstacking (introduced by GSSI brand), are enhancing signal to noise ratio, 
detectability, and range up to 30-50% compared to past performance. Lower frequency 
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has theoretically better depth penetration, but large size of antenna causes ringing from 
irregular rock surface, and weaker shielding of antenna causes further problems with 
tunnel reflections, for which reasons the 250-400 MHz frequencies seem optimal to rock 
characterization and to tunnel detection. Metal reinforced tunnels would be more easily 
detected than non-reinforced. 
Review considered different borehole, ground, and tunnel investigation methods, 
considering the Olkiluoto bedrock conditions. During the time, it was recognized that 
GPR would imply severe limitations even in Olkiluoto crystalline bedrock conditions. In 
favourable situation, without presence of strongly attenuating minerals which occur 
sporadically in layers in Olkiluoto migmatite, the range with GPR is limited to some 
metres to few tens of metres with lowest applicable frequencies. Also, it was concluded 
that application of the method would require expertise on the target, and on processing, 
though the GPR method itself consists of industry standards, is well documented, non-
intrusive, quick to implement and possible to run by non-expert though well-trained 
inspection personnel. GPR can be used in detection of underground excavated spaces in 
certain conditions, but contain also ambiguity in results, and may lead either to false 
alarms, or may not detect the anticipated undeclared activities even when existing. Apart 
of range of investigation, limitations are set by unfavorable survey geometry (dead 
angles), and bedrock conditions: strong attenuation due to conductive bedrock, 
abundant natural reflecting or diffracting events masking the anticipated target, and 
sensitivity to tunnel related interferences like metallic objects, electrical installations, 
uneven surface, and support structures which may suppress the GPR wave in total. Most 
applicable the GPR method would be in salt formations, dry or fresh water saturated 
non-conductive (“granitic” or metamorphic) bedrock. Least favorable conditions include 
sedimentary rock mass, presence of abundant porosity and water content, especially 
with saline water, otherwise conductive bedrock due to mineral content, or metal 
containing support structures. Only partial coverage for verification is possible.  
Seismic methods have largest distance penetration from the tunnel surface (up to 100 
m), and these can be applied both on lining, and from exposed rock surface. Detection of 
tunnels, which are creating diffracting events, would be requiring separately designed 
processing, compared to current survey techniques. For example, a permanent array of 
optical fibre, or geophones, might be applied to accumulate seismic noise as a source, 
and using interferometry, collect adequate level of accuracy to carry time lapse 
tomography to follow potential changes in subsurface. Seismic methods use established 
source and receiver techniques. The survey geometries and processing, focusing on 
specific target and directions, set demand for expertise. Survey requires multiple source 
and receiver stations in direct contact into the investigated medium. Preparation of 
source and receiver locations, assembling the sensors, running the survey, and moving 
to following location require more time, personnel and costs compared to GPR survey. 
After the tunnels are backfilled and drillholes sealed, remaining possibility for 
monitoring would be active seismic 2D or 3D survey from ground level (with limited 
resolution from that distance), permanent seismic monitoring network (passive 
method), or groundwater pressure monitoring. It is unlikely that any permanent 
measurement systems could be installed and left operational in the storage premises 
after their backfill and closure. 
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After closure of the disposal site and backfill of the tunnels, the possibilities for design 
information verification are limited. Monitoring will provide data from undeclared 
activities, using seismic monitoring network and hydrogeological monitoring network 
on their remaining part. Sealing of boreholes for long term safety will lead to abandoning 
at least some of downhole stations. Alternative for existing operator driven monitoring 
systems would be an authority established monitoring or detection array, which would 
be installed outside of the repository volume, to not to disturb the performance of 
repository. Passive monitoring systems can be supplemented with active surveys, either 
repeated as campaigns or using permanently installed multiple sensor arrays. Most 
functionable remote sensing technique would be seismic reflection sounding, either 
from ground level, or to obtain higher resolution, supported by borehole sensors. 
Ground based 2D or 3D seismic survey would be an only available active geophysical 
method to monitor underground tunnels immediately above the repository, after 
backfilling and closure of the disposal facility, though the resolution without drillhole 
data down to depth of 420 m may not be adequate in separation of new objects from 
existing ones. Detection of external undeclared activities after closure of the repository 
would be based on drillhole or ground level-based sensor network or repeated surveys. 
After sealing of the drillholes located close to the repository, drillholes located only 
further distance from the repository perimeter can be used for investigations. 
Simultaneously also the volume, or length of perimeter to be surveyed, would increase. 
Ground surface-based surveys alone are not likely to have adequate range and 
resolution to detect and localize undeclared activities but would require support from 
drillhole based sensors or measurements. Surveys can be carried out as campaigns, 
systematically at frequent time intervals, or again when required. Survey network would 
either be constructed ready before closure, and maintained, or prepared just before 
taking actual survey first time (saving resources). Survey network may partly apply a 
permanently installed, continuously operated and remotely controlled measurement 
system, and partly on-demand applied measurements. 
An early warning detection system used after closure of repository would rely on 
passive seismic network in detection of excavation activities, and some combination of 
campaigns or permanently installed geophysical detection network to support 
localization. This network would need to be installed long distance outside of the 
disposal site volume, both not to disturb the integrity of repository, and to provide 
indication of intrusion in time to react to an attempt.  
Seismic reflection method can be run from ground surface, and resolution can be 
enhanced with drillhole receivers, which can provide information at 100 - 200 m range 
radially around the drillholes. Passive seismic recording systems, applying 
environmental noise, may be used as a signal at least partly to support application of 
active source. Receivers on ground level and in drillholes can be based on optical fibre 
sensors, which provide spatial high coverage and permanently installed monitoring 
system for both active and passive source application. To enable complete coverage for 
seismic drillhole survey, drillholes should not be located further than 300 - 400 m apart. 
Drillhole radar has shorter, 20 – 40 m range around drillholes in Olkiluoto. Drillhole 
radar cannot be applied as permanent array of sensors, due to excessive cost of actively 
operated antennas and receiver system, and low availability of services on commercial 
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basis. Application of drillhole radar would require drillholes located at 50 – 100 m range 
from each another to enable complete coverage in tunnel detection, making the 
workload and cost of survey even higher than for seismic survey. 
Combination of actively run survey campaigns and passive continuous measurements 
can be carried out with various other measurement techniques and geophysical source 
fields. Magnetic field sensors are cheap, so these could be distributed at 5 - 20 m interval 
on length of a drillhole and connected to data retrieval system. Any notable change in 
magnetic field intensity near a drillhole would be considered as indication of an 
undeclared activity. Magnetic field sensors or electromagnetic coil receivers can be 
applied also in detection of electromagnetic secondary field, caused by a highly 
conductive metallic object near the sensor, induced in an active field of electromagnetic 
source. The source can be for example a long-grounded cable, or a large diameter wire 
loop, where a strong electrical impulse or an alternating current sweep would be 
transmitted. Recording of the field close to the target would make detection more 
feasible. Depth level, distance, and direction of cause of an anomaly could be defined 
from data. 
Similar opportunity, though with slightly higher costs, would enable monitoring of 
temperature along drillhole. Optical fibre thermal sensor would retrieve instantaneously 
temperature profile from the full length of a drillhole. Temperature changes due to 
constructed tunnel in the nearby bedrock volume are a slow, diffuse process, which 
means the indication would not be as immediate as with magnetic, electromagnetic or 
gravity methods.  
Each of these methods can be implemented also by running a single receiver 
measurement (logging) at frequent intervals along each drillhole. This would require 
mobilizing tools and measurement crew to the site each time the measurement would be 
carried out. Due to scarce availability of drillhole gravimetric sensors and commercial 
services, also drillhole gravimetry would require running as repeated campaigns.  
Combination of different methods from same investigation area, for example survey line, 
can be useful for interpretation. Examples of useful combined application of resistivity 
and seismic survey have been demonstrated for example in geotechnical investigations 
(Ronczka et al. 2017). Partially depending on methods and sensor technology, several 
different surveys can be run in same drillholes and even using same kind of sensor 
technology (magnetic and electromagnetic, thermal, and seismic), only the active source 
technology and receiver tool would be different. With permanent installations, either all 
relevant sensors would need to be installed in a drillhole chain at same time, different 
drillholes prepared for separate sensors, or space be separated for supplementary 
survey run. 
Each of possible geophysical technique would benefit or require use of baseline survey, 
where the repeat measurements would be compared. Forward modeling to understand 
relevant responses would be necessary. Any active survey technique needs to be 
supported by land use analysis and for example hydrogeological and seismic network 
monitoring. Existing surveys using active measurement techniques do not have a 
complete coverage of baseline investigations covering the whole of the site. To be used 
for comparisons, such baseline data should need to be produced for more limited 
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coverage near the target area, or at the implementation of a monitoring (alarm) 
network. This means that application of any of the methods for design information 
verification, would rely on comparing of the reported layout of tunnels to measurement 
observations, or to carry out several survey campaigns during time, where the previous 
(first) survey results would serve as baseline. 
In case an undeclared activity or deviation from design information would be detected, a 
procedure would be needed how to handle the occurrence. Alarm threshold for each 
observation class would be necessary to be defined. Should the event require 
counterchecking to revive trust on absence of deviatory activities, specific detailed 
inspection in the tunnel, or other, remains to be designed. Inspections may rely on 
already available monitoring network, using for example the ongoing excavation and 
construction work as a source of seismic signal. Would the existing microseismic 
network be adequate for receiver station coverage or requiring to be supplemented by 
denser receiver array, remains a topic for further considerations. Application of 
construction work as a seismic source is an existing technology. Example of feasible 
survey and processing technique are presented by Nagra (Blümling et al. 1990), 
Tsavaras et al. (2008), Amberg (Krüger et al. 2009) and Pöyry (Chwatal et al. 2011) in 
their different applications. 
Active geophysical survey can be used at different geometries and in various stages of 
disposal as remote sensing of the rock volume surrounding the repository. GPR can be 
applied for DIV during operation, at close 0 – 10 m range from tunnel wall and floor, to 
detect undeclared engineered spaces. GPR reflection measurement is quick to 
implement, cost effective, and does not require specialist driven planning or 
implementation, taken that serious range limitations will be considered. Alternatives for 
GPR at similar, or slightly deeper range are other electromagnetic methods and electrical 
sounding (tomography), which have less resolution. Seismic reflection methods from 
tunnel have significantly larger distance range up to 100 m, but the design and 
implementation of method is slower, more expensive and requires high expertise. Each 
of the methods would rely on repeat surveys to detect undeclared activities. Application 
of any of the tunnel-based measurements near the target is not possible after backfilling 
and closure of the site because measurement requires access to the close distance from 
target on tunnel surfaces. 
An early warning detection system outside of the repository would rely on passive 
seismic network in detection of excavation activities, and some combination of 
campaigns or permanently installed geophysical detection network. This network would 
need to be installed outside of the disposal site volume. Borehole radar has short, 20 – 
40 m range around boreholes. Seismic reflection method can be run from ground 
surface, and resolution can be enhanced with borehole receivers, which can provide 
information at 100-200 m range around the boreholes. Passive recording systems, 
applying environmental noise, may be used as a signal at least partly to support 
application of active source. Each of possible geophysical technique would benefit or 
require use of baseline survey, where the repeat measurements would be compared.  
Table 4-1. Remote sensing active geophysical methods and their application possibilities for safeguards. 
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5 – 10 m 
from tunnel 
surfaces 
½ days 1 - 2 k€ Already considered as a 
method. Frequencies 100 
MHz to 2.6 GHz. Lower 
frequencies require 
development in tunnel 
application. Range limited 
by rock mass electrical 
conductivity. Not 
applicable through 
shotcrete. Baseline relying 
on design information. 














potential. 20…250 MHz. 
Underground drillholes 
may not be available. 
Post closure 20-50 m from 
drillhole in 
Olkiluoto 
1/2 day 10-20 k€ 20/60 MHz. Drilling of 








80 m) from 
tunnel or 
drillhole 
1 h 1 k€ Detection of voids. May 
benefit of baseline survey 
and comparison to repeat. 









1 h 1 k€ Detection of magnetic 














1 h 1 k€ Detection of conductive 
support structures or 
excavation machinery 








Detection of conductive 
support structures or 
excavation machinery. 
Large (powerful) source 







20-30 m from 
tunnel 
surface 
1 day 4 k€ Detection of conductive 
support structures. 
Weaker resolution than 
with reflection methods 
 Post closure 
from surface 
c. 100 m max ½ day 2 k€ Resolution can be 
enhanced with drillhole 
recording or crosshole 
array. 
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to avoid ringing. Land 
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array (VSP) more cost 
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sources, limited coverage. 
Can be used as 
combination of 2D/3D 
ground survey. 
Permanent, dense receiver 
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Nuclear safeguards are requested to timely confirm non-diversion of any significant 
quantity of nuclear (fissionable) materials from civil inventories for preparation of 
nuclear explosives or to any other unknown purposes. Traditional safeguards measures 
have included bookkeeping of nuclear materials, frequent checking, and uninterrupted 
monitoring. Geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel is setting challenge to these 
measures.  
After applying containment and surveillance (C/S) for tracking the route of fuel to 
emplacement and keeping continuity of knowledge (CoK) there will be no direct control 
of the materials or that of the containers. Therefore, indirect methods have been 
proposed to safeguard the repository. The “Role of Geophysics” in safeguarding 
geological repositories has been discussed over the years, since they provide 
information about the suitability for disposal, i.e., fracturing in the site geology. These 
methods can also confirm the absence of undeclared tunnels or rock spaces at the site-
dependent detection range of a specific method. They also can detect deviations from the 
reported repository design. In addition, repeated surveys or monitoring can reveal 
changes in the rock mass and thus provide alarms about undeclared activities. 
The design information delivered by operator and verified accordingly may offer an 
opportunity to provide credible assurance on absence of undeclared activities in the 
facility. Frequent design information verification (DIV) works as confidence building on 
that during operation, there would be no breaching of integrity of repository boundaries. 
Definition of such a boundary is one of critical future questions. After closure of 
repository, maintenance of a historical information on repository would become an 
issue. Any comparisons would be based on existing information about the layout. 
Monitoring at the repository provides concrete means to detect possibility of undeclared 
activities. Possibility of early detection is likely to deter an attempt to diversion of spent 
fuel. The microseismic monitoring will serve in detecting and localizing excavation by 
drill and blast method, and noise generated by full face boring machinery. Other 
monitoring measures like hydraulic head measurement, electrical energy application 
monitoring, etc. can provide warning on occurrence of undeclared activity. Monitoring, 
however, does not provide information on shape and size of excavations related to 
potential undeclared underground activities.  
Geophysical surveys during spent nuclear fuel disposal site characterization would 
initially serve as source of geotechnical data, used for geological description, related 
geometric models, and parameter data. The data can be further used in site 
understanding and for baseline information in later safeguards-relevant similar 
activities. Geophysical surveys can be used in design information verification best in case 
the interpretations would be compared to known design, which would be verified before 
bedrock support means like steel bolt or mesh, or concrete liner installation. Ground 
penetrating radar (GPR) from tunnel surfaces using 100 – 400 MHz frequency would 
apply from areas which are not covered by a liner, and in Olkiluoto conditions could be 
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applied to distances of 5 – 10 m from rock face. GPR is a cost effective, rapid and a 
method easily implemented by small crew of personnel, using industry standard tools, 
and not requiring highly skilled operator in design and implementation. Lower 20 – 60 
MHz frequency drillhole radar has greater range of investigation. Deeper penetrating 
(lower 10 – 50 MHz frequency band) GPR application is sensitive to interference from 
tunnel surfaces and installations and would need development work to be used 
successfully. 
Reflection seismic soundings using different survey geometries can be used also at areas 
which are covered by metal reinforced concrete liner or other support structure. 
However, designing and running seismic survey in tunnel conditions, and making an 
interpretation of the results, is a demanding expert task, and tools, though commercially 
available, are both bulky and demanding to be handled properly. Measurements for a 
100 – 300 m tunnel section with preparations can take time of working week and cost 
several tens to several hundreds of thousands of euros. However, properly conducted 
seismic reflection survey can be used to detect an undeclared tunnel to distances of 
more than 100 m from the survey location. Seismic survey needs a contact to 
investigated medium. Coverage of the survey needs to be carefully considered in design 
and processing. Interference from tunnel generated waveforms would need also special 
attention to be suppressed from the results. Critical issue would be also considerations 
on false or true alarm threshold: what is seen in imaging and deemed potentially 
deviatory, and what could not be detected. 
Other geophysical survey techniques with moderate resolution and depth range, capable 
to detect tunnel or void, or related machinery and installations, would be gravimetric 
profile measurement, magnetic profile measurement, electrical sounding or 
electromagnetic profile measurement or sounding. Each of these methods is slower and 
more costly than GPR, imply lower resolution, but deeper penetration, and would be 
more cost effective than a full seismic survey. These surveys have smaller range of 
investigation and less resolution than seismic reflection method. Neither of these 
surveys can detect actual location of a tunnel directly but require forward modeling to 
resolve and understand the results. To avoid risk of false alarm caused by anomalies 
from existing tunnels or natural, already existing sources, a baseline and repeat type of 
survey would be most feasible. 
Any of these methods cannot be applied effectively after the closure of the repository 
from greater distances, as the distance compared to size of potential objects would be 
too long, and thereafter resolution of the adjacent objects too poor to detect would there 
be new objects compared to existing data.  
Some of the geophysical methods can be applied remotely but from close range (that is, 
neighboring tunnel section), to indicate presence of anomalous object associated with 
emplaced capsule, though a favorable indicative electrical, GPR or seismic anomaly 
cannot be considered as a proof of presence of capsule. Also, a false negative 
observation, that there would not be an undeclared tunnel near the disposal volume, 
cannot be completely certain in any circumstances. 
In case the design information verification shows relevant differences to layout and 
construction data declared by operator, application of geophysical methods would 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Report #2008207 116 (
128) 
   
Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation   




require more complete coverage of surveys and checking of possible multiple sources of 
unknown anomalies by drilling (which may not be allowed as being a potential risk for 
repository integrity). Most if not all of anomalies would be of natural bedrock origin. 
Alternative for relying on fuzzy interpretations would be repeat surveys, checking for 
the details in results remaining unaltered between baseline and repeat.  
After closure and backfill of the repository, the geophysical methods may support the 
monitoring by assisting in control of avoiding breaching the boundary of repository (to 
be defined), if so desired. Potential design of alarm network of surveys around the 
repository would be costly and demanding exercise, though even such possibility would 
limit any attempt to diversion. Because for example the shortest length of tunnel 
towards the repository at 1:10 inclination would require over 4 km distance to be 
constructed by drill and blast or tunnel boring machine, and lasting several years, 
preparations for such activity, and operation would be recognized by surveillance of 
different activities and environmental conditions.  
Tunnel preparation might be detected with electricity consumption, electromagnetic 
interference caused by machinery, or transport and storage of residual materials. 
Interference of local environmental conditions, for example in the sea water quality, may 
also reveal large non-reported underground construction work. A legal, purposeful 
excavation activity would require permitting and environmental impact assessment, 
which would be easily detected and understood already in design stage. Clandestine 
operation is unlikely to remain unnoticed. 
In case these are not adequate proofing for what, geophysical soundings may detect the 
prepared tunnel, or absence thereof, by ground surface based seismic, electrical, or 
electromagnetic methods while closer than 50 – 100 m to the ground surface. Deeper 
than that, and closer to the repository boundary, implementation of geophysical surveys 
would require cross drillhole or drillhole to surface surveys and instrumentation. 
Instrumentation can be constructed to be permanent and data acquisition and 
processing at least partly automatized. 
Seismic surveys between drillholes and between surface and drillholes have best 
detection capabilities, because the range is longest, radially up to 200 m from drillhole, 
the boreholes can be instrumented with optical fibre as elastic wave field receiver, and 
environmental noise can be partly used as source signal. Together with interferometric 
data processing and supplementing with timely repeated active source campaigns, 
survey could be applied for long term safeguards approach post repository closure. 
Other drillhole based detection of changes, like thermal, magnetic, or hydrogeological, 
are cheaper to implement and operate, though having shorter range and lower accuracy, 
and would need repeat surveys or permanently installed multiple sensors. Gravimetric 
survey, drillhole radar and electromagnetic surveys would require repeated drillhole 
measurements at specific time intervals or on demand, as installation of multiple 
permanent sensors of excessive cost and limited commercial availability would not be 
cost effective and feasible. 
Any other method than seismic survey, like drillhole radar in Olkiluoto conditions, would 
require closer drillhole spacing in surveillance network and significantly adding up 
related preparing and operational costs. Range of drillhole radar would not exceed 50 m 
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around the drillhole. Other geological environments, like salt formations, or electrically 
highly resistive granitic host rock, would be more favorable for drillhole radar to apply. 
Similar 50 m range for indicative detection and localization of changes in rock volume 
would be achieved by drillhole magnetometry for magnetized (iron containing) 
machinery or tunnel reinforcement, thermal logging for construction and ventilation 
caused temperature changes, drillhole electromagnetic sounding to detect electrically 
conductive tools and installations, or drillhole gravity to detection of voids. 
Hydrogeological groundwater pressure monitoring can be used to sense attempt of 
intrusion from even longer distances. 
 
The drillholes required for measurements could be prepared to safe distance from 
repository as not to breach the integrity of repository and thus endanger the long-term 
nuclear safety, and preferably placed towards potential directions of intrusion. Problems 
related to of this kind of drillholes include that there needs to be some instance who 
would propose, place, and prepare these. Also, funding would be necessary if excess 
drillholes would be prepared. In worst case the repository hosting volume would need to 
be completely encircled with such an array. Geophysical “alarm fence” around repository 
would consist of for example 30 boreholes at 400 m spacing, 600 m deep each, at 2 km 
radius from the centre of the repository. This would be significantly contradictory to 
requirement of cost efficient, easily implemented safeguards-relevant survey method 
requiring minimal special expertise involvement, but bare existence of such possibility 
would be adequate to suppress attempt to intentionally breach repository integrity from 
outside of repository perimeter. 
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